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Abstract 
 
Cognitive neuroscience has been examining consciousness associated with the subject, that is 
the self of the conscious experience and its related multisensory processing of bodily signals, 
the so-called bodily self-consciousness. Different line of research has highlighted the concept 
of the autobiographical self in memory and the associated autonoetic consciousness, that is the 
human ability to mentally travel in time. The subjective re-experiencing of past episodes is 
often described as re-living them from a viewpoint and location that is similar to the initial 
encoding. In the first part of my thesis, I have studied how self-relevant bodily cues and personal 
memories influence our sense of self. In the second part, I have examined how the self is 
involved in spontaneous thoughts. Through a collection of four studies, I will argue here that it 
is possible to explore the underlying characteristics of self-consciousness and its relation to 
bodily signals and memory by a number of cognitive neuroscience approaches, including virtual 
reality (VR), electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). First, I investigated how the presence or absence of multisensory bodily cues influences 
long-term episodic autobiographical memory by using immersive VR environment. Second, I 
examined the underlying brain mechanisms of bodily-self and autobiographical-self by 
combining a meta-analytical approach with recent fMRI results from (a) patients suffering with 
out-of-body experiences and (b) healthy participants with induced illusory states of bodily self. 
Third, I explored how the immersive VR technology can be used to selectively and retroactively 
strengthen episodic autobiographical memory. Fourth, I examined whether it is possible to 
capture the inner, self-relevant conscious thoughts and record them with both fMRI and EEG 
methods. The results from my thesis indicate that (a) the bodily cues fundamentally influence 
the autobiographical memory and (b) it is possible to manipulate the self-related nature of 
conscious thoughts. I will discuss my findings with reference to current understanding of 
bodily-self, autobiographical-self and their links to theories of self-consciousness. Finally, 
based on my results, I will suggest what should be the following, future step towards memory 
prosthesis. 
 
Key words: self-consciousness, episodic autobiographical memory, bodily self, first-person 
perspective, virtual reality, EEG, fMRI 
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Résumé 
 
Les neurosciences cognitives ont examiné la conscience associée au sujet, c'est-à-dire le soi de 
l'expérience consciente et son traitement multisensoriel connexe des signaux corporels, appelée 
la conscience de soi corporelle. Différents axes de recherche ont mis en évidence le concept de 
soi autobiographique dans la mémoire et la conscience autonoétique associée, c'est-à-dire la 
capacité humaine à voyager mentalement dans le temps. La ré-expérience subjective des 
épisodes passés est souvent décrite comme une revivification à partir d'un point de vue et d'un 
emplacement similaire à l'encodage initial. Dans la première partie de ma thèse, j'ai étudié 
l'influence des indices corporels et des souvenirs personnels sur notre identité. Dans la 
deuxième partie, j'ai examiné comment le soi est impliqué dans les pensées spontanées. À 
travers un ensemble de quatre études, je soutiendrai ici qu’il est possible d’explorer les 
caractéristiques sous-jacentes de la conscience de soi et de sa relation avec les signaux corporels 
et la mémoire par un certain nombre d’approches neuroscientifiques cognitives, notamment la 
réalité virtuelle (VR), l’électroencéphalographie (EEG) et imagerie par résonance magnétique 
fonctionnelle (IRMf). Tout d'abord, j'ai étudié l'influence de la présence ou de l'absence 
d'indices corporels multisensoriels sur la mémoire autobiographique épisodique à long terme 
en utilisant un environnement immersif en réalité virtuelle. Deuxièmement, j'ai examiné les 
mécanismes cérébraux sous-jacents du soi corporel et du soi autobiographique en combinant 
une approche méta-analytique avec les résultats récents d'IRMf de (a) patients souffrant 
d'expériences hors du corps et (b) de participants sains présentant des états illusoires induits de 
soi corporel. Troisièmement, j'ai exploré comment la technologie immersive de réalité virtuelle 
peut être utilisée pour renforcer sélectivement et rétroactivement la mémoire autobiographique 
épisodique. Quatrièmement, j’ai examiné s’il était possible de capturer les pensées conscientes 
internes importantes pour l’autosuffisance et de les enregistrer à la fois avec les méthodes IRMf 
et EEG. Les résultats de ma thèse indiquent que (a) les indices corporels influencent 
fondamentalement la mémoire autobiographique et (b) il est possible de manipuler la nature 
liée à soi des pensées conscientes. Je discuterai de mes découvertes en me référant à la 
compréhension actuelle du soi corporel, du soi autobiographique et de leurs liens avec les 
théories de la conscience de soi. Enfin, sur la base de mes résultats, je suggérerai quelle devrait 
être la prochaine étape vers la prothèse de mémoire. 
 
Mots-Clés: conscience de soi, mémoire autobiographique épisodique, moi corporel, 
perspective à la première personne, réalité virtuelle, EEG, IRMf 
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1? Introduction 
Consciousness is everything that we subjectively experience, referred to as qualia, i.e. the 
qualitative feeling within an experience (e.g., listening to music or feeling a pain) (Tononi et 
al., 2016). The conscious experience of self-related events is perceived as embodied, i.e. our 
physical body is a central object surrounded by a world. We observe the world from an inside 
view-point of our body (Mach, 1897). Self-consciousness, which defines the self as a subject 
of conscious experience (Damasio, 1999), originates at different levels from a simple (i.e. the 
minimal level of unconscious experience) to a complex phenomenon (i.e. the core self and the 
autobiographical self). Central to episodic autobiographical memory is autonoetic 
consciousness, i.e. the subjective feeling of re-living the past and mentally travelling back in 
time (Tulving, 1985). In my thesis, I will argue that the underlying aspects of self-consciousness 
and its relation to memory and body can be studied by using a number of cognitive neuroscience 
approaches, including virtual reality (VR), electroencephalography (EEG) and functional 
magnetic resonance (fMRI).   
 
An essential aspect of consciousness is its link with a self, that is the subject of conscious 
experience. The minimal level of conscious experience, the core consciousness, occurs while 
the brain continuously builds a mental representation of the minimal sense of self, the core self, 
caused by an interaction with internal or external stimuli (Damasio, 1999). The association 
between the particular body-representation in the brain and the subject of an experience has 
been investigated neuroscientifically (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Blanke and 
Metzinger (2009) proposed that a minimal sense of self is centered on the integration of 
multisensory bodily processing (e.g. vision, touch, proprioception, vestibular and visceral 
signals) in the brain. We experience the world with an egocentric perspective and from a 
physical location of the body. “The body is always there” as highlighted by William James 
(1890), the pioneering psychologist and philosopher.  
 
Conscious experience is not always bound to here and now. What did you eat for breakfast 
yesterday? Where do you have to go today? When is your meeting tomorrow? The human mind 
is able to detach itself from the present moment and mentally travel to the past or imagine the 
future. As defined by Damasio (1999), the autobiographical self represents a mental state 
derived from the retrieval of self-relevant memories. No scene captures the human ability to re-
experience past event better than the well-known Marcel Proust’s “madeleine moment”. 
Struggling to remember details of his childhood, Marcel tastes a petite madeleine soaked in 
? ???
lime-blossom tea “... and suddenly the memory revealed itself. The taste was that of the little 
piece of madeleine…had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it. And all from my cup of 
tea.” Endel Tulving (1985) associated the subjective possibility to mentally travel in time with 
autonoetic consciousness, i.e. the conscious self-experience in the subjective sense of time. The 
mental time travel relies on episodic autobiographical memory, which allows humans to 
mentally detach themselves from a current self-location and consciously identify themselves at 
another particular place and time.  
 
In order to examine the cognitive, behavioral mechanisms operating during self-consciousness, 
it is essential to better understand the neuronal mechanisms underlying them. “As we take a 
general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first is this different 
pace of its parts. Like a bird’s life, it seems to be made of an alternation of flights and 
perchings.” As William James (1890) pointed out, even though self-consciousness seems to be 
continuous as a stream of water, in fact it is composed of “perchings”, representing brain states 
with its specific mental contents, and “brief flights”, representing the fast transitions between 
mental states. Lehmann et al. (1987) suggested that these short-lasting mental states are 
represented by stable global patterns of electrophysiological brain activity, which they called 
the “microstates of cognition” or “atoms of thoughts”. 
 
My thesis tries to answer these key questions: 
 
Using VR: What are the fundamental functional and anatomical connections between 
episodic autobiographical memory and the sense of bodily-self? 
 
Using EEG and fMRI: Can we capture the spatiotemporal dynamics of large-scale brain 
networks associated with episodic autobiographical memory? 
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1.1? Self-relevant memories 
The relation between the sense of self and episodic autobiographical memory lies at the core of 
our understanding of consciousness. One’s autobiographical memories and sense of self are 
closely related. The self, i.e. the mental processes that create the subjective feeling that defines 
us as unique human beings, is a critical component of consciousness (Damasio, 2003). Memory 
is necessary for everything we do and provides continuity from one moment to another. 
Memory creates our conscious sense of identity, which we construct based on self-relevant past 
events. The relation between the sense of self, autobiographical memory and consciousness 
captivated philosophers and thinkers for centuries (Descartes, 1637; James, 1890; Locke, 1690) 
and has engaged neuroscientists until this day (Damasio, 1999; Klein, 2016; Prebble et al., 
2012; Svoboda, 2009). We are still far from a clear understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
and associations between consciousness, self and memory. Yet, the story of patient H.M., 
arguably the most influential case study in the history of neuroscience, answered more questions 
about memory, self-consciousness and its underlying brain mechanisms than the entire previous 
century of scientific research.  
 
1.1.1? The role of the self in autobiographical memory 
Henry Molaison, patient H.M., became amnesic after his surgery, which involved a bilateral 
medial temporal lobe (MTL) resection to ease his epilepsy (Scoville and Milner, 1957). 
Unexpectedly, even though the targeted resection of the MTL structures helped to treat his 
epilepsy, patient H.M. at the age of 27 lost the ability to form new memories. One of the 
fundamental characteristics of the normally functioning human brain is its ability to acquire 
new information from experience and retain it in memory over time (Kandel, 2001). Patient 
H.M. was left only with his past, particularly the general knowledge that he had acquired before 
his surgery. It is meaningful to characterize memories by the length of information retention as  
James (1890) described “The first point to be noticed is that for a state of mind to survive in 
memory it must have endured for a certain length of time.” Indeed, the temporal component of 
memory is one of its essential characteristics (Dudai, 2004). Patient H.M. could not transfer 
most of the newly acquired information into his long-term memories, however his short-term 
memory was intact. Remarkably, James (1890) was the first one who theoretically distinguished 
between two types of memories, which he called primary and secondary memories. James wrote 
about the primary memory, which is equivalent to the short-term memory, that “the stream of 
thought flows on; but most of its segments fall into the bottomless abyss of oblivion. Of some, 
no memory survives the instant of their passage.” By contrast, secondary memory, which is 
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equivalent to long-term memory, James defined as “the knowledge of a former state of mind 
after it has already once dropped from consciousness; or rather it is the knowledge of an event, 
or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that 
we have thought or experienced it before.” The clinical case of patient H.M. confirmed William 
James’s theoretical assumptions that short- and long-term memories depend on separate 
cognitive mechanisms. Patient H.M. had to depend on his short-term memory in his everyday 
life. He was able to speak in fluent sentences and answer any instantaneous questions. However, 
he could not integrate his current thoughts with his past memories.  
 
Neuroscientists gained new insights from the case H.M., which allowed to classify memories 
into specific cognitive processes. The long-term memory of patient H.M., especially memory 
of past self-related episodes was impaired. Yet, he was for example able to draw a spatial map 
of his house without any conscious recollection of doing so. The pioneering work of Brenda 
Milner (1962) with patient H.M. lead to the conceptualization of long-term memory into two 
distinct systems: (a) non-declarative, so-called implicit memory, which does not require 
conscious awareness in order to learn a new information (e.g., biking) and (b) declarative, so-
called explicit memory, which relies on the conscious awareness of the acquired knowledge. 
Declarative memory is further divided into episodic memory, which is accompanied by a 
subjective feeling of retrieving details of experienced episodes (e.g., “What did you eat for 
breakfast this morning?”) and semantic memory, which consists of general facts (e.g., “What 
is the capital of Czech Republic?”). Patient H.M. was important for the understanding of the 
types memories that function within and outside of conscious awareness. Patient H.M. could 
learn implicitly, without using explicit retrieval processes and without consciously recollecting 
the learning process. 
 
Memories are not static (Dudai et al., 2015). They continuously change with gained experience 
throughout a person’s life. However, to make the scientific study of memory well-controlled 
and objectively measurable, cognitive neuroscience researchers further divided declarative 
memory into discrete stages. This artificial division is an obvious simplification, but a necessary 
one as it allows to examine and describe any specific details within each form and stage of 
memory independently. Encoding, consolidation and retrieval are commonly studied using 
separate experimental designs in the laboratory settings. Yet in real life, memory is a set of 
dynamic, integrated processes including encoding, consolidation and retrieval, which occur 
constantly and simultaneously (e.g., an exposure to a familiar stimulus may simultaneously 
induce memory encoding and retrieval) (Ben-Yakov et al., 2014). Understanding the basic parts 
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of memory formation is essential to construct these parts into a coherent story. The case of 
patient H.M. initiated decades of research exploring the behavioral and neural processes within 
each of the memory stages. The first stage is encoding, during which an information is 
perceived and attended for the first time (Fig. 1A). Patient H.M. had no problem encoding 
information; his deficit was in consolidating, storing and later retrieving facts and events. 
Memory consolidation is a process during which an initial experience is transformed into a 
long-term memory and re-organized over dispersed brain circuits (Dudai et al., 2015) (Fig. 1B). 
The possibility of memory retrieval is a consequence of efficient memory encoding and 
consolidation. It is the process by which one may access an information from the past event in 
the present moment in order to re-experience it again (Fig. 1C). Patient H.M. could recall 
information that he had consolidated and stored before his surgery. Yet, he could not integrate 
the old memory with information from his present life. 
 
 
Figure 1. Stages of Memory. A. Encoding is the first stage of memory formation. Once we obtain the 
information from the environment, the information is coded and organized. B. Consolidation is the 
time-dependent process that determines which of the newly encoded experiences will be preserved into 
long-term memories. During this stage, memory undergoes a storage process that strengthen memory 
traces over time. C. Retrieval is the process of accessing information from our past experiences, 
bringing them together with our present experiences. Memory retrieval is the process that reflects both 
encoding and consolidation. During this stage, the qualitative characteristics of memory, e.g. enhancing 
subjective sense of remembering, may be modified.  
 
1.1.2? Autonoetic Consciousness and Mental Time Travel 
In experimental settings, different types and stages of memory have been studied using distinct 
tasks and measures. Astonishingly, when tested on memory recognition task (i.e. participants 
are instructed to categorize old and new stimuli) in a laboratory setting, the performance of 
patient H.M. was impaired after 1 and 3 days, but became similar to healthy control participants 
after one week (Freed et al., 1987). In more detail, patient H.M. saw 120 complex pictures 
illustrating nature, people and animals in 4 blocks of 30 pictures each for 20 seconds compared 
to participants in the control group who saw each picture for 1 second only. The rate of patient 
H.M.’s forgetting was tested during following recognition task after 10 minutes, 1 day, 3 days 
and a week. On each recognition trial, he had to choose between 2 pictures and answer the 
question “Is this an old or new picture?”. Patient H.M. had permanently impaired long term 
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memory, yet surprisingly he showed normal forgetting comparable to healthy controls on this 
laboratory-based, picture-recognition task (Corkin, 2013). This finding was an exception, 
which stood in a contrast to other studies, which show that recognition memory is defective 
after MTL damage (Reed et al., 1997). Thus, there is no doubt that recognition memory is 
impaired after MTL damage. However, already James (1890) suggested that recognition of 
stimuli which one has seen before may be constructed by two separable memory processes, the 
so-called recollection and familiarity: “I enter a friend’s room and see on the wall a painting. 
At first I have the strange, wondering consciousness, ‘surely I have seen that before,’ but when 
or how does not become clear. There only clings to the picture a sort of penumbra of familiarity, 
- when suddenly I exclaim: “I have it, it is a copy of part of one of the Fra Angelicos in the 
Florentine Academy - I recollect it there!” Recent neuroscientific research (Yonelinas and 
Jacoby, 2012) have provided an experimental support to James’s theoretical assumptions that 
two distinct memory retrieval processes underlie memory recognition. In one of the first 
experimental, laboratory-based studies, participants were asked to memorize 60 words 
(Atkinson and Juola, 1974). In a following recognition test, participants saw one word at a time 
and had to decide whether they had previously memorized it or not. While recollection reflects 
a conscious, effortful search for stored memory, familiarity represents a vague feeling of 
remembering. The surprising results from testing patient H.M. on the lab-based memory 
recognition task not only confirmed the so-called dual-process theories (Jacoby, 1991; 
Yonelinas, 1994), but also suggested that they are processed by independent brain circuits. The 
distinction between familiarity and recollection helped the cognitive neuroscientists to 
understand the ability of patient H.M. to recognize complex pictures up to 6 months after 
encoding, while he was not able to retrieve anything from his everyday life. When patient H.M. 
saw pictures of complex scenes, he recognized them based on his sense of familiarity without 
explicitly recalling having seen them. The declarative memory of patient H.M. was deficient 
due to the hippocampal lesions, yet he was left with a vague sense of familiarity that helped 
him to cope with his amnesia. 
 
Although the number of experiments with self-related, personal stimuli has increased (Cabeza 
et al., 2004; Schacter et al., 2011; Vogel and Schwabe, 2016), the use of personally-irrelevant, 
laboratory-based stimuli is still one of the most widely used methods in studying episodic 
memory. Importantly, the examination of patient H.M. revealed that even though he was able 
to perform well on classical, laboratory-based memory recognition tasks, his memory deficits 
were specific to autobiographical memory. In more detail, Corkin (1984) selected 36 self-
relevant photographs from patient H.M.’s childhood and the same number of unrelated-family 
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photographs were selected to test his autobiographical memory. Interestingly, patient H.M. was 
able to correctly recognize his family members, yet his performance showed that he answered 
differently from healthy participants. When asked about family vacation, most of us can recall 
vivid moments with multisensory details, including smells, sounds, and sensory description. 
Patient H.M. constructed his responses primarily on the general, semantic autobiographical 
knowledge about his family, but he could not consciously re-live any of the past events. Tulving 
(1972) theoretically distinguished the declarative memory into episodic (Fig. 2A) and semantic 
(Fig. 2B) memories based on their distinct states of consciousness.  
 
 
Figure 2. Declarative memory sub-systems based on distinct states of consciousness. Declarative, 
explicit memory contains two sub-groups: A. Episodic memory, which is accompanied by a subjective 
feeling of retrieving personally experienced episodes and B. Semantic memory, which consists of facts 
and general knowledge. It is possible to distinguish declarative memory based on distinct states of 
consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness (self-engagement in the memory accompanied by contextual 
details “what”, “where”, “when”, how”) underlies episodic memory and noetic consciousness (without 
details of the encoded episode) is associated with semantic memory. Furthermore, remembering is 
related to specific details of episodic memory, while knowing is without specific recollection of the past 
episode. Recollection is a conscious, effortful search for stored memory associated with rich, vivid 
memories, while familiarity represents the vague feeling of knowing.  
 
Autonoetic consciousness characterizes episodic memory, which allows one to know what 
happened in the past and remember specific past events. In fact, it requires to move from the 
representation of past experiences to self-engagement in the experiences. To mentally travel in 
time to meaningfully connect the past self with the present self is the core of episodic 
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autobiographical memory. Noetic consciousness characterizes semantic memory which 
underlies an explicit knowledge about the world, general concepts and facts. Based on the 
theoretical distinction between autonoetic vs. noetic consciousness, Tulving (1985) developed 
an experimental remember/know paradigm. This paradigm relies on participants’ reports 
regarding their subjective state of awareness during memory retrieval tasks. Remembering has 
been related to the episodic autobiographical memory (i.e. stimuli evoke a specific memory for 
the episodic setting in which they were experienced), while the semantic autobiographical 
memory is accompanied by the sense of knowing (i.e. the stimuli is experienced without a 
specific recollection of a past episode). Tulving’s classification of declarative memory into 
episodic and semantic is the basis on which to differentiate between recollection and familiarity. 
 
1.1.3? Parietal regions and the subjective experience of remembering 
Numerous fMRI studies investigated the episodic memory and identified the core memory 
network, comprising enlarged activity primarily in the hippocampus, the medial prefrontal 
cortex and the angular gyrus (Levine et al., 2004; Schacter et al., 2012; Svoboda et al., 2006). 
These neural components of episodic memory are crucial in order to retrieve the conscious past 
experiences and any damage to this network may have fundamental consequences to everyday 
life (Scoville and Milner, 1957; Steinvorth et al., 2005). Since the discovery of patient H.M.’s 
amnesia due to MTL damage (Scoville and Milner, 1957), neuroscientists have investigated the 
critical role of these brain structures in contributing to conscious memories. Examining the 
effects of brain lesion on mental functions revealed that particular brain regions are necessary 
for distinct cognitive functions. Recently, studies investigating memory in patients with lateral 
parietal lesions (Ben-Zvi et al., 2015; Berryhill et al., 2007; Levy, 2012; Simons et al., 2010) 
suggest that the ventral posterior parietal cortex (specifically, the angular gyrus and the 
temporoparietal junction) shows an increased activity for retrieval of episodic autobiographical 
memory associated with rich and vivid episodic details (i.e. recollection). Although lateral 
parietal lesion patients can successfully retrieve episodic memories, the vividness and 
confidence in the self-related memories is weakened (Berryhill et al., 2007; Simons et al., 
2010). These results imply that the angular gyrus of the parietal lobe plays a key role in the 
subjective experience of retrieving multisensory episodic autobiographical memory 
(Moscovitch et al., 2016; Simons et al., 2010) (Fig. 3). 
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Figure 3. Episodic Autobiographical Memory Network. The quantitative activation likelihood (ALE) 
meta-analysis (Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012; Turkeltaub et al., 2012) of 41 episodic autobiographical 
memory studies showed bilateral activations in the angular gyrus and the left superior temporal gyrus. 
Activations were found in cortical midline structures, i.e. bilaterally in the posterior cingulate cortex and 
left anterior cingulate cortex. The analysis also revealed activity bilaterally in the hippocampi and 
adjacent parahippocampal gyri and in the left inferior temporal gyrus. Other clusters were found in the 
left inferior frontal gyrus, bilaterally in superior frontal gyrus and in the left middle frontal gyrus (for 
more details see Study 2).  
 
1.2? Bodily Self Consciousness  
A key feature of consciousness is its relation with a self as the subject of conscious experience 
(Blanke, 2012). Cognitive neuroscientists have established a link between a particular body 
representation in the brain and the subject of an experience. The inner aspect of the functional 
state of human brain is the subjective, first-person experience of consciousness. We experience 
the world with an egocentric, first-person perspective (1PP) of the physical body, which we feel 
as our own (Blanke, 2012; Blanke et al., 2015; Mach, 1897). Neuroscience-based investigations 
of self-consciousness emphasized that the sense of embodiment/bodily self-consciousness 
essentially relies on the accurate integration of body-related, multimodal information (e.g. 
vision, touch, proprioception, vestibular and visceral signals) and the sense of agency, i.e. the 
subjective experience of being responsible for one’s own actions. Blanke and Metzinger (2009) 
identified three fundamental aspects of the bodily self-consciousness: a. self-identification/body 
ownership (i.e. the experience of owning a body), b. self-location (i.e. the experience of being 
a physical body in a given location) and c. first person perspective (i.e. perspective on the 
environment). 
  
1.2.1? Experimental illusory states of bodily self 
The multisensory brain mechanisms that underlie the integration of bodily signals, the so-called 
bodily self-consciousness, create the subjective feeling of being a subject of a conscious 
experience (Blanke et al., 2015). Experimental studies on multisensory bodily processing, 
which investigate the subject (or “I”) of experience, have previously stimulated illusory states 
of bodily self-consciousness. An illusory sensation of ownership, i.e. the feeling of owning a 
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body part, can be induced by visuo-tactile manipulations on one’s own and an artificial hand, 
the so-called rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). During the experiment, 
participants are instructed to observe a rubber hand, while their own hand is out of sight. When 
both their own, hidden hand and the visible, rubber hand are stroked in synchrony, participants 
report a subjective feeling as if the rubber hand would be their own hand (Fig. 4A). During this 
experimental manipulation, the vision of the rubber hand becomes dominant over the 
proprioceptive (i.e. information about the real position of one’s own body in space) signals and 
as such results in the self-attribution of the rubber hand. The effect of the rubber hand illusion 
is most often measured with questionnaires or the proprioceptive drift (i.e. the mislocation of 
the stroked hand towards the rubber hand) (Fig. 4B).
 
 
Figure 4. The Rubber Hand Illusion. A. Participant’s left hand is out of sight and instead, the rubber 
hand is visible. The hidden own hand as well as the visible rubber hand of the participant are touched in 
synchrony. B. The synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation creates a subjective feeling that the rubber hand 
belongs to participant’s body as measured with questionnaires and the proprioceptive drift. Figure from 
Botvinick and Cohen (1998). 
 
The rubber hand illusion allows the examination not only of the multisensory integration of 
vision, touch and proprioception, but also the perception of our bodily self and body ownership. 
The recent development of robotics and virtual reality enable to experimentally study the bodily 
self as unitary entity. The full body illusions examine the behavioral and neuronal mechanisms 
beyond the ownership of body parts. In the experimental paradigm of Lenggenhager et al. 
(2007), participants saw their own virtual bodies 2 meters in front of them filmed and shown 
through a head mounted-display, while being stroked on their back (Fig. 5A). In temporally 
synchronous conditions between the seen and felt stroking (i.e. visuo-tactile synchrony), 
participants perceived the virtual body as their own (i.e. change in self-identification) and felt 
as if they were displaced towards the virtual body (i.e. change in self-location). Participants 
were then instructed to respond to questions about the state of their self-identification (Q1: How 
strong was the feeling that the body you saw was you?), illusory touch (Q2: How strong was 
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the feeling that the touch you felt was located where you saw the stroking?), self-location (Q3: 
I felt as if my body was drifting toward the virtual body), and control question (Q4: I felt my 
body as usual, nothing changed) using a 7-point scale. Additionally, the changes in self-location 
were measured by blind-folding participants, relocating them after inducing the full body 
illusion and requesting them to return to the original location.
 
Similarly, Ionta et al. (2011) applied synchronous tactile stimulation on the backs of participants 
when they were lying in the MRI scanner. Participants saw a full body figure stroked on its 
back congruently or incongruently with stroking of participants’ own back. The synchronous 
visuo-tactile stimulation induced higher self-identification towards the virtual body, as 
compared to the asynchronous condition. Interestingly, in this study, even though all of the 
participants were lying on their backs in the scanner, half of the participants experienced 
looking upward at their virtual body (i.e. “up-looking group”, 1PP) (Fig. 5B), while the other 
half of the participants had the feeling of looking down on the virtual body (i.e. “down-looking 
group”, 1PP) (Fig. 5C). Crucially, changes in 1PP were related to changes in self-location, i.e. 
up-looking participants experienced initially lower position of the self-location and a rise when 
stroked synchronously, while the down-looking participants experienced a downward drift 
associated with their self-location. The classical mental ball dropping task provided 
quantifiable measure of self-location, while the participants were lying in the scanner. During 
this task, participants were instructed to imagine holding a ball and guess how long it would 
take before the ball would touch the floor. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Full Body Illusion. A. The VR experimental setting of testing bodily-self using the 
full body illusion paradigm. Figure from Lenggenhager et al. (2007). Participants observe their own 
back with a head-mounted (HMD) display filmed from cameras located two meters behind them, while 
the experimenter applies synchronous or asynchronous stroking on the participant’s back. B. Self-
location changes were related to the experienced direction of 1PP: the up-looking group of participants 
experienced an elevation from an initially low self-location when stroked synchronously. C. The down-
looking group experienced a downward drift. Figure from Ionta et al. (2011).  
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1.2.2? Neurologically altered states of bodily self 
The self is usually experienced as a whole, located in a physical body. However, the bodily 
self-consciousness, particularly the self-identification, self-location and first-person 
perspective, may be altered in patients suffering from particular neurological conditions 
(Critchley, 1950).  Altered states of bodily self-consciousness depend on the disintegration of 
multisensory (e.g., visual, proprioceptive, and somatosensory) bodily signals. These illusory 
own body perceptions, the so-called autoscopic phenomena, comprise autoscopic hallucination, 
heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences. Patients suffering from autoscopic hallucinations 
observe their own body in an extra-personal space, but they perceive themselves to be located 
in their physical body (Fig. 6A). Thus, their sense of location and first-person perspective (1PP) 
remains intact. Patients suffering with heautoscopy observe their own body in an extra personal 
space and the subjective sense of self-location shifts between their physical body and their 
double (Fig. 6B). Patients suffering with out-of-body experiences subjectively feel as if they 
are out of their physical body, which they observe from an elevated, third person perspective 
(3PP) (Fig. 6C).  
 
Figure 6. Autoscopic phenomena model. A. Autoscopic hallucination patients observe their own 
body in an extra-personal space, but they perceive themselves to be located in their physical body (1PP). 
B. Heautoscopy suffering patients observe their own body in an extra personal space and the subjective 
sense of self-location shifts between their physical body and their double. C. Patients with out-of-body 
experience subjectively feel out of their own body, which they observe from an elevated, third person 
perspective (3PP). Figure from Blanke and Metzinger (2009). 
 
Interestingly, Conway et al. (2004) described case studies of patients suffering with 
posttraumatic stress disorder, who experienced intense intrusion of vividly recollected episodic 
autobiographical memories of traumatic experiences, which are often associated with changes 
in perspective. For example, an eye-witness to the terroristic 9/11 attacks consequently suffered 
with distorted flashbacks in which she saw herself (3PP) flying above the ground and observing 
the collision of the plane with the building. After several psychotherapeutic sessions, the eye-
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witness restored her original perspective (1PP). Functionally, out-of-body experiences are 
caused by abnormal integration of tactile, proprioceptive, visual and vestibular inputs (Blanke, 
2012; Pfeiffer et al., 2014). These altered states of bodily-self have directly motivated the 
development of experimental paradigms involving VR technology to test the bodily-self states 
in healthy participants.  
 
 
1.2.3? Parietal contributions to the self-location and first-person perspective 
A number of brain regions become activated during manipulations of bodily self-consciousness, 
including the hand ownership, the face ownership, self-identification or self-location (Fig. 7). 
An enhanced activity in the premotor cortex and intraparietal sulcus is related to the hand 
ownership or a hand embodiment (Graziano, 1999; Makin et al., 2008), while the activity in the 
ventral intraparietal area is associated with face-related changes in bodily-self (Apps et al., 
2015). The major brain areas associated with self-identification are within the premotor cortex-
intraparietal sulcus network, while important regions for self-location are situated in lateral 
temporo-parietal regions, including supramarginal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus and posterior 
insula and  posterior cingulate cortex (Ionta et al., 2011, 2014; Guterstam et al., 2015). 
Temporoparietal junction activity reflected changes in self-location and first-person 
perspective, which were well-matched with clinical data (Blanke et al., 2002; De Ridder et al., 
2007; Heydrich and Blanke, 2013). Patients with brain damage in this region suffer from out-
of-body experiences. It is also possible to experimentally induce such experiences in epileptic 
patients by applying 2-seconds electrical stimulation at the right angular gyrus and the superior 
temporal gyrus (Blanke et al., 2002). Anatomically, out-of-body experiences are the outcome 
of electrical brain stimulation or brain damage particularly related to the right angular gyrus.  
 
 
Figure 7. Brain areas associated with manipulations of bodily self-consciousness. Areas are 
associated with ownership for the hand (in red color: ventral and dorsal premotor cortex, PMv and PMd 
and intraparietal sulcus, IPS) or face (in blue color: ventral intraparietal area/intraparietal sulcus, 
VIP/IPS), self-identification (in green color: ventral and dorsal premotor cortex, PMv and PMd and 
intraparietal sulcus, IPS), or self-location (in yellow color: temporoparietal junction, TPJ). Figure from 
Blanke et al. (2015).  
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1.3?  Self-generated thoughts 
Inspired by Tulving’s memory studies (1985, 2002) on mental time travel and mental states of 
consciousness, neuroscience research embraced the tremendous attention paid to the resting 
brain’s activity and dramatically changed our view on mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2016; 
Fox et al., 2015; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). James (1890) pictured the wandering mind 
as “a bird’s life consisting of brief flights and perchings”.  On a neurological level, the brain is 
organized intrinsically into widespread networks, each playing an important role in our daily 
life activities. For example, the so-called default mode network purposefully engages many 
cognitive processes, enabling our minds to wander during rest (Christoff et al., 2016; Dixon et 
al., 2018; Spreng et al., 2009). In contrast, when we pay attention to an external event or carry 
out a specific task, other relevant regions of the brain become active (Christoff et al., 2009; 
Dixon et al., 2014; Stawarczyk et al., 2017). Sometimes the mind moves spontaneously from 
one thought to another, however at other times it keeps coming back to the same thought, drawn 
by a particular past event or an emotional experience. While a healthy person can easily balance 
time of rest with time of focused attention, someone suffering with a mental health issue may 
continue thinking about negative past episodes (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). To 
capture the stream of ongoing internal experiences is challenging, yet important in order to 
better comprehend the composition of healthy and pathological thoughts. 
 
1.3.1? The conscious experience of the self during rest  
Numerous neuroimaging studies have explored spontaneous neural fluctuations of ongoing 
brain dynamics occurring during rest, i.e. without any explicit task (Biswal et al., 1997; 
Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Fox and Raichle, 2007; Power et al., 2014). Resting-state functional 
connectivity explores the neural activity of functionally connected, yet anatomically distant 
regions of the brain during rest, i.e. the resting-state networks. Most of the studies have explored 
the link between resting state connectivity patterns and cognition in particular resting state 
networks, mainly in the default mode network (Buckner, 2012; Raichle, 2015). The default 
mode network was first described as de-activated during cognitive tasks (Raichle et al., 2001; 
Shulman et al., 1997). Nonetheless, many studies on cognitive mentation showed that in 
contrast to other resting state networks, the default mode network shows an increased activity 
during rest than during cognitive tasks. Internal mental processes that activate the default mode 
network have been related to the self-referential processes, memory retrieval processes, 
decision making, theory of mind and prospection (Kim, 2012, 2016; Spreng et al., 2009). 
? ???
Furthermore, this network also activates when our mind begins to wander (Andrews-Hanna et 
al., 2014; Kucyi, 2017; Kucyi and Davis, 2014). The study of Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010) 
showed that the default mode network includes two sub-networks: i.) the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex subsystem supports internally-guided cognition and includes the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex, the temporoparietal junction, the lateral temporal cortex and temporal poles. 
ii.) the medial temporal lobe subsystem enables formation of imagined scenes and includes the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the posterior inferior parietal lobule, the retrosplenial cortex, 
the parahippocampal cortex and the hippocampus. The anterior medial prefrontal cortex and 
posterior cingulate cortex represent hubs within the complex network. Several other studies 
confirmed that the default mode network does not present a unified network, but comprises 
distinct sub-systems that cooperate over hubs (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Axelrod et al., 
2017; Kim, 2012) (Fig. 8). 
 
Figure 8. The main brain areas related to the default mode network. The quantitative activation 
likelihood (ALE) meta-analysis (Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012; Turkeltaub et al., 2012) of 136 DMN 
studies showed activity in the cortical midline structures. More precisely, activity was found bilaterally 
in the ventral and dorsal parts of the posterior cingulate and bilaterally in the dorsal part of the anterior 
cingulate cortex. Activations were found in the limbic structures, i.e. bilaterally in the parahippocampal 
gyrus. Furthermore, a cluster was found in the supramarginal gyrus (Bréchet et al., unpublished results).  
 
1.3.2? Methods: fMRI resting states and cognitive task states 
Among the most often used functional connectivity techniques belongs the seed-based  analysis, 
which extracts the time-course of the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal from a 
predefined region of interest (ROI) and then identifies regions showing a significant correlation 
with that specific ROI (Arfanakis et al., 2000; Biswal et al., 1997). This time-course correlation 
analysis presents a hypothesis driven method, relying on an a priori defined ROI, i.e. the seed. 
In contrast to the model-dependent methods, the independent-component analysis (ICA) is a 
hypothesis-free technique examining multiple whole-brain connectivity patterns (Damoiseaux 
et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2009). ICA decomposes a number of spatial maps, i.e. independent 
components, from the BOLD signals. Each component presumably represents a common 
? ???
network of neural or physiological activity. Thus, ICA examines functional resting-state, 
whole-brain patterns.  
 
Spatial patterns of temporally correlated BOLD signals under resting conditions resemble 
several brain networks studied during active tasks (Bolt et al., 2017; Cole et al., 2013; 
Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Mill et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2009). These links between resting 
states of the brain and specific functional cognitive processes spark a wide attention on the 
nature of spontaneous activity (Campbell and Schacter, 2017; Davis et al., 2017; Spreng, 2012). 
Striking similarities have been discovered when comparing the spatial distributions of networks 
initiated by experimental tasks and those related to self-reported thoughts (Andrews-Hanna et 
al., 2010b; Axelrod et al., 2017; Shirer et al., 2012), generating a discussion about the mental 
activity at rest and its content (Bressler and Menon, 2010; Buckner, 2012; Christoff et al., 2016; 
Davis et al., 2017; Fox and Raichle, 2007; Kucyi et al., 2016; Power et al., 2011; Raichle, 2015; 
Spreng and Schacter, 2012).  
 
For example, Smith and colleagues (2009) explored the extent to which resting state “functional 
networks” correspond to functional networks active during explicit cognitive tasks. They 
hypothesized that a meaningful interpretation across many functional brain networks could be 
made by directly comparing co-activation networks and resting-state networks. As such, this 
study independently applied independent component analysis (ICA) to two different data sets. 
First, to resting state fMRI study of 36 subjects, second to a large database of task-active 
neuroimaging studies. They expected to find a set of functional networks as seen in resting state 
data that would closely match a set of task activation studies. This study indicated that the main 
task-based functional networks appeared to have similar organization as spontaneous resting 
state co-activation networks, such as executive control network, frontoparietal network, visual 
network or default mode network (Fig. 9). The key finding of this study implied that the 
intrinsic patterns of the resting brain may be disentangled to reveal task-based, function 
networks. 
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Figure 9. The resting state networks (left) versus large scale cognitive task networks (right). 10 
pairs of networks from 20-component ICA of rs-fcMRI (left) and functional BrainMap database (right). 
Maps A, B, C were assigned to the visual network. Map D was assigned to the default mode network, 
Map E corresponded to cerebellum, Map F corresponded to the sensorimotor network, Map G 
corresponded to the auditory network, Map H corresponded to the executive control network, Map I 
and Map J were assigned to the fronto-parietal network. Figure from Smith et al. (2009).  
 
Recently, two review articles by Campbell and Schacter (2017) and Davis et al. (2017) pointed 
to several issues regarding the explanation of resting-states. They reasoned that the extensive 
use of resting state networks in cognitive neuroscience is based on the idea that resting state 
networks define cognitive large-scale networks. However, the authors pointed out several 
problems with this assumption: i.) regions within a resting state network are often disconnected 
in different cognitive functional networks. For example, the brain regions within the default 
mode network (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), such as ACC or PCC, are often disconnected in 
cognitive tasks (Sestieri et al., 2011a). Therefore, knowing that brain regions are part of the 
same resting state network does not imply that these two brain regions will also be co-activated 
during a particular cognitive task. ii.) regions disconnected in a resting state network become 
connected in cognitive functional networks. For example, the prefrontal cortex is typically part 
of the language network (Lee, 2012) and the hippocampus is classified as part of the default 
mode network (Kim, 2011). However, these two regions become connected during memory 
encoding tasks. Therefore, the functional association between regions during a task is often 
more specific than during rest. iii.) a particular region within resting state network may have 
multiple roles in distinct cognitive functional networks. For example, the ventral parietal cortex 
is involved in attentional re-orientation, number processing, theory of mind and episodic 
memory retrieval (Cabeza et al., 2008; Sestieri et al., 2011b). Depending on the functional 
processes involved, brain regions can rapidly change patterns of functional connectivity. 
Therefore, resting states cannot explain the fast modifications in patterns of functional 
connectivity. iv.) the function of a region cannot be based on its role during rest, because it 
varies depending on its performance. For example, the core hubs of the default mode network, 
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i.e. anterior cingulate cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, become less active during episodic 
memory retrieval tasks (Rugg and Vilberg, 2013). Thus, the reviews by Campbell and Schacter 
(2017) and Davis et al. (2017) question whether resting brain activity can truly explain task-
based, functional large-scale cognitive networks. The authors argue that to achieve better 
understanding of the fundamental anatomical and cognitive functions, the resting state studies 
have to be accompanied by task-based studies. 
 
1.3.3? Methods: Spontaneous EEG microstates 
Both conscious thoughts and recall of past events occur in milliseconds (Bressler, 1995; de 
Pasquale et al., 2017; Koch et al., 2016; Tononi et al., 2016). The dynamics that underlie these 
subjective experiences have to describe the brain functioning in this brief time range. EEG 
measures the brain’s electrical activity with high temporal resolution (i.e. on the scale of 
milliseconds) and therefore might be used to investigate the temporal dynamics of mental states 
(Michel and Koenig, 2018). Lehmann and colleagues (1987) proposed that the spatial and 
temporal characteristics of resting state networks may be investigated using EEG microstate 
analysis. EEG microstates are defined as global patterns of scalp potential topographies 
recorded with multichannel EEG that dynamically change over time in an organized pattern 
(Michel and Koenig, 2018). More specifically, the brain electric activity can be measured on 
the head surface as potential fluctuations (Fig. 10A). To improve the signal to noise ratio (SNR), 
only the time points of the local maxima of the global field power (GFP), corresponding to high 
global neuronal synchronization, are used for further analysis (Fig. 10B). The broad-band 
spontaneous activity is then plotted as potential topographies, the so-called EEG maps, at any 
moment in time (Fig. 10C). The temporal sequence of topographical maps appears to be 
disorganized, however Lehmann et al. (1987) observed that the spontaneous EEG activity, 
described as scalp potential topographies stays constant for a short time, before transitioning to 
another topography. Pascual-Marqui et al. (1995) suggested a statistical investigation of the 
EEG maps’ topographies. This data-driven analytical approach is based on k-mean cluster 
analysis (Fig. 10D) that groups the EEG topographies with high spatial correlation and defines 
the descriptive topography. The cluster analysis is first calculated on the individual level, and 
second on the group level across participants. Surprisingly, only a few cluster maps explain a 
large portion of the variance of the data. Several studies that used k-mean cluster analysis 
revealed that the optimal number of clusters is 4, explaining about 65% - 85% of the global 
variance (Britz et al., 2010; Brodbeck et al., 2012). Koenig et al. (1999) initially labelled these 
4 maps as class A, B, C and D (Fig. 10E). After determining the cluster maps, the temporal 
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characteristics of microstates can be retrieved. This is achieved by computing spatial 
correlations between microstate maps identified at the group level and the map at each time 
point of each participant’s EEG. The back-fitting procedure quantifies a number of microstates’ 
parameters, such as duration (i.e. the average time a microstate was present) or the occurrence 
(i.e. how often a microstate re-occurred per second).  
 
 
Figure 10. EEG microstate analysis. A. broad-band, spontaneous EEG recording B. The red line 
indicates the peaks of the global field power (GFP) C. the GFP peaks are presented as topographical 
maps D. topographical clustering, such as k-means clustering E. the group k-mean clustering showed 4 
dominant EEG microstate topographies F. the EEG recording was characterized at each moment in time 
by the particular microstate which showed the best correlation. Based on the labelling, the microstate 
parameters were calculated: microstate duration and occurrence for each participant. Figure from 
Khanna et al. (2014).  
 
1.3.4? Approaches to measure spontaneous thoughts 
The occurrence of spontaneous, personal and inner thoughts presents a unique experimental 
challenge due to the unconstrained cognitive control (Christoff, 2012; Fox et al., 2015; Kucyi, 
2017). fMRI or EEG studies usually relate brain activity during rest to cognitive processes 
indirectly with questionnaires (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a) or by probing participants about 
their current thoughts during rest (Kucyi et al., 2016; Perogamvros et al., 2017; Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2015; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). For example, Lehmann et al. (1998) tried to relate 
EEG microstate to the ongoing mental activity. During this mind wandering study, EEG was 
recorded from 13 healthy participants at rest. Whenever the participants heard a signal, they 
were instructed to briefly report “what just went through their mind”. About 30 stimuli were 
given to each participants at random intervals during the continuous EEG recording. The self-
reports were audio recorded and independent raters classified the ongoing thoughts of 
participants as either visual-concrete thoughts (e.g., “I saw our lunch”) or abstract thoughts (“I 
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thought about the meaning of a word”). EEG microstate analysis determined significant 
topographical differences, specifically between the two classed of thoughts, that is abstract or 
concrete, in a time-dependent manner of two seconds before the prompt (Fig. 11). 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Self-reports of ongoing thoughts with EEG microstates. 30 reports of conscious 
experiences were collected during rest and categorized into visual imagery and abstract thought. Brain 
electric activity was uninterruptedly recorded and segmented into microstates. Two types of reported 
experiences (i.e. visual and abstract thoughts) were related to significant changes in duration and 
occurrence of two microstates. Figure with courtesy of C. Michel.  
 
Similarly, the fMRI study of Christoff et al. (2009) also used an experience sampling method, 
which involved irregularly probing participants to specify their current mental state and as such 
allowing an evaluation of brief changes in the content of consciousness. (Fig. 12). Interestingly, 
the authors report a simultaneous activity in default mode network and executive network at 
the same time during mind-wandering and the activity was the greatest when participants were 
unaware of mind wandering, i.e. lacking on meta-awareness (i.e. the mental state that arises 
when explicitly noticing the present content of consciousness) (Smallwood and Schooler, 
2015).  
 
 
Figure 12. Experience sampling during fMRI recordings. Participants received probes, while 
performing a go/no-go task. Participants were then asked 2 questions about their current mental state. 
First question: “Where was your attention focused just before the probe?” Second question: “How 
aware were you of where your attention was focused?”. Figure from Christoff et al. (2009). 
 
 
? ???
1.4?  Thesis outline 
The aims of this chapter is to give a short summary of the scientific articles included in the 
thesis and briefly provide the main motivation, research question, methodology and findings of 
each publication. The results are then further discussed and integrated in the Discussion section.  
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1.4.1? Viewing one’s body during encoding enhances episodic memory (study 1) 
 
Episodic autobiographical memory studies have been recently conducted using new approaches 
to (1) control for the stage of memory encoding and (2) reflect a real life-like testing outside 
the laboratory setting. For example, St. Jacques and Schacter (2013) developed a museum 
paradigm, in which participants encoded episodes while wearing a camera that automatically 
took photos. Still, these studies did not integrate participants’ physical bodies when re-testing 
the autobiographical memory of the past events. Perceiving one’s own physical body as part of 
a visual scene, such as seeing one’s own hand pointing at a painting during a museum tour, 
relies on a multisensory integration of proprioceptive, visual and tactile cues (Blanke et al., 
2015). Subjective experiences create a link between episodic autobiographical memory and 
bodily self-consciousness, which suggests that the multisensory bodily signals may also be 
relevant to the conscious re-experiencing of self-relevant, past events. In this study, we used a 
novel VR system, which allowed us to create well-controlled, real life-like scenes into which 
80 healthy participants were immersed during the initial stage of encoding and later retrieval. 
The main aim of the first experiment was to validate the VR paradigm to study episodic 
autobiographical memory in a naturalistic setting. In the second experiment, we tested whether 
the congruent multisensory bodily cues, i.e. the presence or absence of one’s own physical body 
seen from first-person perspective, would impact episodic autobiographical memory 
performance. In a third control experiment, we tested whether the body-related changes in 
memory performance were related to multisensory bodily cues or could be replaced by any 
moving control object. The experiments had one main technological and one main scientific 
objective: a.) to create episodic autobiographical memory setting in the laboratory-based 
environment using immersive VR and b.) to examine whether multisensory bodily cues, which 
were previously shown to influence self-consciousness and egocentric, first-person view 
cognition, would modulate episodic autobiographical memory. Based on previous bodily self-
consciousness work which has shown that body-related views enhance perceptual (Aspell et 
al., 2009; Noel et al., 2015) and egocentric cognitive processes (Canzoneri et al., 2016), here 
we have hypothesized that the presence of one’s physical body would enhance memory 
performance. First, we showed that the immersive VR technology allows to test real life-like 
events in a well-controlled, laboratory-based setting. Second, we demonstrated that the 
presence of one’s own physical body during encoding significantly enhances memory 
recognition and that this effect was body specific. These findings are further discussed in 
section 3.1.1. 
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1.4.2? Subjective self-experience in bodily consciousness and memory (study 2)  
 
Remembering personally experienced events in vivid, multisensory detail involves integrating 
perceptual events and selecting meaningful spatiotemporal entities from the stream of 
experience into a specific conscious representation during memory retrieval (Bonnici et al., 
2016). The subjective re-experiencing of past events is often described as re-living the past 
event from a viewpoint and location that is similar to that during encoding of the event (Nigro 
and Neisser, 1983; Rice and Rubin, 2011). Therefore, the two spatial components of bodily 
self-consciousness, the first-person perspective and self-location, are of particular relevance to 
episodic autobiographical memory (Bergouignan et al., 2014; St. Jacques et al., 2017). Studies 
of patients with lesions in the angular gyrus show that the lateral parietal cortex is critical for 
the subjective, conscious experience of retrieving multisensory episodic memories (Hower et 
al., 2014; Simons et al., 2010). Similarly, a number of  reviews discuss the function of parietal 
lobe in bodily self-consciousness (Blanke, 2012; Blanke et al., 2015). Nonetheless, it is not 
known to what extent and whether bodily self-consciousness and autobiographical memories, 
either episodic or semantic, involve distinct or similar brain regions. In this study, we examined 
whether the activations in the inferior parietal lobule as observed in the study of Ionta et al. 
(2011), which experimentally manipulated the self-location and first-person perspective aspects 
of bodily self-consciousness, may anatomically overlap with the activations related to the 
subjective conscious experience of remembering self-relevant past events. We also included 
results from a lesion analysis (Ionta et al., 2011) of nine neurological patients suffering with 
out-of-body experiences with abnormal self-location and first-person perspective, whose brain 
damage was localized in the inferior parietal lobule. We performed a systematic quantitative 
meta-analysis of episodic and semantic autobiographical memories to investigate whether brain 
regions related to memory may share common neural substrates with bodily self-consciousness. 
We hypothesized that the first-person perspective and self-location of bodily self-consciousness 
are relevant to the autonoetic consciousness of episodic autobiographical memory and therefore 
we expected an anatomical overlap between these features in parietal regions. First, we showed 
an anatomical overlap bilaterally in the angular gyrus, specific to bodily self and episodic 
autobiographical self. Second, we showed no overlap between bodily self and semantic 
autobiographical self. These findings are further discussed in section 3.1.2.  
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1.4.3? The bodily self selectively and retroactively strengthens memory (study 3) 
Many seemingly irrelevant everyday life events may become significant only later in time 
(Kensinger, 2015). For example, that stranger who asked for directions becomes more relevant 
after you realize that your wallet is missing. Studies on mental self-projections (Tulving, 1983; 
Arzy et al., 2008, 2009) suggest that the experience of the self in the present moment is also 
involved with the ability to remember our past or imagine the future. This conscious self-
awareness (i.e. a mental state in which the content of one’s consciousness refers to knowledge 
about oneself, for example reflecting about one’s personality or identity) is intrinsically 
connected to the multisensory bodily processes (Blanke et al., 2015; Tacikowski et al., 2017). 
Recently, two behavioral studies showed how memory for neutral images can be enhanced by 
future fearful (Dunsmoor et al., 2015) or rewarding (Patil et al., 2017), conceptually-related 
events. More precisely, during the first stage of incidental encoding, the so-called “pre-
conditioning classification task”, two neutral categories of images portraying animals and tools 
appeared to be of the same relevance. During a second phase of the incidental encoding, the so-
called “conditioning classification task”, a prominent event, either fear conditioning or reward 
motivation, became purposefully associated with one of the two categories (animals or tools). 
A following memory recognition task revealed that participants remembered neutral images 
(for example tools) that were directly associated with fear or reward during the conditioning 
phase and they also remembered better the conceptually-related images (tools) from the pre-
conditioning phase. In this study, which included 30 healthy participants, we examined whether 
the retroactive and selective effect could be a.) triggered by the multisensory bodily signals, 
such as the presence or absence of one’s own physical body, b.) generalized to naturalistic 
scenes, such as inside rooms or outside scenes, into which the participants would be immersed 
using VR technology, rather than static, lab-based images. We expected that performance for 
contextual details in a one-hour delay memory recognition task would increase in the presence 
of bodily self-related cues (i.e. the presence of one’s own physical body from the first-person 
viewpoint). First, we showed that the presence of one’s own body can retroactively strengthen 
memory recognition. Second, we demonstrated that this retroactively enhancing effect became 
selectively associated with a particular group of items (either from rooms or scenes). These 
findings are further discussed in section 3.1.3. 
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1.4.4? Capturing thoughts with EEG and fMRI (study 4) 
 
The temporal structure of spontaneous mentation is a key to the formation of a meaningful 
stream of consciousness. For example, when we daydream, an entire lifetime can continuously 
pass our minds in an hour. The human perception appears continuous, dynamic and 
unsegmented (Zacks et al., 2001). Recently, fMRI studies have proposed that functionally 
distinct sub-systems of the default mode network may be activated at the same time (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010b; Axelrod et al., 2017). Yet, overwhelming evidence shows that information 
processing evolves through a stream of discrete conscious units, each representing one specific 
mental state. EEG microstate analysis investigates the temporal dynamics of large-scale neural 
networks (Michel and Koenig, 2018; Van De Ville et al., 2010). Furthermore, the duration and 
occurrence of EEG microstates regulate the quality of unconstrained mentation and provide an 
evidence for the electrophysiological segmentation of continuous brain activity into brief brain 
states (Baars, 2002a; Changeux and Michel, 2004; Michel and Koenig, 2018). In this study, we 
examined the spatiotemporal dynamics of large-scale brain networks associated to particular 
thoughts. 16 participants were instructed to direct their thoughts to their past, self-related 
memories or to mental, self-unrelated calculation, in order to examine the large-scale networks 
underlying the internal conscious thoughts. We examined the spatiotemporal dynamics of brain 
activity with high-resolution 7-Tesla fMRI and high-density EEG in two separate sessions. 
First, we studied the changes in BOLD activity for each brain region through the fractional 
amplitude of low frequency (fALFF) analysis and the interactions between those regions across 
time through functional connectivity analysis to examine if different functional regions become 
active at the same time. Second, we investigated the brief temporal organization of the large 
scale networks using the EEG microstate approach. Particularly, we examined the basic features 
of the EEG microstates: their duration, occurrence and the transitional probabilities. We 
expected that the fMRI data would confirm that the default mode network comprises distinct 
sub-systems. We then hypothesized that the EEG microstate analysis would reveal that these 
functional networks are not continuous, but rather temporally parsed. First, the fMRI data 
confirmed sub-networks of the default mode network are activated during episodic memory 
retrieval and these subnetworks show distinct connectivity patterns. Second, EEG microstate 
analysis showed specific microstates that increased in duration and occurrence during 
autobiographic episodic memory retrieval and during mental arithmetics. These findings are 
further discussed in section 3.1.4. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Episodic autobiographical memories (EAMs) are recollections of contextually rich and 
personally relevant past events. EAM has been linked to the sense of self, allowing one to 
mentally travel back in subjective time and re-experience past events. However, the sense of 
self has recently been linked to online multisensory processing and bodily self-consciousness 
(BSC). It is currently unknown whether EAM depends on BSC mechanisms. Here, we used a 
new immersive virtual reality (VR) system that maintained the perceptual richness of life 
episodes and fully controlled the experimental stimuli during encoding and retrieval, including 
the participant’s body. Our data reveal two classical episodic memory findings. Recognition 
memory for complex real-life like scenes decays with a delay and improves depending on the 
number of items that were changed between encoding and retrieval, validating the present VR 
system. We also report that delayed retrieval performance was enhanced when participants 
viewed their body as part of the virtual scene during encoding and that this body effect was not 
observed when no virtual body or a moving control object was shown, thereby linking the sense 
of self, and BSC in particular, to episodic memory. The present VR methodology and the present 
behavioral findings will enable the study key aspects of EAM, may benefit memory research in 
healthy participants, and also be of relevance for the understanding of memory disorders. 
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Introduction 
 
A defining feature of episodic autobiographical memory (EAM) is the capacity to provide 
information about the content of our conscious personal experiences of “when” and “where” 
events occurred as well as “what” happened [1,2]. Previous studies defined EAM as the recall of 
contextually rich and personally relevant past events that are associated with specific sensory-
perceptual and cognitive-emotional details [3–10]. EAM has been distinguished from semantic 
autobiographical memory, the latter being associated with general self-knowledge and the recall 
of personal facts that are independent of re-experiencing specific past events [11–17].  
 
In a series of seminal papers, Endel Tulving highlighted the subjective dimension of EAM 
associated with the re-experiencing of specific past events by pointing out the importance of the 
sense of self and introducing his influential notion of autonoetic consciousness. He argued that 
autonoetic consciousness is of fundamental relevance to EAM, allowing one to mentally travel 
back in subjective time and recollect one’s previous experiences [2,18–20]. Tulving distinguished 
autonoetic consciousness from noetic consciousness, linking the latter to semantic memory and 
semantic autobiographical memory and to knowing about (rather than re-experiencing) specific 
past events. Others extended Tulving’s notion of EAM and proposed that it is contributing to the 
sense of self across time [10,12,21–25] and developed behavioral tasks such as mental time travel 
[26–31].   
 
Although, several other cognitive domains have been proposed to contribute to the sense of self 
(i.e. language, mental imagery, facial self-recognition [32–35], recent research has highlighted 
the importance of non-cognitive multisensory and sensorimotor contributions to the sense of self. 
This novel theoretical and experimental approach is based on behavioral [36,37], neuroimaging 
[38–40] and clinical data [39,41] and involves the processing and integration of different bodily 
stimuli to the sense of self: bodily self-consciousness (BSC); for review see [42,43]. BSC includes 
conscious experiences such as self-identification and self-location [36,37,44,45], as well as the 
first-person perspective [39,46,47]. This work was based on clinical observations in neurological 
patients with so-called out-of-body experiences characterized by changes in the sense of self, in 
particular of the experienced self-location and perspective from an embodied first-person 
perspective to a third-person perspective [39,41] and has been able to induce milder, but 
comparable, states in healthy subjects using virtual reality (VR) technology to provide 
multisensory stimulation [36,39,47].   
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Given the link of BSC with subjective experience and previous claims that subjective re-
experiencing of specific past events is a fundamental component of EAM [2,18], we argue that 
multisensory bodily processing may not only be of relevance for BSC, but also for 
consciousness concerning past events. Recent findings have shown that BSC impacts several 
perceptual and cognitive functions such as tactile perception [48,49], pain perception [50,51], 
visual perception [52–54], as well as egocentric cognitive processes [55]. Concerning episodic 
memory, St. Jacques et al. [56] used a novel camera technology to examine the differences in 
self-projection (i.e. the capacity to re-experience the personal past and to mentally infer another 
person’s perspective) and found that the ventral–dorsal subregions of the anterior midline are 
functionally dissociable and may differentially contribute to self-projection when comparing 
self versus other. Bergouignan et al. [57] reported that recall of EAM items and hippocampal 
activity during the encoding of episodic events is modulated by the visual perspective from 
where the event was viewed during encoding and St. Jacques et al. [58] showed that first- versus 
third-person perspective during retrieval modulated recall of autobiographical events and 
associated this with medial and lateral parietal activations. Together, these findings revealed 
that retrieval-induced forgetting is enhanced by third-person, but not first-person perspective. 
Therefore, these studies suggest that encoding of episodic memory requires the natural 
relationship between the body and the world, which is perceived from the first-person 
perspective. As such, we here predicted that bodily multisensory processing, that has been 
described to modulate BSC, would interfere with EAM processes. 
 
Traditionally, behavioral and neuroimaging EAM studies rely on questionnaires, verbal reports, 
interviews, or mental imagery and predominantly investigated memory retrieval by using a 
variety of stimuli and procedures such as cue words and pictures [59–64]. For example, 
important research relied on interviews with the participants [61,65] on personalized lists of 
significant life events of participants [9,30,66–68], and employed different procedures asking 
participants to re-experience particular life episodes [59,62,63,69,70]. This differs from 
research investigating verbal memory through encoding and recall of word lists [71–74] or 
testing spatial memory with figures, spatial paths, or other visuospatial materials [75–77] (for 
which it is much easier to fully control encoding and retrieval). Beyond the use of controlled 
images, short video clips or words in EAM studies [4,78], an important line of neuroscientific 
EAM work has used novel approaches employing stimuli from real world encounters, outside 
the laboratory. For example, Cabeza et al. [79] created a campus tour paradigm and tested EAM 
retrieval by using digital photos taken from the tour. Similarly, Schacter et al. [80] introduced 
a museum tour paradigm, which was used to study the reactivation-induced updating in memory 
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for events experienced during the tour. Thus, during encoding, subjects went on an audio-
guided museum tour, while wearing a camera which automatically took photos some of which 
were selected to test EAM (see also [56]). Vogel and Schwabe [81] also used pictures, which 
were taken automatically and continuously by a camera during a 2-hour walk through a zoo for 
testing EAM, comparing events represented by pictures from their own zoo tour with those of 
others.  Several EAM research groups have relied on advances in video technology and VR 
during encoding and retrieval of information (i.e. spatial navigation[82,83]; social 
interactions[84,85]). Participants were seated in front of a computer screen showing a virtual 
environment and asked to navigate in such environments using a joystick (encoding) and later 
asked to recall selected objects from the environment (retrieval). These computer-based VR 
studies suggest that both interactions with the environment during encoding or retrieval 
influence memory performance. Compared to passive participation, several VR studies showed 
better learning performances across free recall trials and recognition tasks [82,86–88]. Plancher 
et al.[89] suggested that interactions with the naturalistic environment created with VR 
enhanced spatial memory. However, despite these important achievements, these virtual 
environments were mostly using non-immersive VR systems, did not employ real life like 
virtual scenes, and did not use VR technology that allows integrating the participants’ body 
(and hence multisensory bodily stimulation) for the tested virtual life episodes. In the present 
experiments, we took advantage of a recently developed immersive VR system, which allows 
us to preserve the perceptual richness of life episodes, to fully control the experimental stimuli 
during encoding and retrieval, and to integrate and manipulate multisensory information of our 
participant’s body in an online fashion. Our paradigm thus approaches 3D real life episodes as 
encountered during a person’s life, but in a VR setting for which all items of the scene during 
encoding and retrieval are fully controlled. As such, this approach extends previous memory 
research, which studied the relation between episodic memory and autobiographical memory 
mainly by use of selected photographs. The present experiments had one major technological 
and one major scientific goal: (1) develop and test EAM-like memory in the laboratory with 
virtual episodes using immersive VR and (2) investigate whether multisensory bodily 
stimulations that have been shown to impact BSC, perception, and egocentric cognition 
modulates EAM.  
 
In the first experiment, we tested our immersive VR system and sought to address some of the 
experimental limitations of earlier EAM studies, which either had limited control of actual 
autobiographical stimuli and events during encoding and only examined the stage of EAM 
retrieval [5,60,68,90] or controlled EAM encoding, but without the immersion into the original 
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scenes during EAM retrieval [9,57,66]. The main aim of our first experiment was to validate our 
novel VR paradigm in order to study EAM in a more naturalistic setting. We further tested EAM 
performance and confidence for immersive three-dimensional (3D) VR scenes at two different 
time points and for different number of objects (that changed between both sessions), we 
predicted memory decreases depending on delay and on the number of objects changed. 
Numerous behavioral cognitive studies have observed dissociations between memory accuracy 
and memory confidence [91–97]. For example, Talarico & Rubin [91] showed that the objective 
accuracy for events of September 11th, 2001 did not differ from accuracy in every-day events. 
However, the subjective feeling of remembering was enhanced for the highly arousing EAMs 
compared to everyday-like EAMs. Likewise, Sharot & Yonelinas [93] found that emotional 
photos were remembered with a greater subjective sense of recollection, yet the objective memory 
performance between emotional and neutral photos did not differ. Similar to the prior 
investigations examining the effect of emotional memories on subjective confidence, we thus 
sought to investigate the impact of multisensory bodily cues on subjective confidence. 
 
In the second experiment, we investigated the main scientific hypothesis of the present 
experiments and tested the potential link between multisensory own body signals, that are 
fundamental for BSC and EAM. Vision and proprioception are sensory signals that are highly 
relevant for the brain in order to rapidly and continuously update the instantaneous representation 
of the body in space. Perceiving one’s body as part of a visual scene (for example a hand lying 
on a table) relies on i. visual, ii. proprioceptive, and iii tactile cues. These signals are processed 
initially in different brain regions and subsequently integrated in multisensory brain regions (i.e. 
Blanke et al., 2015). Such multisensory body-related signals are not just relevant for hand 
perception, but also for BSC, including hand ownership (i.e. the feeling that this hand is mine), 
self-identification with the body, self-location (i.e. experiencing the self as being located in 
space), and the first-person perspective (i.e. experiencing the world from a spatial origin with a 
direction) [42,43,98]. We thus examined whether the presence of online and congruent 
multisensory cues from the subject’s body (i.e. the presence of one’s own physical body from the 
first-person viewpoint) impacts memory performance and confidence in the present VR 
paradigm, compared to an experimental condition where such online first-person bodily cues are 
absent. Based on BSC work that has shown that view of the body enhances perceptual and 
cognitive tasks [57,58] and based on the fact that during memory encoding the body is in most 
instances co-perceived with the other elements of the scene, we predicted that the presence of a 
body during encoding would enhance memory performance. Finally, we performed a third 
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(control) experiment in order to test whether the effect of multisensory bodily stimulation that we 
observed in the second experiment is specific to multisensory bodily cues. 
  
Methods  
Subjects 
A total of 79 subjects with normal or corrected to normal vision were recruited to participate. 
None of the participants indicated neurological or psychiatric deficits and all subjects were right-
handed. In experiment 1, 16 subjects (M = 23.7 years, SEM = 0.7 years, 8 female) participated in 
the immediate recognition group and 15 right-handed subjects (M = 23.4, SEM = 0.8, 7 female) 
participated in the one-hour delayed recognition group. In experiment 2, 16 subjects (M = 26.8 
years, SEM = 0.6, 4 female) participated in the immediate recognition group and 16 subjects (M 
= 24.5 years, SEM = 1.1, 8 female) participated in the one-hour delayed recognition group. In 
experiment 3, 16 right-handed subjects (M = 25.4, SD = 3.7, 7 female) participated in one-hour 
delayed group. Sample size was derived from power analysis of previous BSC studies [99,100] 
and previous studies on mental time travel [28,30] indicating that 16 participants are sufficient 
for the present experiments. The study was approved by the local ethical committee and all three 
experiments were conducted in conformity with the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed consents 
were obtained from all our subjects. 
 
Virtual Reality Technology  
Our VR technology uses a spherical capturing and recording system and an immersive setup for 
first-person perspective (1PP) replay of the recorded real environments. For recording a scene, 
14 cameras (GoPro Hero4) are assembled on a spherical rig (360hero 3DH3PRO14H) and linked 
to 4 pairs of binaural microphones (3DIO Omni Binaural Microphone) to cover the entire sphere 
of perception around a viewpoint (360° horizontally and vertically, stereoscopic vision, binaural 
panoramic audio). A custom software (Reality Substitution Machine, RealiSM, 
http://lnco.epfl.ch/realism) then aggregates all data into a single high-resolution panoramic 
audiovisual computer format (equivalent to more than 4 stereoscopic full HD movies). A head-
mounted display (HMD, Oculus Rift DK2; 900x1080 per eye, FOV ~105º Vertical, 95º 
Horizontal) was used to immerse subjects into the recording and sound was administered with 
noise-cancelling headphones (BOSE QC15). Furthermore, the HMD was coupled with a 
stereoscopic depth camera (Duo3D MLX, 752x480 at 56Hz) mounted on its front face to capture 
subjects’ bodies from 1PP. The RealiSM software then augments the fully immersive 
environment with a realistic view from which subjects could see their hands, trunk and legs from 
1PP. As a result, subjects experienced as if they would be physically present in the pre-recorded 
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scenes and seeing oneself (not a 3D avatar). The software also allows integrating 3D virtual 
objects seamlessly in the scene (experiment 3). 
  
Stimuli 
Subjects were immersed in three (experiment 1) or two (experiments 2 and 3) pre-recorded rooms 
via the HMD (see below). For the encoding session, 10 everyday-life objects (e.g., coffee 
machine, pen, trash bin) were placed in each room. These real-life objects created the natural 
context of episodic memory at both encoding and retrieval. During retrieval, rooms remained 
either exactly the same as during encoding (i.e. the same 10 real-life objects were again presented 
at the same places in the previously visited rooms) or some of the objects (i.e. 1, 2 or 3 objects) 
were replaced by new objects that were not previously seen in any of the scenes. Each room 
included different set of objects in order to keep the same level of novelty and thus avoid any 
facilitation on the following recognition task. 
 
Paradigm 
Each of the three experiments consisted of two sessions, an incidental encoding period (session 
1) followed by an immediate (group 1) or one-hour delayed (group 2) surprise recognition task 
(session 2). We studied incidental encoding (i.e. subjects were unexpectedly given a recognition 
test) in order to examine which of the every-day items would subjects remember without 
expecting the recognition test. In all three experiments, subjects were not informed that we 
would later test their memory for the stimuli encountered during the encoding session. Before 
the two experimental sessions, subjects were seated on a chair and asked to put on the HMD 
and headphones. Before the two experimental sessions, subjects were seated on a chair and 
asked to put on the HMD and headphones. In order to familiarize with the VR technology, each 
subject was immersed into an outside scene for 5 minutes, which we have recorded in a park 
close to the Lake of Geneva. We specifically asked our subjects to remain seated, turn and look 
around and to explore the scene as if they were sitting on a bench in the park. The lake scene 
consisted of a blue sky, there were trees behind them, and there was a view on the lake in front 
of them overlooking the French Alps on the other sides of the lake). Paradigm and testing 
sequence are depicted in Figure 1A. 
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Figure 1A. Experimental procedure and 3D scenes. After a period of familiarisation with the immersive 
VR setup, participants performed the encoding session (10 minutes) during which they were exposed to 
different life-like 3D scenes. Scenes were characterized by a room that contained different objects (table, 
photocopy machine, pen, etc.). In experiment 1, one group of participants performed the retrieval session 
(30 minutes) immediately after the encoding session or after a one-hour delay (see main text for further 
detail). 
 
Encoding Session 
During the encoding session, to assure that subjects explored the entire room and to monitor their 
attention within the different 3D scenes (i.e. the different rooms), participants were instructed to 
freely explore each virtual room. Moreover, we programmed a virtual ball that appeared in each 
of the three rooms and was moving within the rooms for a duration of 30 seconds and covered all 
sections of the virtual room. Participants were asked to fixate the virtual ball and to follow its 
movements through the virtual room. In total, the target objects in the scenes, which were 
questioned during the retrieval session appeared at 6 different positions in each room. After the 
ball stopped moving, participants freely explored each room for another 30 seconds.  
 
The procedure in experiment 2 was identical. However, in order to test the effect of viewing one’s 
own body during encoding we asked subjects to follow the trajectory of the ball and to point at 
the moving ball with their hand and finger. The main manipulation consisted in showing the 
participant’s physical body (body condition) or not (no-body condition). This was accomplished 
with the use of the stereoscopic depths cameras to capture in the participant’s body and by turning 
them on in the body and off in the no-body condition. The participant’s body was inserted in real-
time in the virtual room and shown from the habitual visual first-person viewpoint. In the body 
condition, the subjects saw their physical hand, the trunk, and their legs (i.e. the stereoscopic 
depths cameras were turned on) in the HMD and as part of the virtual 3D scene (Figure 1B). In 
the no-body condition, the virtual 3D scene was identical except that the participant’s body was 
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missing (i.e. the stereoscopic depths cameras were turned off) (Figure 1C). The order of 
presentation of the body and no-body condition was counterbalanced between subjects. In 
experiment 2 each participant explored two rooms (i.e. with 3 rooms as in experiment 1 the 
experiment would have been too long). 
 
In experiment 3, participants were also asked to follow the movement of the ball appearing in 
each room (by physically pointing at it with their hand and finger). Yet in the object condition 
they were shown a non-bodily control object, instead of their own physical body (Figure 1D; see 
Supplemental video). The no-body condition was the same as in experiment 2. The presentation 
of the no-body and object condition was counterbalanced between subjects. No explicit 
instructions to memorize the objects of visited rooms were provided. In experiment 3, each 
participant explored two rooms (i.e. to keep conditions comparable with respect to experiment 2). 
 
Figure 1B-D. The figure shows different conditions during the encoding session that we used in 
experiments 1-3 (the retrieval session was the same across all experiments). Thus, participants always saw 
the same 3D scenes on the head-mounted display, but the body of the participant was either not seen at all 
(Figure 1B; body condition), seen as part of the 3D scene (Figure 1C; no-body condition), or instead of 
the body a control object was seen (Figure 1D; control condition).    
 
Retrieval Session 
During the retrieval session, which was the same for all three experiments (i.e. no body or control 
object was shown), subjects were informed that they would be immersed in the same rooms again. 
They performed a total of three blocks of 40 trials (each lasting 10 seconds). Within the three 
blocks of 40 trials, we presented 10 trials, which were exactly the same as during the original 
encoding session (i.e. including the same 10 objects). The remaining 30 trials were different and 
had either 1, 2 or 3 new objects replacing the respective number of objects shown during the 
encoding session. The blocks and individual trials in each block were presented in a randomized 
order. Participants were free to re-explore the virtual scenes for 10 seconds, after which they were 
asked two questions that were shown on the HMD. First, participants performed a two-alternative 
forced choice task (yes/no) whether the virtual scene shown during the retrieval session 
corresponded to the virtual scene during encoding (recognition task) (“Is the scene exactly the 
same as when you first saw it?”). Participants indicated their response with a wireless computer 
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mouse. Second, participants were asked how confident they were about their answer (via a rating 
scale projected in the HDM; range from 0 (low) to 9 (high confidence)).  
 
Statistical analysis 
 
In experiment 1, an independent samples t-test for hit rate and false alarm rate was applied to test 
whether EAM performance differed depending on delay (i.e. immediate x one-hour delayed 
condition). Independent sample t-test were further used to analyze whether the hit rate and false 
alarm for EAM confidence ratings differed depending on delay. A mixed analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) with the number of objects changed (i.e. 1 object, 2 objects or 3 objects) and delay 
(i.e. immediate x one-hour delayed group) was performed. Further, a 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was 
run to understand the effects of delay (i.e. immediate x one-hour delayed groups) and number of 
objects changed in a room (i.e. 1 object, 2 objects, 3 objects) for the EAM confidence for the false 
alarm rates. Where appropriate, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections of degrees of freedom were used. 
Significant ANOVA effects were explored by post-hoc tests using Bonferroni correction. The 
significance level was set to alpha 0.05. 
 
In experiment 2, we performed a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with delay (i.e. 
immediate x one-hour delayed groups) and body (i.e. body x no-body condition) on EAM 
performance for both hit rate as well as for false alarm rate. In order to investigate in more detail 
the effect of the number of objects changed across the different experimental conditions, we 
performed an additional analysis: 2 (i.e. immediate x one-hour delayed groups) x 2 (i.e. body x 
no-body condition) x 3 (i.e. 1 object, 2 objects or 3 objects) mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), which was done only for the number of false alarms.  
 
For EAM confidence, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was performed with the factors retrieval time (i.e. 
immediate x one-hour delayed groups) and body (i.e. body present x body absent). Additionally, 
a three-way mixed ANOVA was run on the EAM confidence to gain more information about 
the effect of the number of objects changed specific to the false alarm rate. Where appropriate, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections of degrees of freedom were used. Significant ANOVA effects 
were explored by post-hoc tests using Bonferroni correction. The significance level was set to 
alpha 0.05. 
 
In experiment 3, an independent samples t-test was applied to test whether EAM performance 
differed in the no-body versus object condition. This was done for hit rate and for false alarm rate. 
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An independent sample t-test was also used to examine whether EAM confidence false alarm 
differed in the no-body versus object condition. A mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) with 
the number of objects changed (i.e. 1 object, 2 objects or 3 objects) and body (i.e. no-body x 
object) was performed. Similarly, a 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was run to understand the effects of 
body (i.e. no-body x object) and number of objects changed in a room (i.e. 1 object, 2 objects, 3 
objects) for the EAM confidence for the false alarm rates. Where appropriate, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections of degrees of freedom were used. Significant ANOVA effects were explored 
by post-hoc tests using Bonferroni correction. The significance level was set to alpha 0.05. 
 
Results 
Experiment 1 (Immediate versus one-hour delayed condition) 
 
Participants in the delay group showed a significant decline in performance compared to the 
immediate memory recognition group. Mean hit rate was significantly lower in the delay group 
(M = 55.5, SEM = 5.3) than in the immediate group (M = 73.1, SEM = 3.6) (t (29) = 2.7, p = 
0.01) (Figure 2A). False alarm rates did not differ between both groups (immediate group: M = 
31.4, SEM = 5.8; delay group: M = 23.3, SEM = 3.0; t (29) = 1.1, p = 0.2) (Figure 2B). These 
data show that subjects recognized 3D scenic events better when tested immediately after the 
exposure than when tested with a delay of one hour, without any effect of delay on false 
recognitions. 
 
Confidence ratings for hits in the immediate group (M = 6.2, SEM = 1.6) were not significantly 
different from those in the delay group (M = 6.8, SEM = 1.3) (t (29) = 1.09, p = 0.2) (Figure 2C). 
The same was found for false alarms confidence that did not differ between the immediate group 
(M = 5.8, SEM = 0.4) and delay group (M = 6.4, SEM = 1.2) (t (29) = 0.7, p = 0.3) (Figure 2D). 
Thus, despite changes in recognition, confidence did not differ depending on delay.  
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Figure 2. EAM performance in experiment 1 (immediate versus one-hour delay) 
EAM performance (hit rate, false alarm rates) and subjective confidence ratings are indicated in percentage 
+ SEM. (**) P < 0.01; (*) P < 0.05. Figure 2A. Hit Rate; Figure 2B. False Alarm Rate; Figure 2C. 
Confidence ratings (Hits); Figure 2D. Confidence ratings (False alarms). Blue color represents the 
immediate condition. Green color represents the delayed condition. 
 
We next examined whether performance in the present task depended on the number of objects 
changed within each immersive 3D scene. This analysis was conducted on the false alarm rate 
(as no objects changed for hits, by definition). As predicted, analysis revealed a significant main 
effect for the number of objects changed (F (2, 58) = 52.85, p < 0.0005, partial η2 = 0.64) (Figure 
3A). Pairwise comparisons were performed for statistically significant main effects and revealed 
that subjects made progressively fewer false alarms with increasing number of objects (all p-
values < 0.0005). 
 
There was also a statistically significant main effect for the number of objects changed (F (2, 58) 
= 4.163, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.12) (Figure 3A), revealing that subjects were progressively more 
confident in their performance with increasing number of objects that were changed between both 
sessions. These data show that subjects made more recognition errors and were less confident in 
conditions in which less objects were changed between encoding and retrieval.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. False alarms depend on number of items changed (experiment 1) 
EAM performance (false alarms) is indicated in percentage + SEM. (**) P < 0.01; (*) P < 0.05. Figure 
3A. False Alarm versus Number of Items changed (i.e., 1 item, 2 items, 3 items); Figure 3B. Confidence 
Rate for False Alarm versus Number of Items changed (i.e., 1 item, 2 items, 3 items).  
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Experiment 2 (Body versus no-body condition) 
 
Data for hit rates showed a significant two-way interaction between the time of retrieval and body 
conditions (F (1,30) = 7.44, p = 0.01, partial η2 = .19). Post-hoc testing revealed that this effect 
was explained by a higher hit rate in the body, which was found specifically in the delay group 
(body: M = 82.5, SEM = 8.2; no-body condition: M = 63.7, SEM = 8.2; t (15) = 2.51, p = 0.02), 
but not in the immediate group (Figures 4A and 4B). The same analysis for false alarms rate did 
not reveal any differences F (1, 30) = 0.002, p =0.96, partial η2 = .00 (Figures 4C and 4D). These 
data show that recognition of immersive 3D scenes, that also include the first-person view of the 
subject’s body, mimicking real-life experience is modulated and enhanced with respect to the 
same scenes without such a bodily view.  
 
Figure 4. Body view enhances recognition (experiment 2) 
Immediate versus one-hour delay EAM performance is indicated in percentage + SEM is indicated. (**) 
P < 0.01; (*) P < 0.05. Figure 4A. Hit Rate in immediate body (in purple color) versus immediate nobody 
(in pink color) condition; Figure 4B. Hit Rate in delayed body (in purple color) versus delayed nobody (in 
pink color) condition; Figure 4C. False Alarm Rate in immediate body (in purple color) versus immediate 
nobody (in pink color) condition; Figure 4D. False Alarm Rate in delayed body (in purple color) versus 
delayed nobody (in pink color) condition. 
 
 
Confidence ratings for hits did not reveal any differences between the time of retrieval and body 
conditions (F (1,30) = 1.06, p = 0.31, partial η2 = .03). The same analysis for false alarms also did 
not reveal any differences (F (1,30) = 0.193; p = 0.66, partial η2 = .00). Thus, despite changes in 
recognition, confidence did not differ depending on time of retrieval or body conditions.  
 
We also examined in more detail, whether memory performance (false alarms) in the immediate 
and delayed groups depended specifically on the number of objects changed and whether a body 
was seen or not. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for the number of objects changed 
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for the false alarm rate (F (2, 60) = 27.48, p < 0.0005, partial η2 = 0.47). Pairwise comparisons 
were performed for statistically significant main effect and revealed that subjects made 
progressively fewer false alarms with increasing number of objects (all p’s < 0.0005). No 
statistically significant three-way interaction was found between the time of retrieval, body 
conditions and number of objects changed (F (1.35, 40.54) = 1.84, p = 0.18, partial η2 = 0.05).  
 
Similarly, we tested whether the confidence in the performance accuracy for both immediate and 
delayed groups (i.e. confidence ratings for false alarms trials) depended on the number of changed 
objects within each scene and the body condition. Results show that subjective ratings mirrored 
changes in memory performance. The main effect for objects showed a statistically significant 
difference for the number of objects changed (F (2, 60) = 7.79, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.2). Post-
hoc analysis revealed a statistically significant change from 1 object to 3 objects (p < 0.0005; 
Bonferroni corrected). There was no significant effect of body, nor significant three-way 
interaction was found (F (1.85, 55.55) = 1.14, p = 0.32, partial η2 = 0.03). Thus, despite changes 
in recognition of 3D scenes depending on whether the subjects viewed their body during encoding 
or not, our subjects’ confidence was equal across conditions. These data from experiment 2 show 
that subjects made more recognition errors and were less confident in conditions in which less 
objects were changed between encoding and retrieval, as in experiment1. 
 
Experiment 3 (object vs no-body condition) 
 
There was no significant difference in hit rates for subjects in the object condition (M= 70.0, 
SEM = 8.3) compared to the no-body condition (M = 70.0, SEM = 8.2) (t (15) = 0.00, p = 1.00) 
(Figure 5A). Similarly, false alarm rates did not differ between groups (object group: M = 46.2, 
SEM = 7.7; no-body group: M = 46.0, SEM = 6.5; t (15) = -0.05, p = 0.96) (Figure 5B).These 
data show that recognition of immersive 3D scenes, where a non-bodily object, instead one’s 
own body, is visible from the first-person view, does not modulate performance in the present 
task with respect to the same scenes without body or rectangular control object.   
 
Confidence for hits in the object condition (M = 4.8, SEM = 0.2) was not significantly different 
from the no-body condition (M = 4.4, SEM = 0.2) (Figure 5C). Confidence for false alarm also 
did not differ between conditions (object condition: M = 4.3, SEM = 0.3; no-body condition: M 
= 4.5, SEM = 0.2) (Figure 5D). 
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Figure 5. No difference between object and nobody view (experiment 3) 
One-hour delay EAM performance is indicated in percentage + SEM is indicated. (**) P < 0.01; (*) P < 
0.05. Figure 5A. Hit Rate for object versus nobody condition; Figure 5B. False Alarm Rate for object 
versus nobody condition; Figure 5C. Confidence ratings (Hits); Figure 5D. Confidence ratings (False 
alarms). 
 
Further, we examined whether memory performance depended on number of objects changed  
and the body condition. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for the number of objects 
changed for the false alarm rate (F (2, 30) = 7.79, p < 0.0005, partial η2 = 0.34). Post-hoc analysis 
revealed a statistically significant change from 1 object to 3 objects (p = 0.01; Bonferroni 
corrected). No statistically significant two-way interaction was found between the body 
conditions and number of objects changed (F (2, 30) = 2.3, p = 0.11, partial η2 = 0.13). There was 
no significant difference between the no-body and object conditions. 
 
We also tested whether the confidence in the performance accuracy depended on the number of 
changed objects within each scene and the body condition. The main effect for objects showed a 
statistically significant difference for the number of objects changed (F (2, 30) = 3.42, p = 0.04, 
partial η2 = 0.18). Similarly, no statistically significant two-way interaction was found between 
the confidence ratings for the body conditions and number of objects changed (F (2,30) = 0.55, p 
= 0.58, partial η2 = 0.03). 
 
Discussion 
The present study allows us to draw three major conclusions. First, the present VR setup permits 
to measure recognition memory for 3D scenes that are immersive, rich in contextual detail, and 
that further integrates the moving body of the participant in online fashion. Our VR setup, thus, 
approaches real-life experiences in controlled laboratory conditions. Moreover, the present VR 
setup allowed us to project the same 3D virtual scenes during the encoding and retrieval sessions, 
providing us arguably with a level of experimental control that is comparable to examinations of 
classical word/picture-based recognition paradigms [101–104], which are typically used to study 
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memory. Second, applying this new setup we report that recognition memory for the tested VR 
scenes depends on the delay and on the number of changed elements between encoding and 
retrieval, comparable to findings for verbal and visual-spatial memory. Third, we show that 
viewing one’s body as part of the virtual scene during encoding enhances delayed retrieval. This 
body effect was not observed when no virtual body was shown or when a moving control object 
(instead of the virtual body) was shown, suggesting that embodied views lead to body-related 
performance changes, as reported in studies investigating BSC.  
   
An experimental VR setup that controls real-life like episodes during encoding and retrieval 
Most prior laboratory-based EAM studies used cue words or images to trigger memory retrieval 
and mental time travel to the past in a controlled fashion [5,6,12,31,60,82,89,105–107]. However, 
these studies controlled only for memory retrieval but not for memory encoding [4]. Contrary to 
these previous studies, we exposed our participants to rich and immersive real-life scenes without 
the need for explicit mental time travel. Unlike earlier computer-based scenarios, we also did not 
present participants with artificial scenarios (simulated events in 3D), but immersed them into 
360° video recordings of everyday real-life scenes that we digitalized for the encoding and 
retrieval sessions. Using the present naturalistic and controlled VR setup, we ensured that our 
participants experienced virtual 3D scenes with congruent multisensory bodily information 
(visual, motor, vestibular); these approach real-life experience as compared to classical virtual 
computer game tasks that have been used for episodic memory investigations in the past 
[108,109]. Thus, the present VR technology and future improvements of it will open new 
possibilities for conducting episodic memory research under ecologically valid experimentation 
in the laboratory by providing not only the ability to precisely design all stimulus aspects, but also 
to replay fully controlled sequences of real-life events.  
 
Delay and number of changed objects modulates recognition memory performance  
Our data reveal two classical episodic memory findings. Recognition memory for real-life like 
scenes decays with delay and improves depending on the number of items that were changed 
between encoding and retrieval. Previous EAM research is compatible with these findings, but 
has not been able to test or quantify this directly. By definition, the autobiographical memories 
of each individual differ and cannot be reproduced across participants and studies. As such, our 
VR approach allows for more control of the environment, in particular the use of the exact same 
context for both the encoding and the retrieval phase as well as a digital method to manipulate 
and control the 3D stimulus material. Combining immersive VR with memory research thus 
allowed us to get both high control and reproducibility, while allowing to test real-life like 
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scenes and events as compared to standard retrieval tasks. Specifically, while associative 
recognition memory for words or pictures [110–112] and EAM [96,97,113] has been tested for 
different memory delays, previous VR-based paradigms, investigating the formation of 
episodic memory of lifelike events, mostly tested immediate memory performance 
[83,84,114,115] (but see [116]). The present findings can be compared with classical memory 
findings for verbal and pictorial material where increasing delays increases forgetting 
[18,92,93,117,118] and with spatial memory work, where active navigation reduces forgetting 
as compared to passive viewing [82,86,87,89]. Thus, although we only tested short delays (i.e. 
one hour), our data show that subjects remembered 3D scenes better when tested immediately 
after encoding as compared to delayed retrieval. Our second predicted finding that recognition 
memory was better when more items were changed between the encoding and retrieval is also 
compatible with classical findings concerning the recognition of visual changes when testing 
long-term memory for spatial scenes, complex figures (including faces), or short texts [119,120] 
, further revealing the experimental validity of the present setup for research in episodic 
memory.  
 
Embodiment and episodic memory of life-like events 
Besides reproducing classic memory effects, the present study also reveals a new finding, i.e. that 
memory is better when the body is visible at the encoding. Research on embodiment and BSC 
has used several VR paradigms and revealed the influence of multisensory and sensorimotor 
bodily input and has highlighted the importance of the view of the observer’s body [43]. Such 
research showed that BSC can be modulated by showing the body or body parts of the participant 
from different first-person viewpoints compared to showing no body at all. Moreover, this effect 
has been shown to be body-specific by demonstrating that different non-corporeal objects shown 
from the same position and viewpoint do not alter BSC [43]. Here, we extend this BSC principle 
to memory research by showing in experiment 2 that the recognition of 3D scenes that included 
within the first-person view also the subject’s body (as is characteristic of normal everyday 
perception) was modulated and significantly enhanced with respect to the same scenes without 
such a bodily view. This is compatible with previously reported effects for multisensory bodily 
perception [48,49] and BSC [37,39,44]. These BSC studies showed that visuo-tactile perception, 
as well as self-identification and self-location towards a seen human body or body part are 
enhanced when the body is shown in congruent position with respect to the subject’s body. 
Accordingly, we argue that the present body effect on the recognition memory of 3D scenes is 
comparable to similar effects in multisensory perception and BSC (i.e. for review see [43]) as 
well as a number of cognitive processes, where self-related bodily information is critical. For 
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instance, viewing the body increases tactile perception [121], modulates interpersonal tactile 
responses [122,123], affects social cognition [124,125], and concept processing [55]. 
 
The post-encoding modulation of EAM performance at a delay due to the presence of bodily-
self  
It is of relevance to point out that the enhancement of EAM performance in the body present 
condition was observed only in the one hour delayed retrieval session, but not when the retrieval 
followed immediately after the encoding session. Most events that people experience during their 
daily life will be forgotten. What determines which of the every-day experiences will be 
remembered? It has been well demonstrated that people tend to remember better those life-
episodes, which are distinct and personally meaningful and, of importance for the present study, 
relate to the self or self-consciousness [21,28,30,126–129]. Additionally, the ability to 
discriminate among similar experiences is a crucial feature of episodic memory [130]. As such, 
the encoding while viewing one’s body may provide a better separation of memory traces than an 
encoding without a body as the multisensory integration of congruent signals from the body 
generates a more distinct target pattern to compare to the lures. Moreover, the typical delay for 
hippocampal consolidation processes continues beyond approximately one hour (for shorter 
delays it may rather relate to short-term memory, relying distinct mechanisms) [131–134]. 
Accordingly, we argue that enhanced self-relevance and recruitment of BSC-related processing 
in the present experiment (by viewing one’s body during encoding) improves the consolidation 
process of episodic memories, but not shorter-spanned memories. Similar delay-only effects have 
also reported during other manipulations. Thus, Sharot & Yonelinas [93] showed that emotion 
had no effect on recall when tested immediately after encoding, but only after a delay. Future 
work, including neuroimaging should investigate whether the modulation of delayed recall as 
described in the present experiments and those by previous authors rely on similar or distinct 
mechanisms. This testing may also include the investigation of additional BSC constraints (i.e. 
peripersonal space and embodiment [43,49,135]).  
 
It could be argued that the enhanced EAM performance of experiment 2 could relate to differences 
in the amount of visual information provided in both conditions (higher in the body versus the 
no-body condition) or higher salience or attention due to the additional inclusion of the tracked 
body in the body condition. First, we note that addition of the tracked body actually covers or 
hides parts of the virtual scene and may have thus incidentally hid some of the changed items and 
should thus rather decrease recognition memory. Yet, the opposite was observed in experiment 
2. However, in order to formally investigate the potential role of differences due to vision or 
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attention between conditions we compared, in experiment 3, the no-body condition with a 
condition in which subjects viewed a non-bodily control object that was moving congruently with 
the participant’s body in real-time. Data from this experiment revealed no memory improvement 
in the object condition, arguing against a visual or attentional account and further corroborating 
our proposal that the present recognition enhancement is due to multisensory-motor bodily 
stimulation that has been shown to be crucial for BSC [36,42,49,136] and characteristic of normal 
everyday experience. These data also argue against the possibility that the present body effect on 
recognition memory can be generalized to an embodied object as the object condition did not 
induce any performance changes. Future EAM studies should investigate other BSC aspects, such 
as peripersonal space, embodiment, and visual-proprioceptive alignment [43]. By revealing 
bodily effects in the present EAM paradigm, we thus link BSC to EAM, extending earlier memory 
work [57] that has focused on contributions of the first-person perspective in autobiographical 
memory or of vestibular processing on EAM [137]. Finally, based on these data we argue that the 
brain mechanisms of BSC are linked to those of autonoetic consciousness that are of fundamental 
relevance to EAM. Autonoetic consciousness is the ability to mentally travel back in subjective 
time and recollect one’s previous experiences [2,18–20] and the present data suggest that 
multisensory bodily processing during encoding and remembering are not only of relevance for 
the conscious bodily experiences of self-identification, self-location, and first-person perspective 
[36,37,39,44–47], but also autonoetic consciousness.  
 
Confidence and episodic memory 
Does confidence mimic these changes in episodic memory performance? We report, as predicted, 
that confidence increased jointly with memory recognition improvements for conditions in which 
more objects were changed. This finding is in line with several studies showing that confidence 
in everyday, non-arousing EAM, measured by remember/know paradigms and recollection 
questionnaires, declines together with the objective memory performance [97,110,113]. 
However, our data also show that confidence levels dissociate from memory performance, as 
delay dependency and the view of one’s body (experiment 2) during encoding modulated 
recognition memory, but not confidence levels. Further research needs to target objective memory 
performance and subjective confidence using real-life scenes as tested with the present VR setup. 
The differential delay- and body-effects in the present study suggest that memory performance 
and confidence rely on distinct functional mechanisms [138],  potentially consistent with the 
classical two-component model of episodic memory highlighting the distinction between 
familiarity and recollection, with only the second leading to changes in confidence [112].  
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Outlook 
The present VR methodology and the present behavioral findings will enable to study several 
key aspects of EAM, including its subjective, behavioral and neural mechanisms and may 
benefit basic memory research in healthy participants, the understanding of memory disorders, 
and potentially provide therapeutic options. Concerning the involved brain mechanisms of 
BSC-EAM interactions it will be important to describe how BSC related neural systems 
described for body ownership and self-identification [139,140], self-location and first-person 
perspective [39,141], as well as for temporal aspects of self-related processing [24,140] will 
interact with the well-described memory circuits in the medial temporal lobe. However, as the 
typical encoding of everyday life events is always associated with multisensory information 
involving the body (only few of which we tested here), more detailed investigations are 
necessary, involving BSC constraints [43]. Moreover, beyond bodily cues, the present setup 
also allows to control, auditory, visual cues, social cues and language material during encoding 
and retrieval and thus to test its effects on EAM in in rich real-life like scenarios. The same 
techniques could also be extended and adapted to the investigation of amnesic patients. Future 
work may study in particular the links between autonoetic consciousness and BSC. Finally, 
there is a growing interest in VR for education (e.g. neurosurgery, firemen, pilots), cognitive 
behavioral therapy (e.g. treating phobias or post-traumatic stress disorder), and as pain 
treatments [142,143]. Future work is needed in order to explore the differences between VR 
and traditional studies in terms of learning and performance. Adaptations of the present setup 
will allow to personalize memory scenarios for a given memory patient and may be beneficial 
in memory rehabilitation [144,145].  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Parietal cortex and adjacent parts of the temporal cortex have recently been associated with 
bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Similarly, growing evidence suggests that the lateral parietal 
cortex is crucial for the subjective aspects of episodic autobiographical memory (EAM), which 
is based on the conscious experience of reliving past events. However, the neuroanatomical 
relationship between both fundamental aspects remains currently unexplored. Moreover, 
despite the wealth of neuroimaging data on EAM, only few neuroimaging studies have 
examined BSC and even fewer examined those aspects of BSC that are most closely related to 
EAM. Here we investigated whether regions in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) that have 
been involved in spatial aspects of BSC (self-location and first-person perspective), as described 
by Ionta et al., are also active in studies investigating autobiographical memory. To examine 
this relation, we thus compared the regions indicated in the study by Ionta et al., based on data 
in healthy participants and neurological patients, with the results from a meta-analytical study 
we performed based on functional neuroimaging studies on EAM and semantic 
autobiographical memory (SAM). We report an anatomical overlap bilaterally in the angular 
gyrus (AG), but not in other parietal or temporal lobe structures between BSC and EAM. 
Moreover, there was no overlap between BSC and SAM. These preliminary data suggest that 
the bilateral AG may be a key structure for the conscious re-experiencing of past life episodes 
(EAM) and the conscious on-line experience of being located and experiencing the world in 
first-person (BSC). 
 
 
Keywords: multisensory integration, parietal cortex, bodily self-consciousness, out of body 
experience, episodic autobiographical memory, ALE meta-analysis, fMRI, lesion analysis 
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1.? Introduction 
 
The subjective feeling of a unified self that is experienced as residing in one’s own body, which is 
localized at a specific position (self-location) and from where one perceives the world  (first-person 
perspective) defines the three major components of multisensory bodily self-consciousness (BSC) 
(Blanke et al., 2015; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Although the experimental investigation of BSC and 
the underlying brain networks remains a challenge, recent advances in digital technologies have 
provided compelling ways of successfully inducing illusory states of BSC in healthy individuals by 
manipulating multisensory bodily cues (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007b; Petkova and 
Ehrsson, 2008). Recently, illusory self-location and first-person perspective were manipulated in a fMRI 
study (Ionta et al., 2011) by applying tactile stroking to the back of a participant, while simultaneously 
displaying the stroking on the back of a virtual body via a head mounted display. Such experimentally-
induced changes in BSC have been linked to activity at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; Brodmann 
area 39/40). Likewise, lesions, seizures or electrical brain stimulation in the TPJ area also result in 
changes in self-location and first-person perspective (Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; De Ridder et al., 2007; 
Ionta et al., 2011). Thus, patients suffering from so-called out of body experiences (OBE) caused by 
brain damage at the TPJ, subjectively experience the world from an illusory disembodied self-location 
with an inverted direction of first-person perspective and they self-identify with this elevated position 
(Blanke and Arzy, 2005; Heydrich and Blanke, 2013; Ionta et al., 2011). 
 
The subjective sense of self in time that enables us to re-experience ourselves in the past and 
mentally project ourselves into the future, i.e. autonoetic consciousness, has been considered 
the defining aspect of episodic autobiographical memory (EAM) recollection (Tulving, 1985). 
Traditionally, since the discovery of severely amnesic patients with damage to the medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) (Scoville, 1957; Steinvorth et al., 2005), many fMRI studies confirmed 
the essential role of MTL structures in memory (Cabeza et al., 2007; Clark and Maguire, 2016; 
Daselaar et al., 2008; St. Jacques et al., 2015; Svoboda et al., 2006). Relevant to the present 
study, numerous neuroimaging studies on episodic memory (Bellana et al., 2017; Cabeza and 
St Jacques, 2007; Gilmore et al., 2015; Rugg and Vilberg, 2013; Rutishauser et al., 2017; 
Sestieri et al., 2011, 2017; St Jacques et al., 2013) also reported persistent and robust activations 
in the lateral parietal cortex, particularly the angular gyrus (AG; Brodmann area 39). 
Interestingly, patients with lateral parietal lesions are successful in objective EAM tasks, 
however, it has been found that the vividness, richness and subjective confidence in 
experiencing their personal memories is diminished (Berryhill et al., 2007; Hower et al., 2014; 
Rugg and King, 2017; Simons et al., 2010).  These neuropsychological, fMRI and TMS studies 
suggest that the sole engagement of MTL structures may not be sufficient for the multi-modal 
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and conscious experiences, which accompany subjective, detail-rich and self-related EAM 
recollection, and that additional regions, such as those in the lateral parietal cortex, are involved 
as well.  
 
The activity in the angular gyrus has also been associated with semantic memory (Binder et al., 
2009; Bonnici et al., 2016; Humphreys and Ralph, 2017; Seghier et al., 2010). Recent resting 
state function connectivity MRI studies proposed that the lateral parietal cortex, particularly the 
AG, may represent a heterogeneous area comprised of functionally and anatomically distinct 
sub-regions (Daselaar et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2010, 2013; Seghier, 2013), also questioning 
whether AG supports the same processes during episodic and semantic retrieval. Critically, 
Brown et al. (2018) demonstrated that the left posterior parietal cortex contributes to both EAM 
and SAM, but each demonstrating divergent activities. More specifically, the AG exhibited a 
graded pattern of activity, declining from episodic recollection to correct rejections of novel 
events in semantic remembering. Consistent with the prior literature, we therefore hypothesized 
that SAM (i.e. the general self-awareness of personal facts), which is independent of re-
experiencing particular, conscious, vivid and multi-modal life episodes, would not anatomically 
overlap with BSC activations in lateral parietal cortex.  
 
Given the link of BSC with subjective experience and seminal proposals by Endel Tulving that 
subjective re-experiencing of specific past events is a fundamental component of EAM 
(Tulving, 1985, 2005), BSC and autonoetic consciousness may share neural mechanisms. As 
subjective re-experiencing of own life events is often characterized by a viewpoint and location 
from where the event is re-experienced, it may be argued that the two spatial components of 
BSC (first-person perspective and self-location) are of particular relevance for EAM. Moreover, 
St. Jacques et al. (2017) showed (using different methodology) that first-versus third-person 
perspective during memory retrieval modulated recall of autobiographical events, associated 
with lateral parietal activations, potentially overlapping with BSC activations. Despite several 
reviews discussing the role of parietal lobe in BSC (Blanke, 2012; Blanke et al., 2015; Serino 
et al., 2013) as well as the recent interest in the contribution of parietal lobe to EAM (Igelström 
and Graziano, 2017; Moscovitch et al., 2016), it is currently unknown whether and to what 
extent BSC and autobiographical memories (episodic or semantic) engage the same or distinct 
brain regions. In order to provide preliminary data, we investigated the question of overlap 
between the spatial aspects of BSC and EAM by studying whether the activations in IPL and 
the adjacent parts of the posterior temporal cortex during the experimental manipulation of both 
aspects of BSC, as observed in the study by (Ionta et al., 2011) in healthy subjects, overlap with 
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those described in EAM studies. We further included results from a lesion analysis study of 
nine neurological patients with OBEs (abnormal self-location and abnormal first-person 
perspective) whose brain damage was also localized at TPJ. We performed a systematic 
quantitative coordinate based meta-analysis (Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012) on human EAM as 
well as SAM functional neuroimaging studies to examine whether and where brain regions 
associated with autobiographical memories share common or distinct neural substrates with 
BSC as reported in  the study by (Ionta et al., 2011). Based on the evidence that both EAM 
and BSC recruit the lateral parietal cortex and given the fundamental link between BSC and 
EAM with multi-modal subjective and conscious experiences, we hypothesized that there 
would be an anatomical overlap in this structure between BSC and autobiographical memory, 
specifically for the episodic (EAM), but not the semantic aspects (SAM). Consistent with the 
prior literature, EAM would be related to BSC in the posterior parietal cortex, particularly the 
AG region, because of its role in integrating cross-modal, multi-sensory features to form a 
unified episodic memory representation, which is fundamentally related to multi-sensory BSC 
signals (i.e. particularly the first-person perspective and self-location). 
 
2.? Methods 
 
2.1?   Experimental and clinical studies on bodily self-consciousness (BSC) 
 
We evaluated data from our previously performed fMRI study in twenty-two healthy subjects 
(M = 25.4, SD = 5.7, 22 male), assessing neural mechanisms of BSC using multisensory 
stimulation. In this study, Ionta et al. (2011) experimentally manipulated two global aspects of 
BSC (self-location and first-person perspective) by using an MRI-compatible robot. Based on 
the original study by (Lenggenhager et al., 2007a), which used virtual reality technology (VR) 
to experimentally manipulate BSC, (Ionta et al., 2011) applied synchronous tactile stimulation 
to the participants’ back while lying in the MRI scanner. Participants observed a full body avatar 
being stroked congruently on its back from a third-person perspective. After synchronous visuo-
tactile stimulation, participants showed higher self-identification towards the virtual body, as 
compared to the asynchronous condition. Furthermore, about half of the participants 
experienced an upward looking first-person perspective (compatible with the physical 
orientation of their body), while the remaining half of the participants had the impression to be 
looking down (down-ward-looking perspective). This perspective was incompatible with the 
orientation of their body, compatible with a third-person perspective induced by the full-body 
illusion. Moreover, the study by (Ionta et al., 2011) also included results from lesion analysis 
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of nine neurological patients, suffering from a carefully defined altered state of BSC, 
namely out-of-body experiences (OBEs) caused by focal brain damage (OBEs are 
characterized by abnormal self-location and abnormal first-person perspective). By 
normalizing each patient’s lesion into common reference space, statistical lesion overlap 
comparison was carried out, contrasting the lesions of the OBE-patients with those from a 
control group using voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM; Bates et al., 2003). For 
more details, see Supplementary information in Ionta et al. (2011).  
 
2.2? Selection of studies and inclusion criteria for EAM and SAM meta-analyses 
 
For both the episodic as well as the semantic autobiographical memory studies, we conducted a 
comprehensive and systematic search of the literature using PubMed 
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/) and Web of Knowledge (http://wokinfo.com). The following 
combination of keywords was used for episodic autobiographical memory: “autobiographical memory”, 
“episodic”. For the semantic autobiographical memory, we selected: “autobiographical memory”, 
“semantic”. The reference lists of the included studies and several previous meta-analyses were used to 
find studies (Kim, 2016; Martinelli et al., 2013; Svoboda et al., 2006). Studies using positron emission 
tomography (PET) or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) were included in the analyses. 
Studies were considered only if activation coordinates were reported in standardized Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) or Talairach (TAL) coordinates and the analysis reported on the whole 
brain. All Talairach coordinates were transformed into the MNI coordinates using a linear 
transformation (Lancaster et al., 2007). ?
 
Only study results in healthy subjects with no neurological or psychiatric disorders, brain 
lesions or pharmacological manipulations were considered. Studies including both younger and 
older healthy participants were included in the analysis. No single subject studies were 
considered for the analyses. If articles reported several experiments with independent samples, 
then these experiments were considered individually in the analysis. Visual as well as auditory 
cues were included irrespectively of their emotional valence. Both recent and remote memories 
for the EAM analysis were included. Personal events and judgments of the self-versus others 
were included in the SAM analysis.  
 
2.2.1? Episodic (EAM) and semantic (SAM) autobiographical memory studies 
 
Forty-one experiments investigated EAM (Supplementary Table 1) and this meta-analysis included 
588 foci and 813 subjects. We focused primarily on studies investigating self-related, personally-
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relevant EAM irrespective of their specificity, age or control task. Thus, we included both recent and 
remote EAM (e.g., Addis et al., 2012; Oddo et al., 2010), using semantic memory (Donix et al., 2010; 
Holland et al., 2011) as well as low level baseline condition (e.g., rest or pseudo words) (Nadel and 
Moscovitch, 1997; Piolino et al., 2008) as control tasks. We selected twenty-five experiments examining 
SAM (Supplementary Table 2) and included 314 foci and 396 subjects. Particularly, we included 
studies investigating familiar, self-relevant semantic information (e.g., faces, places, objects), but also 
self-trait judgements (Sugiura et al., 2009, 2011). Control task in the SAM category included unfamiliar 
information or other-trait judgements (e.g., Gutchess et al., 2007; Jenkins et al., 2008).  
 
2.3   Data analysis for EAM and SAM studies 
 
We employed the quantitative activation likelihood estimation (ALE) algorithm as 
implemented in the GingerALE software, v2.3.6 (Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012; Turkeltaub et al., 
2012). The ALE algorithm ultimately aims at assessing statistically whether a specific task 
activates each specific voxel of the brain more likely than by chance (Eickhoff et al., 2009). To 
account for spatial uncertainty in the location of activity, each voxel at the location of the peak-
activation from each contrast and experiment is convolved with a 3-dimensional Gaussian 
kernel whose full-width at half maximum is weighted by the number of subjects used in that 
particular experiment. The sum of these Gaussians constitute the modeled activation (MA) 
maps. We used a within-cluster p < 0.05 FWE correction with p < 0.001 uncorrected as the 
cluster-forming threshold. The minimal cluster size was set to 200mm3. Visualization of foci 
and the activation clusters from the above mentioned analyses was performed using MRIcron 
software (http://people.cas.sc.edu/rorden/mricron/index.html) and the clusters were labeled 
using the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and 
Brodmann atlas implemented within the same software.  
 
3.? Results 
 
3.1? ??????EAM regions (individual ALE analysis) 
 
The ALE meta-analysis of the forty-one EAM studies uncovered ten clusters (Table 1). More 
specifically, we found activation bilaterally in the angular gyrus (AG, Brodmann area 39) and the left 
superior temporal gyrus (STG, Brodmann area 22). We found consistent activations in cortical midline 
structures, i.e. bilaterally in the ventral and dorsal parts of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; 
Brodmann areas 31 and 23) and left anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, Brodmann area 10). The analysis 
also revealed activity bilaterally in the hippocampi and adjacent parahippocampal gyri (PHG; Brodmann 
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areas 28, 35, 36) and in the left inferior temporal gyrus (ITG, Brodmann area 21). Other clusters were 
found in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, Brodmann area 47), bilaterally in superior frontal gyrus 
(SFG, Brodmann area 32) and in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG, Brodmann area 6).  
 
 
 
Table 1. Results from BSC experimental study (N=22) FDR-corrected, p < 0.05 and neurological 
patients study (N=9) based on voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) FDR-corrected, p < 
0.01. 
R= right, L= left, B= bilateral; x, y, z are the coordinates in MNI space.  
Label provided using the Brodmann atlas. *Active cluster size in voxels.  
 
3.2? SAM regions (individual ALE analysis)  
 
The ALE meta-analysis of the twenty-five SAM studies uncovered two clusters (Table 2). These were 
located in the cortical midline structures, i.e. bilateral ventral and dorsal parts of the ACC (Brodmann 
areas 32, 24) and bilaterally in the ventral and dorsal PCC (Brodmann area 31 and 23). There was no 
activity in the region of the angular gyri. 
 
 
Table 2. Results from EAM meta-analysis. Within-cluster FEW-corrected p < 0.05 with p <0.001 
(uncorrected) as the cluster forming threshold. R= right, L= left, B= bilateral; x, y, z are the coordinates 
in MNI space. Label provided using the Brodmann atlas.  
 
3.3? Anatomical overlap between BSC, EAM and SAM  
 
The BSC regions from the fMRI study on healthy subjects by Ionta et al. (2011) were located 
at the left and right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and included the posterior part of the 
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superior temporal gyrus, the parietal operculum, the posterior insula and superior portion of the 
supramarginal gyrus (lTPJ MNI: -54, -32, 20; rTPJ MNI: 55, -28, 16). The quantitative lesion 
analysis of the patient data in Ionta et al. (2011) revealed a maximal lesion overlap at the rTPJ 
and included the posterior end of the superior and middle temporal and angular gyri (MNI: 
54, -52, 26), which was located somewhat posterior to the fMRI-based BSC regions. The 
union of the regions from the fMRI and lesion analyses defined our BSC regions (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results from SAM meta-analysis. Within-cluster FWE-corrected p < 0.05 with p <0.001 
(uncorrected) as the cluster forming threshold. R= right, L= left, B= bilateral; x, y, z are the coordinates 
in MNI space. Label provided using the Brodmann atlas. 
 
 
We found an anatomical overlap between EAM regions and BSC regions bilaterally in the 
angular gyrus (Brodmann area 39) (Figure 1A). The size of the anatomical overlap between 
BSC and EAM was 1192mm3 on the left side and 128mm3 on the right side. EAM and SAM 
overlapped in the ventral and dorsal parts of the PCC (Brodmann areas 31 and 23) and 
bilaterally in the dorsal part of ACC (Brodmann area 32) (Figure 1B). The size of the 
anatomical overlap between the ventral and dorsal parts of the PCC was 776 mm3 and 560 mm3 
in the dorsal part of the ACC.   
? ???
 
Figure 1A. Visualization of the anatomical overlap between BSC (Ionta et al., 2011) and EAM 
ALE analysis in bilateral parietal cortex. Figure 1B. Visualization of the anatomical overlap between 
SAM and EAM ALE analyses in the cortical midline structures. Within- cluster FWE-corrected p < 
0.05 with p < 0.001 (uncorrected) as the cluster forming threshold. Label provided using the MRIcron. 
 
 
4? Discussion 
 
The present study extends previous EAM studies by investigating the role of subjective, conscious 
processing in autobiographical memory, based on spatial aspects of BSC (self-location and first-person 
perspective). Given the link of BSC with subjective experience and seminal proposals by Endel 
Tulving that subjective re-experiencing of specific past events is a fundamental component of EAM 
(Tulving, 1985, 2005), we speculated that neural processes related to multisensory bodily processing are 
not only relevant for BSC, but also for consciousness concerning past events and EAM (i.e. autonoetic 
consciousness). Subjective re-experiencing of own life events is often described as if experiencing the 
remembered event from a viewpoint and location that is similar to that during encoding of the event. 
Accordingly, we speculated that the first-person perspective and self-location of BSC are of particular 
relevance for autonoetic consciousness and EAM. The current data are preliminary (as we could only 
include data from (Ionta et al., 2011)), but allow to confirm this prediction. More brain imaging data on 
these two spatial aspects of BSC is needed to further confirm our findings.  
 
Our findings suggest that EAM activity indeed anatomically overlaps with BSC in the AG. 
Previous work on BSC investigated self-related processing by using multisensory cues through 
a variety of experimental paradigms, highlighting contributions from own body signals 
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(Bergouignan et al., 2014; Blanke, 2012; Blanke et al., 2015; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; 
Ehrsson, 2007; Serino et al., 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2010). We note that during the encoding of 
personal-life episodes, multisensory signals about the body of the observer that are of relevance 
for BSC are always perceptually c o - present. Such signals are thus potentially of relevance for 
BSC and EAM, even though during encoding t h e s e  s i g n a l s  o f t e n  r e m a i n  in the 
background.  For instance, (Ciaramelli et al., 2010) found that patients with left-lateralized 
lesions in the posterior parietal cortex suffered from an impaired and disembodied, subjective 
experience associated with a navigation task. Moreover, Bergouignan et al. (2014) reported 
that recall of EAM items and hippocampal activity during the encoding of episodic events 
is modulated by the visual perspective from where the event was viewed during encoding. 
Using different methodology, St. Jacques et al. (2017) showed that first-versus third-person 
perspective during memory retrieval modulated recall of autobiographical events, and  
associated this with medial and lateral parietal activations. In a recent study (Bréchet et al., 
2018b), VR technology has allowed us to experimentally control and manipulate key elements 
of BSC during EAM encoding and retrieval, revealing that classical BSC factors also 
influence EAM performance. Thus, our current findings are compatible with these data on 
shared resources for BSC and EAM and reveal an anatomical overlap bilaterally at the level 
of AG. However, many different manipulations of perspective and visual viewpoints have been 
carried out in the past (i.e. see Blanke, 2012). The subjective and behavioral changes as well as 
the associated brain activity as investigated for example by (Ionta et al., 2011) or St. Jacques et 
al. (2017) are thus not easily comparable. Thus, more work is also needed to investigate the 
common and distinct brain mechanisms involved in these different “perspective” manipulations. 
 
Our finding is in line with previous neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies (Foster et al., 2015; 
Kim, 2016; Kim et al., 2012; Svoboda et al., 2006), consistently reporting the lateral parietal region as 
the second most frequently activated region outside MTL structures during EAM retrieval. Although 
the lateral parietal cortex has been often associated with visuo-spatial perception, attention (Corbetta 
and Shulman, 2002) and multisensory integration (Driver and Noesselt, 2008; Tomasino and Gremese, 2016), it is 
only more recently that studies associated the lateral parietal cortex and especially the AG with 
retrieval related to EAM (Bellana et al., 2017; Cabeza et al., 2007; Gilmore et al., 2015; Igelström and 
Graziano, 2017; Moscovitch et al., 2016; Rugg and Vilberg, 2013; Rutishauser et al., 2017; Sestieri et 
al., 2011, 2017). This has led to several suggestions about the contributions of the parietal cortex, 
especially AG, to EAM retrieval. For example, the working buffer hypothesis (Vilberg and Rugg, 
2008) suggested different roles for the ventral and dorsal regions in lateral parietal cortex, linking ventral 
parietal cortex to EAM recollection (i.e. the ability to subjectively re-experience past events enabled by 
autonoetic consciousness) and the dorsal parietal cortex to familiarity related processing (i.e. general 
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recognition of events without any details associated with noetic consciousness) (Cabeza et al., 2008). 
Recently, Bonnici et al. (2016) investigated the role of the AG during retrieval of unimodal and 
multimodal episodic and semantic memories. Their findings suggest that the AG may enable the 
multimodal (i.e. audio-visual) integration of sensory features into rich, vivid and subjectively relevant 
EAM. This interpretation of the essential role of AG in the subjective experiencing of multi-sensory past 
events is consistent with the recent research on BSC that highlighted the multi-sensory and sensorimotor 
processing and integration of different bodily stimuli to the sense of self localized in the lateral parietal 
area (i.e. Blanke et al., 2015). Nonetheless, the precise role of AG in memory and autobiographical 
memory is still a matter of controversy.  
 
The current study revealed bilateral lateral posterior parietal activations in the AG (Brodmann area 39) 
for EAM, but not SAM. There is an increasing debate whether the neural correlates of EAM and SAM 
are shared or distinct. While Levine et al. (2004) claim distinct neural correlates for EAM and SAM, 
Renoult et al. (2012) suggest that the neural correlates of SAM may closely resemble episodic or 
semantic depending on the memory measures. Specifically, autobiographical fact and self-knowledge, 
which are heavily involved in self-referential processing, activate the MPFC. This finding is in line with 
a recent meta-analysis of Martinelli et al. (2013), which showed that SAM and conceptual self (CS) 
activated the medial prefrontal structures. Confirming our finding of ACC and PCC activity for SAM, 
recent meta-analyses that involved trait-judgements of the self vs. other or self vs. others events, 
suggested a critical role of anteromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex in the self-
referential processing (Kim, 2012; Northoff et al., 2006; Qin and Northoff, 2011). For example, the 
meta-analyses of Kim (2012, 2016) suggested that conscious memory retrieval, both semantic and 
episodic, is associated with the involvement of the intrinsic default mode network (DMN). Importantly, 
Piolino et al. (2009) emphasized that the lifelong changes in autobiographical memory play a critical 
role in the debate about the neural basis of EAM and SAM. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind the 
well-known temporal shift of autobiographical memories from episodic to semantic (Conway et al., 
1997). This temporal shift corresponds to the concept of semantization of long-term memories over time 
(Brewer, 1986), which suggests that long-term autobiographical memories become a combination of 
both subjective experiences of EAM and self-knowledge and facts of SAM (Cabeza and St Jacques, 
2007; Piolino et al., 2007; Westmacott and Moscovitch, 2003). Similarly, it is relevant to note the aspect 
of memory repetition, which also influences the autobiographical recollection. While re-living similar 
episodes (the so-called external repetition; for more detail see (Piolino et al., 2009) may lead to 
decontextualization of past events, thinking or talking about the past event (the so-called internal 
repetition) may enhance the details of the past events (Nadel et al., 2007; Rubin and Kozin, 1984). 
Renoult et al. (2012) suggested an intermediate category of declarative memory, the so-called personal 
semantics (i.e. autobiographical facts, such as “Jacob is the name of my brother”), which he compares 
to the general semantic knowledge about the world (such as “Jacob was the son of Isaac in the Old 
Testament). The authors pointed out that neuropsychological studies using Autobiographical Memory 
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Interview (AIM) of Kopelman et al. (1989) generally assume the same neural correlates of both personal 
and general semantics. Interestingly, several studies of Maguire and colleagues (Maguire and Frith, 
2003; Maguire and Mummery;1999) suggested an overlapping activity in medial prefrontal region for 
both personal and general semantics, however personal semantics showed stronger, left-lateralized 
activity in prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, temporal pole and temporoparietal junction. It is 
important to note that our current meta-analysis on SAM did not distinguish between studies 
investigating familiar, self-relevant semantic information (e.g., faces, places) and studies examining 
self-trait judgements. We highlight that our finding of CMS for SAM meta-analysis is similar to previous 
studies on self-referential processing, however we cannot exclude the possibility that separating the self-
referential judgements as an independent meta-analysis could have led to further findings. The inclusion 
of incongruent studies is an important limitation of the present meta-analysis on autobiographical 
memory. Future work should specifically focus on particular aspects of episodic and semantic 
autobiographical memory, including the personal semantic and general semantic memory and also 
improve the analysis with respect to BSC.  
 
Tulving (1972) theoretically differentiated two main components of autobiographical memory by their 
distinct states of consciousness. SAM has been characterized by the noetic consciousness (i.e. subjects 
remember personally relevant facts) (Schacter et al., 2007; Tulving, 2002). Contrary, autonoetic 
consciousness defines the EAM (i.e. subjects re-experience the past or project themselves into the future) 
(Tulving, 1972). Based on the evidence that both EAM and BSC recruit the lateral parietal cortex and 
given the fundamental link between BSC and EAM with multimodal subjective, conscious experiences, 
we hypothesized that there would be an anatomical overlap in this structure between BSC and 
autobiographical memory, specifically for the episodic (EAM), but not the semantic aspects (SAM). The 
present study confirms and extends previous EAM studies, by showing that the neural processes related to 
multisensory bodily processing are not only relevant for BSC, but also for consciousness concerning past 
events and EAM (i.e. autonoetic consciousness). Thus, the present ALE data on EAM and SAM 
corroborate the recent proposals about the involvement of the lateral parietal cortex, including the AG 
and adjacent regions of the superior temporal gyrus in EAM. Accruing evidence points toward the causal 
role of AG in the subjective, conscious recollection of past episodes. The current findings are thus 
consistent with the proposal that particularly the AG and not the cortical midline structures that are 
involved in the self-referential processing, is involved in integrating multiple memory features into a 
multi-modal (i.e. including sounds, smells, sights) conscious representation that enables the rich and 
vivid subjective re-living of an event.   
The present data suggest that AG (revealed by the study of Ionta et al. (2011) was jointly 
involved in BSC and EAM. Unlike neurological patients with damage to MTL structures 
(Scoville, 1957; Steinvorth et al., 2005), patients with lateral parietal lobe damage do not suffer 
from severe EAM deficits. For this reason, the subtler EAM impairments associated with 
? ???
damage to the lateral parietal cortex were previously largely overlooked. However, recent 
clinical studies investigating memory in patients with parietal lesions have provided valuable 
insights and especially highlighted contributions of the AG to EAM (Berryhill et al., 2007; 
Hower et al., 2014; Simons et al., 2010). Even though patients with damage to parietal cortex 
are able to retrieve past personal events, a number of such lesion studies revealed that the 
ventral part of the lateral parietal cortex, especially the left AG, is associated with the 
impairment of subjective re-experiencing of vivid, rich and multi-sensory EAM. Moreover, 
patients with parietal lobe damage often report lower confidence in the retrieval of their 
EAM. These findings suggest a particular role of AG in the subjective experience of EAM 
recollection and indicate that the MTL may not be sufficient for the full-blown subjective 
experience of the self in the past. Critically, it is important to mention a number of 
neuroimaging studies that have described the functional differentiation on the level of neural 
networks, which play a role in episodic memory retrieval, particularly the MTL structures and 
frontoparietal regions. These neuroimaging studies demonstrated that an activation within 
these latter brain circuits often reflects the memory recollection versus the subjective feeling 
of familiarity related to the contextual memory details (Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Rugg and 
Vilberg, 2013; Squire et al., 2004). This functional heterogeneity within parietal regions and 
between the sub-regions of MTL activity patterns supports the different aspects of 
autobiographical memory. For example, in the recent study of Brown et al. (2018), participants 
were asked to judge the temporal sequence of past events from their own life or lives of others. 
While activity in most of the MTL regions was related to episodic autobiographical memory, 
neural activity in superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus and hippocampal tail showed 
similar involvement for both episodic and semantic autobiographical memories. Importantly, 
activity in the angular gyrus revealed a graded pattern from episodic recollection to semantic 
remembering. Furthermore, several neuroimaging studies (Addis et al., 2004b, 2004a; Holland 
et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2004) showed enhanced activity in the left parahippocampus, left 
temporoparietal junction, fusiform gyri and right inferior temporal cortex when past events are 
repeated compared to unique events. Recently, Jonker et al. (2018) developed a paradigm 
during which participants encoded object-scene pairs, following with retrieval resulting in 
increased re-activation of both target objects and contextually related objects in a network 
including the hippocampus and posterior medial network of parietal regions, known as the 
default mode network (Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012; Rugg and Vilberg, 2013). Based on the 
present meta-analytical findings we suggest that BSC-related processing in bilateral AG may 
play an important role in EAM, especially with respect to subjective re-experiencing of 
EAM. However, it is important to highlight that this anatomical overlap between EAM and 
? ???
BSC is small and both cognitive functions have a largely separated basis. Furthermore, an 
important limitation of the present study is we could only include a single neuroimaging study 
that experimentally investigated self-location and first-person perspective. Future work will 
hopefully be able to perform meta-analysis also for these BSC components, thereby improving 
the analysis with respect to EAM, as well as with other forms of perspective manipulations 
relying on viewpoint changes or mental imagery. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent data in cognitive neuroscience suggest that the lateral parietal cortex contributes to the EAM 
retrieval. The present study extends earlier neuroimaging and neuropsychological patient work and 
provides preliminary evidence for shared neural parietal resources between BSC and EAM, but not 
SAM. The present data suggest that conscious re-experiencing of past life episodes (EAM) and the 
conscious on-line experience of being located and experiencing the world first-person (BSC) both 
depend on the lateral parietal cortex structures. We find that especially the AG is jointly involved 
bilaterally in processing related to BSC and EAM and may be a key structure for neural processing 
related to self-consciousness including conscious online experiencing and later re-experiencing in EAM. 
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Abstract 
Memory is an adaptive process that continuously updates itself, according to what information 
may be important to oneself in the future. Recently, it has been demonstrated that memory for 
older, neutral images can be selectively and retroactively enhanced by future emotional (fearful 
or rewarding) events, which are conceptually related to the neutral images, while unrelated 
events encoded at the same time did not profit from the retroactive strengthening. Personally 
meaningful past episodes, defined as episodic autobiographical memories (EAM), are related 
to our sense of bodily-self, the so-called bodily self-consciousness (BSC). We here 
hypothesized that the presence of the bodily-self in previously neutral scenes is a strong, salient 
stimulus that would retroactively strengthen the memory for these past episodes. We therefore 
used an immersive virtual reality (VR) system to test whether the presence of one’s own 
physical body can retroactively and selectively strengthen EAM. Our technology enabled us to 
study and demonstrate that the presence of one’s own physical body creates a strong retroactive 
effect and selectively strengthens EAM. First, we extend our recent findings by showing that 
the presence of congruent multisensory, visual and proprioceptive cues from one’s own 
physical body experimentally enhances EAM performance. Second, we demonstrate that these 
salient, bodily self-related cues can selectively and retroactively modify post-encoding memory 
consolidation. Our findings bring a new evidence that personally meaningful memories are not 
fixed, but may be weakened as well as strengthened by later self-relevant events, which is of 
relevance for the understanding of memory disorders. 
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Keywords: episodic autobiographical memory, bodily self-consciousness, post-encoding 
consolidation, behavioral tagging, real-life events 
 
Introduction 
Most events that we experience during our daily life will be forgotten 1,2. We form detailed and 
lasting memories only for a small part of our daily experiences. What determines which of the 
everyday experiences will be remembered? Past events that are personally meaningful and 
related to our sense of self tend to form into our episodic autobiographical memories (EAM) 3. 
EAM comprises precise information about the place, the time as well as the content of a self-
relevant, past event. We tend to remember salient past events, because the information may be 
relevant to us in the future. However, we do not always know when an important event will 
happen. In fact, many seemingly irrelevant life events may become important only with 
hindsight. For example, that stranger who asked for directions become more relevant after you 
realize that your wallet is missing. Synaptic and behavioral tagging hypotheses have suggested 
a neurobiological mechanism of memory consolidation, by which initially unstable and weak 
memories are retroactively strengthened by conceptually related strong event 4–8. It is crucial to 
temporarily store apparently irrelevant events in memory, in case these unimportant past events 
may gain unexpected importance later in time. Thus, these hypotheses suggest that initially 
weak memories may become strengthened, if these memories gain meaning later in time.  
 
Every event in our lives is encoded from the natural perspective of our own bodies (first-person 
perspective, 1PP) 9,10. Subjective re-experiencing of personal, past events is often described as 
from a viewpoint and location that is similar to that during encoding of the event. The conscious 
awareness of the self is intrinsically linked to the processing of multisensory bodily signals 11–
13. The subjective feeling that our body belongs to us (self-identification) and is placed at a 
particular position (self-location) belong to the fundamental aspects of bodily self-
consciousness (BSC) 12,14. In our recent study 15, we have examined the influence of congruent 
multisensory, visual and proprioceptive cues on episodic autobiographical memory. Crucially, 
this study showed that memory performance was significantly enhanced when participants 
viewed their body immersed in the virtual reality (VR) scenes during encoding, thus linking the 
sense of self and the bodily self-consciousness particularly to episodic autobiographical 
memory. This immersive VR technology, which provides a fully controlled, yet real life-like, 
self-relevant multisensory and contextually rich event, may be especially beneficial for the 
understanding of enhancements or impairments of self-relevant, personal episodic memory.  
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Recently, two behavioral studies demonstrated how memory for neutral images can be 
enhanced by future fearful 16 or rewarding 17 events, which were conceptually related to the 
neutral images. Consistently with the tag and capture mechanism 4, authors hypothesized that a 
weak synaptic tag may have been activated during a first phase, the so-called “pre-conditioning 
classification” of an incidental memory encoding. During the pre-conditioning classification, 
two neutral categories of images depicting animals and tools appeared to be of the same 
relevance. However, during a second phase of the incidental encoding, the so-called 
“conditioning classification”, a salient event, either fear conditioning or reward motivation, 
became associated with only one of the two categories of images. This association between a 
group of neutral images and salient event might have triggered selective protein-synthesis 
consolidation of the previously weak memory trace 4. As a result, during a later memory 
recognition task, participants remembered not only objects that were associated with fear or 
reward during the conditioning phase, but surprising they also remembered better the 
conceptually-related images from the pre-conditioning phase. Interestingly, the retroactive 
memory enhancement was not only category selective, but also time-dependent. Memory was 
strengthened with delay (24h or 6h), but not immediately after encoding, indicating that such 
form of memory consolidation required post-encoding long-term mechanisms 18–20. Although 
these two behavioral studies provided a new evidence that meaningful events may selectively 
consolidate memory for prior, seemingly insignificant information at the time of encoding, 
some important questions remain open. These studies demonstrated that re-prioritization, i.e. 
memory is retained if an information becomes relevant, occurs under fear conditioning 16 and 
when associated with a reward motivation 17. However, it remains unknown, whether this 
retroactively enhancing effect could be triggered with different type of salient events, such as 
the presence of one’s own physical body. In addition, previous studies used lab-based images 
of animals or tools presented on the computer screen to test the retroactive strengthening of 
episodic memory. Critically, it is not known whether retroactive strengthening would extend to 
more realistic and natural situations of past experiences. Using immersive VR technology that 
allows to test episodic autobiographical memory in a fully controlled setting may be particularly 
valuable for the understanding of personally meaningful, enhancing or impairing effects on 
memory.  
 
In a previous VR study 15, we showed that bodily self-relevant information at the encoding 
strengthens later memory for real-life events, thereby associating the bodily self-consciousness 
and one’s sense of self to episodic autobiographical memory. Here we tested whether bodily 
self-relevant cues, similar to the emotionally relevant cues, could retroactively enhance 
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previously encoded weak, neutral memories. Our main goal was thus to test whether the 
physical body selectively and retroactively strengthens the memory for contextual details of 
real life-like events. In order to test the selectivity of the retroactive memory strengthening, we 
used inside rooms and outside scenes as two distinct categories of events and tested whether 
the body-effect is category specific (experiment 2). We hypothesized that a.) the presence of 
one’s own physical body would retroactively enhance memory for real life-like events and that 
b.) the retroactive memory enhancing would be selective to conceptually related items (e.g., 
body-present condition in inside rooms would enhance prior memory of inside rooms, but not 
outside scenes), while unrelated items encoded (memory for outside scenes) at the same time 
would not benefit from the retroactive memory strengthening and vice versa. To test these two 
hypotheses, we used the Reality Substitution technology (RealiSM), a novel form of mixed 
virtual and augmented reality. As in our previous study 15, this VR technology allowed us to 
present real-life episodes and manipulate particular details in them. We were able to immerse 
and manipulate the presence or absence of the participants’ physical bodies in the inside rooms 
and outside scenes, so that they felt as if they were present in there. Thus, our technology 
enabled us to further examine the link between self-processes in BSC and EAM by immersing 
participants into contextually rich, inside rooms and outside scenes (similar to encoding animals 
and tools in the previous two studies 16,17). Instead of using fear conditioning or reward, we 
associated one of the two conditions (i.e. rooms or scenes) with a presence or absence of one’s 
own physical body. 
 
Prior to testing our key hypothesis that the memory enhancing, bodily self-related effect is 
category specific, we had to create VR compatible inside rooms and outside scenes as two 
distinct categories of events (similar to animals and tools). For this, we followed-up on our prior 
study 15 in which we used inside rooms and showed that the presence of one’s own physical 
body enhanced the memory for real-life like events of those inside room. Here, we expanded 
the experimental setting to new paradigms consisting of outside scenes (experiment 1), into 
which were participants immersed during two stages (encoding and retrieval) of EAM testing. 
We hypothesized that the memory for contextual details of the outside scenes (similar to inside 
rooms) and the subjective confidence in one-hour delay memory recognition task would 
increase in the body-present compared to body-absent condition.  
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Results  
Experiment 1: Body x nobody condition  
In order to assess the enhancement of memory for real-life like events based on the presence or 
absence of one’s own physical body, participants were immersed into 2 outside scenes (similar 
to previous study with inside rooms) that were pre-recorded and played via a head mounted 
display (HMD). To familiarize with the VR technology, each participant was immersed into a 
scene for 5 minutes. We specifically asked the participants to remain seated, turn and look 
around and to explore the environment. The experiment consisted of 2 sessions, an incidental 
encoding task (session 1) followed by one-hour delayed surprise memory recognition task 
(session 2). The design and procedure are depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Study paradigm of experiment 1. First, participants incidentally learned the context of two 
different outside scenes (i.e. encoding session; 10min). Participants were immersed back into the scenes 
with one-hour delay and were asked to perform a recognition task together with subjective confidence 
ratings for each presented scene (i.e. retrieval session; 30 min). Before the actual study, participants 
were seated in a chair, they were asked to put on the HMD and noise-cancelling headphones to avoid 
external disturbances and familiarised themselves with the VR technology (10min).  
 
The main manipulation (i.e. the presence or absence of one’s physical body) was accomplished 
with the use of the stereoscopic depths cameras (i.e. turning them on/off) to capture in real-time 
participants’ bodies from the 1PP. In one scene, participants could see their physical hand, trunk 
and legs, hence there was a visual feedback of the physical body (i.e. the stereoscopic depths 
cameras were turned on) (Figure 2a). In the second scene, there was no visual feedback of 
subject’s body (i.e. the stereoscopic depths cameras were turned off) (Figure 2b). The order of 
presentation of the body and nobody condition was counterbalanced between participants.  
? ???
 
Figure 2: An example of physical bodily-self manipulation in the pre-recorded outside scene. 
Participants were asked to point with their finger at the moving ball. 2a. Participants experienced the 
feeling of being physically present in the outside scene as they had the visual feedback of seeing their 
physical hand. 2b. Participants were physically pointing at the ball, but there was no visual feedback.  
 
10 daily-life objects, such as a flowerpot or a bench in a park, were positioned in both scenes 
during the memory encoding session (session 1). Each scene included different set of 10 objects 
in order to keep the same level of novelty and to avoid any facilitation on the following 
recognition task. During the memory retrieval session (session 2), scenes stayed either exactly 
the same as during encoding (i.e. the same positioned 10 daily-life objects) or some of the 
objects (i.e. 1, 2 or 3 objects) were replaced by new objects. In total, 20 objects were presented 
in the 2 outside scene. 
 
In order to examine whether objective memory performance ratings differed depending on the 
body x nobody condition for hit rate and confidence hit, statistical analysis relied on a paired t-
test. During the one-hour delayed condition, participants showed a significantly higher hit rate 
in the body condition (M = 77.8, SEM = 5.0) than in the nobody condition (M = 59.2, SEM = 
9.4); t (13) = 2.4, p = 0.02 (Figure 3a). These data show that participants had greater objective 
EAM performance in the one-hour delayed condition for outside scenes when tested with their 
body present than absent during initial memory encoding. Interestingly, the subjective 
confidence ratings for hits in the body group (M = 4.9, SEM = 0.2) were not significantly 
different from the nobody group (M = 4.2, SEM = 0.4); t (13) = 1.7, p = 0.1 (Figure 3b). 
Similarly, to examine the false alarm rate and confidence false alarm for subjective confidence 
ratings depending on the body x nobody condition, a paired t-test was performed. False alarm 
rates did not differ between both groups (body group: M = 25.4, SEM = 3.5; nobody group: M 
= 20.0, SEM = 3.0; t (13) = 1.0, p = 0.2) (Figure 3c). However, participants were subjectively 
more confident when making false alarms in the body group (M = 4.5, SEM = 0.2) than in the 
nobody group (M = 3.8, SEM = 0.3); t (13) = 2.1, p = 0.05 (Figure 3b). These results show that 
both the objective EAM as well as the subjective confidence for false alarms increased in the 
body condition. 
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Figure 3: EAM performance in experiment 1 (body x nobody, one-hour delay memory recognition 
task). EAM performance (hit rate, false alarm rates) and subjective confidence ratings are indicated in 
percentage + SEM. (**) P < 0.01; (*) P < 0.05. 3a. Hit Rate; 3b. Confidence ratings (Hits); 3c. False 
Alarm Rate; 3d. Confidence ratings (False alarms). 
 
In order to test the effects of the body condition (i.e. body present x body absent) and the number 
of objects changed (i.e. 1 object, 2 objects or 3 objects) on the false alarm rates and on the 
confidence for the false alarms, 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was performed. This analysis 
was thus conducted on false alarm rates as by definition no objects changed for hits. The results 
revealed a statistically significant main effect for the objects changed F (2, 26) = 0.8, p < 0.0005, 
partial η2 = 0.6 (Figure 4a). Pairwise comparisons were performed for statistically significant 
main effects and revealed that participants made progressively fewer false alarms with 
increasing number of objects (all p-values < 0.0005). We conclude that the number of false 
alarms decrease with increasing number of replaced old objects for new ones compared to the 
original encoding stage. Likewise, we tested whether the subjective confidence in the 
performance accuracy (i.e. confidence ratings for false alarms trials) depended on the number 
of objects changed (i.e. 1 object, 2 objects, 3 objects) within each scene and on the one hour 
delayed performance. There was a statistically significant main effect for objects changed F (2, 
26) = 10.3, p = 0.006, partial η2 = 0.4. Post-hoc analysis revealed a statistically significant 
change from 1 object to 3 objects (p < 0.03; Bonferroni corrected) (Figure 4b). These data 
suggest that the number of false alarms as well as the subjective confidence for number of false 
alarms decrease with an increasing number of replaced old objects for new ones. 
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Figure 4: False Alarm versus Number of Objects Changed (i.e. 1 item, 2 objects, 3 objects). EAM 
performance is indicated in percentage + SEM are indicated. (**) P < 0.01; (*) P < 0.05. 4a. False Alarm 
versus Number of Objects changed 4b. Confidence Rate for False Alarm versus Number of Objects 
changed. 
 
In this first experiment, we thus demonstrate that the presence of congruent multisensory cues 
from one’s body experimentally enhances the objective EAM performance. This finding 
expands our previous paradigm of inside rooms 15, by showing here that the embodied-self 
modifies the objective recollection of every-day like EAM using our novel outside scenes. 
Several VR paradigms have been used in the research on embodiment (for a review, see 12) and 
showed BSC can be modulated by showing the body or body parts of the participant from 
different first-person viewpoints compared to showing no body at all. Here, we extend this BSC 
principle to memory research by showing that the recognition of real life-like scenes that 
included the subject’s body (as is characteristic of normal everyday perception) was modulated 
and significantly enhanced with respect to the same scenes without such a bodily view. 
 
Experiment 2:  Retroactive Strengthening 
In order to investigate whether the physical body selectively and retroactively strengthens the 
memory for contextual details of real life-like events, participants were immersed into distinct 
rooms and scenes. Our aim was to examine whether bodily cues would retroactively boost 
previously encoded neutral memories. The encoding task (session 1) had two phases: the pre-
body phase (phase 1) and body vs. nobody phase (phase 2). Importantly, to avoid any potential 
rehearsal effect, participants were not instructed to memorize (incidental encoding), followed 
by a one-hour delayed surprise memory recognition task (session 2) (Figure 5). During “the 
pre-body phase” (phase 1), 2 inside rooms and 2 outside scenes were presented each with 10 
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daily-life objects (e.g., table, painting in the inside rooms; bike, barbecue grill in the outside 
scenes). Objects were presented one at a time, each placed in a different position. The pre-body 
phase (phase 1) was similar to the “pre-conditioning classification task” (phase 1) of an 
incidental memory encoding in the two previous selectively and retroactively strengthening 
memory studies 16,17. During “the body x nobody phase” (phase 2), 2 new inside rooms and 2 
new outside scenes were presented each with 10 novel daily-life objects (e.g., lamp, candle 
stand in the inside rooms; balloon, garden playhouse in the outside scenes) one at the time. 
Participants were asked to find the object and physically point at it. The body x nobody phase 
(phase 2) was similar to the “conditioning classification task” (phase 2) of an incidental memory 
encoding in the two previous studies 16,17. In the previous studies, a salient event (fear or reward) 
applied during phase 2 became associated with only one of the two categories (tools or animals) 
of images. In our current study, we have substituted the fear conditioning or reward motivation 
with the presence or the absence of one’s own physical body and used inside and outside rooms 
as the two testing categories. During the memory retrieval stage, all 4 inside rooms and 4 outside 
scenes were presented again with total of 40 old objects (seen during phase 1 and phase 2 of 
encoding) and 40 new objects per each room or per each scene, serving as distractors. Each 
object was presented one at a time.  
 
Figure 5: Study paradigm of experiment 2. First, participants explored 2 empty rooms and 2 empty 
scenes without any object for 15sec each. Participants were then instructed to find daily-life objects (40 
total) belonging to inside rooms (20 objects) and outside scenes (20 objects) and press a button once 
they found it during the pre-body conditioning (phase1). During the body x nobody condition (phase 2), 
participants explored 2 new empty rooms and 2 new empty scenes without any object for 15sec each. 
Participants were then instructed to find new set of daily-life objects (40 total) belonging to inside rooms 
(20 objects) and outside scenes (20 objects) and point toward the object once they found it. During the 
memory retrieval, participants were asked to recognize each object as new/old and rate how confident 
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they are about the answer.  
 
In order to test the effects of the body condition (i.e. body present vs. body absent) and the 
phase (pre-body condition vs. body x nobody condition) on the memory for contextual details 
of real life-like events, repeated measures ANOVA was performed. Follow-up t-test were 
conducted separately for each phase (phase 1 and phase 2). Where appropriate, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections of degrees of freedom were used. Significant ANOVA effects were 
explored by post-hoc tests using Bonferroni correction. The significant level was set to alpha 
0.05. A significant main effect of body condition (i.e. body x nobody) was found in the 
retroactive, one-hour delayed group for contextual details of real life-like events. F (1, 14) = 
0.8, p < 0.0005, partial η2 = 0.6. As predicted from results of Experiment 1 and our previous 
study 15, a memory enhancement was also found in the body condition (M = 55.0, SEM = 3.5) 
x nobody condition (M = 46.3, SEM = 3.3) for items shown in phase 2 (t (14) = 2.4, p = 0.02) 
(Figure 6b). More importantly, the body effect on memory extended retroactively for the 
conceptually related objects that were observed in the pre-body condition (phase 1), even if the 
body was not shown at that phase. Specifically, the follow up t-tests revealed that EAM 
performance for the hit rate was higher in the pre-body (M = 57.6, SEM = 3.1) as compared to 
the pre-nobody condition (M = 49.5, SEM = 3.6); (t (14) = 2.22, p = 0.04 (Figure 6a). These 
results suggest that weak memories from the pre-body phase once conceptually related acquired 
salient relevance.  
 
 
Figure 6: EAM performance in experiment 2 (one-hour delay memory retrieval). EAM performance 
(hit rate) is indicated in percentage + SEM. (**) P < 0.01; (*) P < 0.05. 6a. Pre-conditioning/pre-body 
hit rate (phase 1); 6b. Body x nobody Hit rate (phase 2).  
Our findings bring a new evidence for retroactive memory enhancement, showing that also multisensory 
bodily self-related cues can significantly modify post-encoding memory consolidation. This finding 
confirms and extends the findings of previous studies 16,17 by showing that a.) the presence of one’s own 
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physical body does retroactive enhance memory for real life-like events and that b.) the retroactive 
memory enhancing is specific to conceptually related items encoded in real life-like scenes. 
 
Discussion  
In two experiments, we explored the relationship between multisensory bodily cues and 
memory recollection for contextual information. The main finding (experiment 2) is that 
memory for seemingly insignificant every-day details of neutral real life-like events can be 
enhanced, if future conceptually related details acquire salience by the presence of one’s own 
physical body. Recent behavioral studies 16,17 showed that emotional learning (aversive as well 
as appetitive) can retroactively and selectively strengthen memories for conceptually related 
neutral events. However, unlike in the previous lab-based episodic memory studies, we used 
our VR technology, which a.) enabled us to immerse our participants and their physical bodies 
into complex real-life inside rooms and outside scenes, thus creating the subjective feeling of 
being physically present in there and b.) experimentally control both stages of memory 
encoding and retrieval and manipulate the presence or absence of participants’ own physical 
bodies in the real-life like events. Here, we provide an experimental evidence that the memory 
for real life-like events may be explicitly manipulated by the self-related, bodily cues. In this 
study, we argue that the experience of the physical bodily-self is intrinsically linked to the 
autobiographical-self as we show that the memory for episodic details gets enhanced in the 
body-present condition compared to the body-absent condition. Furthermore, the effect of the 
bodily-self retroactively and selectively boosts initially weak memories as compared to no 
enhancement of the bodily-absent effect. 
 
Our findings suggest that the self-relevant, episodic memories and self-related, multisensory 
processing underlying the BSC are intimately linked together. Here, we argue that the 
fundamental aspect underlying both EAM and BSC is the autonoetic consciousness, the 
subjective human ability to mentally travel in time and re-experience self-relevant events 21. 
Previous lines of research succeeded in experimentally manipulating multisensory bodily 
stimuli to induce changes in distinct components of BSC, including self-identification (the 
experience of identifying with one’s body), self-location (the experience of where I am in space) 
and 1PP (the experience of from where do I perceive the world) 11,12. For instance, tactile 
stimulation of a subject’s hand or body coupled with spatially and temporally synchronous 
stroking of a viewed virtual hand or body gives rise to illusory self-identification and illusory 
self-location over a virtual body 22–24. Here, and in our previous study 15, we demonstrated that 
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multisensory bodily cues – in this case the presence and the congruency of body cues with body 
movements in VR – affect higher-level cognitive processes related to the self, such as EAM.  
 
The current study makes a step further in linking BSC and EAM. Our findings reveal that bodily 
cues enhance retroactively memory for previously encoded episodic events. Memory 
consolidation is a dynamic process by which an experience is transformed into a long-term 
memory 20,25–27. What determines which memories may last, while others fade? While we may 
not consciously remember all the insignificant details of our every-day lives, we tend to 
remember those details of past events, which may become useful for predicting and controlling 
important events in the future 28, Yet, it seems to be relevant to temporarily store 
inconsequential details of events, in case these details may gain saliency later in time. The study 
of Frey and Morris 4 provided a neurobiological mechanism that suggests that initially weak 
and unstable memories are tagged for later stabilization by long-term potentiation (LTP) 
processes. This neurobiological mechanism has been extended to show how weak training of 
rats, which would be forgotten, may be stored in long-term memory after a novel behavioral 
experience, the so-called behavioral tagging 6,29,30. However, whether the behavioral tagging 
also occurs in humans was unknown until the recent behavioral studies 16,17. These studies 
demonstrated that only specific, older events that were conceptually related to following salient 
experiences, become selectively enhanced while other older, unrelated information that was 
encoded at the same time did not benefit from the retroactive strengthening. This effect was 
found only with delay, but not immediately after the encoding, which suggest the importance 
of post-encoding consolidation processes. Studies of post-encoding consolidation suggest that 
various processes may predict better memory performance. For example, memory performance 
has been shown to correlate with experience dependent hippocampal-cortical functional 
connectivity 18, persistence of multi-voxel patterns into rest and active task 31 as well as 
associative memory consolidation 32. The typical delay for hippocampal consolidation 
processes starts at approximately one hour 20,25–27. Therefore, we showed that enhanced self-
relevance and recruitment of BSC-related processing in the present experiments improves not 
only the memory for contextual details of real life-like events, but also the contextual details of 
seemingly irrelevant events at the time of encoding, which gained importance only later in time. 
These findings are raising many questions, especially about the relation between self-relevant 
information and bodily-self processes in time.  
 
To conclude, our current work provides a new evidence for selective and retroactive 
consolidation of conscious self-experiences that are conceptually related to future events, which 
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are linked to the processing of multisensory bodily signals. A compelling implication of our 
findings suggest that it may be critical to temporarily store seemingly irrelevant everyday life 
episodic autobiographical details, because they may gain future relevance. Future work, 
including neuroimaging should investigate whether the post-encoding memory consolidation 
processes that are underlying the results as described in the present experiments and those by 
previous authors rely on similar or distinct mechanisms. 
 
Methods  
Participants  
The sample of experiment 1 consisted of 15 right-handed participants (M = 26.1, SEM = 0.9, 
10 female). The study sample of experiment 2 consisted of 16 right-handed participants (M = 
25.3, SEM = 1.6, 10 female). The sample size was based on the sample size from our previous 
study 15. Informed consents were obtained from all our participants. The study was approved 
by the local ethical committee and the two experiments were conducted in conformity with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Reality Substitution technology (RealiSM) 
Similar to our previous study 15, we created realistic outside scenes, from which participants 
could see their own hands, trunk and legs from 1PP. Participants felt immersed into the pre-
recorded scenes and seeing themselves present there. The VR technology included spherical 
capture and recording system for 1PP simulations of real-life environments. 16 cameras and 
microphones covered the whole sphere of perception around a viewpoint (over 360° 
horizontally and vertically, stereoscopic vision, binaural panoramic audio). RealiSM software 
combined all data into a high-resolution panoramic audiovisual computer format (equivalent to 
more than 4 stereoscopic full HD movies). A head-mounted display (HMD, 640 x 800 
resolution, 110° diagonal field of view; Oculus Rift Development kit; Oculus VR) was used to 
immerse participants into the pre-recorded outside scenes. Stereoscopic depths cameras were 
attached on the HMD to capture participants’ bodies (i.e. cameras were on/off) from the 1PP.  
 
Experiment 1 
Encoding Session 
Participants were immersed in 2 different outside scenes. In the beginning of the experiment, a 
ball appeared in each of the 2 outside scenes and started to freely move around for 30 seconds. 
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Participants were asked to visually follow a movement of the ball. This attention task was 
created in order to assure that participants fully explored both of the 360° pre-recorded scenes. 
Moreover, participants were asked to follow the trajectory of the ball by physically pointing at 
the moving ball with their finger.  
 
Retrieval Session 
One hour after the encoding session, participants re-visited the same outside scenes they 
explored during the encoding. There were 3 blocks of 40 trials, each trial lasting 10 seconds. 
Within the 3 blocks of 40 trials, 10 trials were presented as exactly the same as during the 
original encoding session (i.e. including the same previously presented everyday-life 10 
objects). 30 trials were modified and presented with either 1, 2 or 3 new objects replaced by the 
old ones. The blocks and individual trials were presented in a randomized order. Participants 
were free to re-explore each outside scene for 10 seconds, after which they were asked two 
questions. The instructions were displayed on a black background of the HDM display. First, 
participants were asked whether each scene looked exactly the same as when they first saw it. 
Participants were holding a wireless computer mouse, by which they provided the answers (i.e. 
yes/no). Second, participants were asked how confident they were about their answer. The 
scale, which appeared in their HDM display was from 0 to 6 and by pressing the computer 
mouse, participants selected their answers.  
 
Experiment 2 
Encoding Session 
In experiment 2, participants were asked to explore 2 empty inside rooms and 2 empty outside 
scenes for 15 seconds. After the 15 seconds, participants were immersed into the same rooms 
and outdoor scenes again. There was one object at the time appearing in each environment for 
10 seconds. Participants were asked to find the object and press a button of a wireless computer 
mouse if they found it. All participants understood the instructions and successfully found each 
object in the outside scenes and inside rooms. In total there were 40 objects presented during 
the pre-body phase (phase 1). After 5 minutes break, participants were immersed into 2 novel 
empty inside rooms and 2 novel empty outside scenes for 15 seconds. During this body x 
nobody phase (phase 2), participants were first asked to explore the 4 empty environments. 
After the 15 seconds, participants were immersed into the same rooms and outdoor scenes 
again. There was one object at the time appearing in each environment for 10 seconds. 
Participants were asked to find the object and physically point at it if they found it. All 
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participants understood the instructions and successfully found each object in the outside scenes 
and inside rooms. The main manipulation (i.e. the presence or absence of one’s physical body) 
was specific to either 2 inside rooms or 2 outside scenes in phase 2. Crucially, in the body 
condition, participants could see their physical hand, trunk and legs while physically pointing 
at the objects in either the rooms or scenes, while in the nobody condition only the scene, 
without the body was visible. The presentation of the body x nobody condition was 
counterbalanced between participants. No explicit instructions to memorize the objects of 
visited rooms were provided. Participants were not informed that their memory for stimuli 
encountered during the encoding session would be tested during the retrieval session. Before 
the actual study, participants were seated in a chair, they were asked to put on the HMD and 
noise-cancelling headphones to avoid external disturbances and familiarized themselves with 
the VR technology similarly to experiment 1.   
 
Retrieval Session 
Participants were informed that they would re-visit the same outside scenes and inside rooms 
again in 4 blocks of 20 trials, each trial lasting 10 seconds. Within the 4 blocks of 20 trials, 10 
trials were presented with exactly the same 10 objects (old) as during the original encoding 
session and 10 trials with 10 new objects. Participants were free to re-explore each outside scene 
and inside room for 10 seconds, after which they were asked two questions. The instructions 
were displayed on a black background of the HDM display. First, participants were asked 
whether each object was the same as when they first saw it. Participants were holding a wireless 
computer mouse by which they provided the answers (i.e. yes/no). Second, as in experiment 1, 
participants were asked how confident they were about their answer. The scale, which appeared 
in their HDM display was from 0 to 6 and by pressing the computer mouse, participants selected 
their answers. 
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Abstract 
The temporal structure of self-generated cognition is a key attribute to the formation of a 
meaningful stream of consciousness. Recent fMRI studies suggested that functionally distinct 
networks are activated at the same time during task-initiated self-generated processing, 
seemingly in contradiction with overwhelming evidence that information processing evolves 
through a stream of discrete conscious units. Here, we analysed both fMRI resting states and 
EEG microstates to probe the temporal dynamics of self-generated cognition. Participants were 
asked to mentally retrieve self-relevant past events or to perform serial mental arithmetic 
operations, thereby shifting from self-related to self-unrelated thoughts. BOLD activity 
mapping revealed selective enhanced activity in temporal, parietal and occipital areas during 
the memory compared to the mental arithmetic condition, evincing their role in integrating the 
re-experienced past events into conscious representations during memory retrieval. Functional 
connectivity analysis showed that these regions were organized in two major subparts, 
previously associated to “scene-reconstruction” and “self-experience” subsystems. EEG 
microstate analysis allowed studying these participant-driven thoughts in the millisecond range 
by determining the temporal dynamics of brief periods of stable scalp potential fields. This 
analysis revealed selective modulation of occurrence and duration of specific microstates in the 
memory and in the mental arithmetic condition, respectively. EEG source analysis revealed 
similar spatial distributions of the sources of these microstates and the regions identified with 
fMRI. These findings imply a functional link between BOLD activity changes in regions related 
to a certain mental activity and the temporal dynamics of mentation, and support growing 
evidence that specific fMRI networks can be captured with EEG as repeatedly occurring brief 
? ????
periods of integrated coherent neuronal activity, lasting only fractions of seconds. 
 
1.? Introduction 
Spontaneous mentation is neither random nor meaningless (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015), 
however how to precisely capture the wandering mind and attribute it to specific cognitive 
thoughts, is yet unclear (Fox et al., 2015). One way to better understand the neural mechanism 
of self-generated cognition is to instruct participants to think of specific experiences during a 
certain period with eyes closed (Benoit and Schacter, 2015; Stawarczyk and D’Argembeau, 
2015). A recent fMRI study by Axelrod and colleagues (Axelrod et al., 2017) employed this 
technique to distinguish different brain processes that are at work during internal mentation. 
They showed, as expected, that the Default Mode Network (DMN) dominated during self-
generated processing, independent of the type of mental experience (future/past imagery, 
episodic memory, empathizing). The authors then compared this activation pattern with the 
brain responses to specific cognitive tasks, i.e. self-referential processing, scene reconstruction 
and language-related processing, and showed that different parts of the DMN correlated with 
these task-related networks. These observations thus suggested that different cognitive 
processes are activated at the same time during internal mentation. 
Notwithstanding the importance of this finding in the context of the multi-component account 
of the DMN, the notion of simultaneity is relative. It depends on the time scale we are looking 
at. Already in 1890, William James postulated that the stream of consciousness is not 
continuous, but parsed in a series of states of mind (James, 1890). He argued that during such 
states we have only one conscious thought with a unitary content, however complex it may be, 
which will be distinct from the thought in the previous or following mind state. Since then, an 
accumulation of theoretical and experimental evidence supports the concept of spontaneous 
mental activity as being discontinuous and parsed into a series of conscious states, which 
behave as discrete spatiotemporal patterns of global neuronal activity. Terms such as “pulses 
of consciousness” (James, 1890), “perceptual frames” (Efron, 1970), “neuronal workspace” 
(Baars, 1997; Dehaene et al., 1998), “heteroclinic channel” (Rabinovich et al., 2001), or 
“structure flow on manifolds” (Huys et al., 2014) describe various concepts of parcellation of 
consciousness into sequential episodes (for reviews see (Deco et al., 2011; Meehan and 
Bressler, 2012; Michel and Koenig, 2018)). The prevailing hypothesis of all these concepts is 
that only one global state exists at any moment in time and that conscious mentation emerges 
by serial appearance of such states (Seth and Baars, 2005). This appears in contradiction to the 
observations of the study of Axelrod and colleagues (Axelrod et al., 2017), which states that 
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different cognitive processes are activated at the same time during internal mentation. The 
reason for this contradiction is that the temporal dynamics of neural networks observed with 
fMRI are driven by fluctuations on a time scale of tens to hundreds of seconds, due to the 
sluggish nature of the hemodynamic response function that drives the activity-related BOLD 
signals (Preti et al., 2017). This is clearly not the time scale in which cognitive mental activities 
fluctuate. As pointed out repeatedly by Steven Bressler and colleagues (Bressler, 1995; Bressler 
and Tognoli, 2006), large-scale neuronal networks have to change on a sub-second time scale 
to adapt to momentary thoughts. Thus, even if dynamic functional connectivity methods are 
used to analyse fMRI resting state networks, they cannot capture the fastest, most elementary 
temporal changes of cognitive activities during spontaneous mentation, and are thus not 
appropriate to understand the neural mechanisms underlying the temporal flow of thoughts in 
the wandering mind (Kucyi, 2017). 
EEG microstate analysis allows to investigate these fast temporal dynamics of large-scale 
neural networks and to access information about the functional organization of spontaneous 
mentation in time (Michel and Koenig, 2018; Van De Ville et al., 2010). EEG microstates 
reflect brief epochs of coherent neuronal activity that persist for around 100 milliseconds 
(Khanna et al., 2015; Michel and Koenig, 2018). Previous studies demonstrated that the 
occurrence, duration and sequence of EEG microstates determine the quality of spontaneous 
mentation, and as such could represent the basic building blocks of conscious mental processes 
(Lehmann et al., 1998). EEG microstates thus qualify as the electrophysiological manifestation 
of the segmentation of ongoing mental activity into short-lasting brain states (Baars, 2002; 
Changeux and Michel, 2004; Michel and Koenig, 2018). Only a few studies have tried to relate 
EEG microstates to specific cognitive processes (Lehmann et al., 1998; Milz et al., 2016; 
Seitzman et al., 2016) and none of these studies compared the EEG microstates directly to the 
underlying brain networks observed with fMRI during the same processes. 
The overall goal of this study was to capture the occurrence of spontaneous thoughts within 
specific, externally-controlled cognitive domains, using ultra-high field 7T fMRI and high-
density 64-channel EEG recordings to obtain both hemodynamic and electrophysiological 
signatures with high functional sensitivity. Fifteen healthy participants were recorded during 
spontaneous mentation (hereafter termed “rest condition”) and while focusing their thoughts 
repeatedly for periods of 20sec with eyes closed on either episodic, self-related memories 
associated with a briefly presented image (“memory condition”), or arithmetic calculations 
(“math condition”). Consistent with cognitive tasks that require working memory and direct the 
attention outside of the self (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), we chose the math condition as a 
? ????
control condition in order to selectively de-activate regions that become active in 
autobiographic episodic memory retrieval (Foster et al., 2012, 2015).  
To probe functional changes specific to the distinct cognitive domains, we compared the spatial 
distribution of local BOLD activity changes, as well as their organization in large-scale 
networks, across conditions. We then examined the fast temporal organization of the brain’s 
large-scale network dynamics, using the EEG microstate approach. Specifically, we focused on 
the most basic characteristics of the EEG microstate temporal dynamics: their duration, their 
frequency of occurrence and their transition probabilities. Finally, we estimated the brain 
networks generating the EEG microstates and compared them to the fMRI networks.  
 
2.?  Methods 
2.1.? Participants and Experimental Paradigm 
We included 15 healthy participants (30.5±5.5years, 5 male/10 female) in this study. The work 
was approved by the institutional review board of the local ethics committee, and all 
participants provided written informed consent prior to the experiment.  
Each participant underwent three sessions: i. an interview session, ii. an EEG recording session, 
and iii. an fMRI session. During the interview, all participants performed a classical 
autobiographical memory questionnaire (ABMQ) (Rubin et al., 2003) in order to select vividly 
remembered images, which were then used for the EEG and for the fMRI sessions, which 
included three distinct conditions each (Figure 1): eyes-closed rest  (6min), mentally retrieving 
personal past episodes (10min), and mental arithmetic operations (10min). The memory and 
math conditions comprised twenty 30-s trials each. On each trial, a personal image (e.g., photo 
of a participant with a birthday cake) or a calculation (e.g., 447-7=) was presented for 5sec, 
followed by a 20sec period of closed-eyes during which the participants retrieved the past event 
or continued to serially subtract/add the given number. After this period, there was a question: 
“How much did you relive the original event?” for the memory task and “How much attention 
did you pay to the calculation?” for the mental arithmetic task. The time allowed to read and 
respond to the question was 5sec. Participants answered by a button press (1=”not at all”, to 
4=”fully”). The ratings confirmed active involvement of our participants with high confidence 
ratings that were comparable between the EEG (M=3.2, SEM=0.12) and the fMRI (M=3.1, 
SEM=0.11) memory session as well as the EEG (M=3.5, SEM=0.12) and the fMRI (M=3.41, 
SEM=0.11) math session.   
? ????
 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental paradigm.  
Each experimental session started with a 6 min eyes-closed rest condition followed by two counter-
balanced experimental conditions. In the memory conditions, participants saw a personal image for 5sec, 
after which they closed their eyes and had to retrieve the event. After each trial, participants were 
prompted by a brief flash of light to open their eyes, and answered a control question with a button press: 
“How much did you relive the original event?” (scale 1= “not at all” to 4= “fully”). Before the scanning, 
all participants performed a classical autobiographical memory questionnaire (ABMQ) (Rubin et al., 
2003) in order to select the 20 most vividly remembered images that were then shown during the task. 
In the math condition, participants saw a formula presented for 5 sec on the screen. They then closed 
their eyes and were asked to continually subtract the number from the preceding result for 20 sec. After 
each trial, participants answered to the question “How much attention did you pay to the calculation?” 
by button press (scale 1= “not at all” to 4= “fully”). 
 
2.2.? fMRI Acquisition and Analysis 
2.2.1.? fMRI Acquisition  
The fMRI sessions were conducted on an actively shielded Magnetom 7T head scanner (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany), equipped with AC84 head gradients (80mT/m max. gradient strength, 333 T/m/s 
max. slew-rate) and an 8-channel transmit/receive head loop array (Rapid Biomedical, Rimpar, 
Germany). During each paradigm, whole-brain functional data were acquired using a simultaneous 
multi-slice (SMS) 2D GE-EPI sequence, with TR/TE = 1000/22ms, α = 54°, 110×110 matrix size with 
2.0 mm isotropic spatial resolution, 75 sagittal slices with 3× SMS acceleration and 1/3 field-of-view 
(FOV) CAIPI shift (Setsompop et al., 2012), 2× in-plane GRAPPA acceleration (anterior-posterior 
direction) and 7/8 partial Fourier undersampling. This protocol was designed to simultaneously provide 
fairly high temporal resolution (1 volume/s) and spatial resolution (2-mm voxel width), with whole-
brain coverage. For each subject, an additional 5-volume scan was also performed with reversed phase 
encoding direction (posterior-anterior), for subsequent correction of susceptibility-induced EPI 
distortions. To aid spatial co-registration, T1-weighted anatomical data were acquired with a 3D 
MP2RAGE sequence (Marques et al., 2010) with TR/TI1/TI2/TE = 5500/750/2350/1.87 ms and 1.0 mm 
isotropic spatial resolution. 
 
2.2.2.? fMRI Pre-processing  
The fMRI data were processed using the FMRIB Software Library (FSL v5.0, Oxford, UK) combined 
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with Matlab routines developed in-house (Mathworks, Natick MA, USA). Data pre-processing included 
motion correction (MCFLIRT tool, 6 degrees of freedom) (Jenkinson et al., 2002), slice-timing 
adjustment (set to the middle of each TR, via linear interpolation), brain segmentation (BET tool) 
(Smith, 2002), Gaussian spatial smoothing (FWHM = 4mm) and temporal de-trending (100sec cut-off). 
To reduce contributions from head motion, a set of 24 confound regressors derived from the motion 
parameter time courses were regressed out of the fMRI data by general linear model analysis. Each 
dataset was co-registered to the standard MNI space as follows: first, for each subject, the fMRI data 
were B0-unwarped using FSL-TOPUP (Andersson et al., 2003) and brought to the subject’s anatomical 
space using FLIRT with boundary-based registration (Greve and Fischl, 2009) (12 degrees of freedom). 
The co-registration to MNI space was then determined using the anatomical images, again through 
FLIRT (12 degrees of freedom). 
 
2.2.3.? Fractional Amplitude of Low Frequency Fluctuations (fALFF) Analysis  
Voxel-wise fALFF values were estimated for the pre-processed fMRI data of each subject and paradigm, 
in native space, as proposed by Zou et al. (Zou et al., 2008): the time series of each voxel was 
transformed to the frequency domain and the sum of amplitudes in the 0.01–0.08 Hz interval was divided 
by the sum of amplitudes of the full frequency band. The individual fALFF maps thus obtained for each 
paradigm and subject were then brought to MNI space for group analysis. The fALFF maps were 
compared between the memory and math conditions using paired T-tests across subjects, and statistical 
significance was determined using topological false-discovery rate (FDR) inference to correct for 
multiple comparisons (Chumbley et al., 2010) (cluster-forming threshold T > 2.20, FDR α = 5%). 
 
2.2.4.? Functional Connectivity Analysis  
The brain regions (clusters) displaying significant fALFF changes between the memory and math 
conditions were further considered for connectivity analysis. These regions were warped to each 
individual run’s native space, and the voxels belonging to each region were identified. The functional 
connectivity between each pair of regions was estimated as the average Pearson correlation value 
between the full time course of every voxel in the first region with that of every voxel in the second 
region. The estimations were organized in a connectivity matrix, and also included an estimation for 
each region paired with itself, serving as a measure of functional homogeneity within the region. 
 
2.3.? EEG Acquisition and Analysis 
2.3.1.? EEG Recording and Pre-processing. 
EEG was recorded with a 64-channel BrainAmp EEG system (Brain Products, Munich, Germany) at 
5000 Hz. Offline, the EEG was down-sampled to 250Hz and band-pass filtered between 1 Hz and 40 
Hz using a noncausal filter (2nd order butterworth Low and High pass, - 12 db/octave roll-off, computed 
linearly forward and backward, eliminating the phase shift, and with poles calculated each time to the 
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desired cut-off frequency). Infomax-based Independent Component Analysis (ICA) was applied to 
remove oculomotor and cardiac artefacts based on the channels with maximal amplitude, the 
topography, and time course of the ICA component. Bad electrodes were then interpolated using a 3-D 
spherical spline (Perrin et al., 1989) and the data was re-computed to the common average-reference. 
For the memory and the math condition, all 20 sec epochs of eyes closed were concatenated. Finally, 
the data were visually inspected and periods with remaining artefacts were marked and excluded from 
further analysis. 
 
2.3.2.? K-means clustering 
The free academic software Cartool was used for the microstate analysis (Brunet et al., 2011). A 
modified k-means cluster analysis (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994) was applied to the data of each subject 
and condition. Only maps at local maxima of the Global Field Power (GFP) entered the cluster analysis, 
as they represent time points of highest signal-to-noise ratio (Koenig and Brandeis, 2016). Polarity of 
the maps was ignored in the clustering. Cluster-analysis was applied in two steps: first on the data of 
each individual subject and condition, and then on the cluster maps derived from each subject within a 
condition. In order to determine the optimal number of clusters (both within and across subjects), 7 
criteria were used to evaluate independently the quality of each clustering. They were then merged 
together in order to derive a single synthetic meta-criterion (Custo et al., 2017). This improves 
confidence in the right estimation of the optimal number of clusters, as compared to previous work 
relying on a single criterion only (i.e. Cross-Validation criterion (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995) or the 
Krzanowski-Lai Index (Murray et al., 2008)). 
 
The following 7 criteria were taken from (Charrad et al., 2014; Krzanowski and Lai, 1988; Milligan and 
M. C.Cooper, 1985; Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995): 
1.?Gamma: An adaptation of Goodman and Kruskal, based on concordant vs. discordant clustered 
pairs. 
2.?Silhouettes: Evaluation of the consistency of each cluster through its goodness of fit. 
3.?Davies and Bouldin: A function of the sum of the ratio of within-cluster to between-cluster 
separation. 
4.?Point-Biserial: A point-biserial correlation calculated between the distance matrix and a binary 
cluster index. 
5.?Dunn: An evaluation of the goodness of separation of all clusters. 
6.?Krzanowski-Lai Index: A ratio of the relative difference of the within-clusters dispersion. 
7.?Cross-Validation: A modified version of the predictive residual variance. 
The meta-criterion was defined as the median of all optimal numbers of clusters across all criteria. The 
meta-criterion calculation is implemented in the free academic software Cartool 
(https://sites.google.com/site/cartoolcommunity/).  
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2.3.3.? Back-fitting 
The group cluster maps of a given condition were fitted back to the original EEG of each 
subject, including all data points (not only GFP peaks), except for periods that were marked as 
artefacts. Back-fitting means that the spatial correlation between the cluster maps and each 
individual data point was calculated and the data point was labelled with the cluster map that 
showed the highest correlation (winner takes all, see e.g. (Britz et al., 2010; Van De Ville et al., 
2010)). Note that the polarity of the maps was ignored in this back-fitting procedure. Data points 
where none of the cluster maps reached a correlation higher than 50% were labelled as “non-
assigned”. Once the whole recording was labelled, a temporal smoothing was applied by 
ignoring segments where a given cluster map was present for less than 4 time points (32ms) 
and the time points were split and assigned to the preceding and following cluster map. Two 
temporal parameters were then quantified for each recording of each subject: the mean duration 
a given cluster map (microstate) was present without interruption, and the number of times per 
second a given microstate appeared, independent of the duration – termed “occurrence” (Michel 
and Koenig, 2018). In addition, we analysed the syntax of EEG microstates by computing the 
probabilities from a single nth-previous state to the current one for each subject and transition 
pair and normalized it by all between-class transitions (Lehmann et al., 2005; Tomescu et al., 
2018).  
 
2.3.4.? EEG source localization 
In order to estimate the sources contributing to each of the microstates, we calculated a 
distributed linear inverse solution (LAURA) (Grave De Peralta Menendez et al., 2004). The 
lead field for the inverse solution was calculated for 64 electrode positions and the average 
brain of the Montreal Neurological Institute, in a grey matter-constrained head model using the 
LSMAC head model with 5000 distributed solution points (Brunet et al., 2011). A 
standardization across time was applied for each solution point in order to eliminate activation 
biases (SI Appendix, SMethod). The estimated current densities of each subject were then 
averaged across all time points that were attributed to a given microstate in each condition.  
 
2.3.5.? Statistical analysis 
The cluster maps derived for each of the three conditions (rest, memory and math) were ordered 
according to their highest spatial correlation across conditions, and labelled according to the 
canonical microstate maps described in the literature (Michel and Koenig, 2018). In order to 
evaluate whether the microstate maps with the same labels were generated by similar networks, 
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we compared the estimated sources of each cluster map between the three conditions. For that, 
paired t-tests were calculated for each solution point across subjects and Bonferroni-corrected 
for multiple testing. 
To investigate differences in the temporal dynamics (duration, occurrence) of the microstates 
between conditions we performed repeated measure ANOVAs with the factors “condition” 
(rest, math, memory) for each microstate class. We applied a threshold of p<.0001 to correct 
for multiple testing and performed post-hoc comparisons only if this threshold was reached.  
 
3.?Results 
3.1.? Instructed thoughts modulate fMRI networks. 
To identify changes in brain activity across different brain regions during the two task-initiated, self-
generated processing conditions (math and memory), fALFF values were mapped (Zou et al., 2008), 
serving as a model-free measure of local BOLD activity (Biswal, 2012). Having obtained a fALFF 
estimate for each brain voxel of each fMRI run and participant, these values were then compared 
between conditions on the group level. Condition-specific fALFF changes were found for several 
cortical and subcortical brain regions. The regions with significantly higher brain activity during the 
memory compared to the math condition (Fig. 2a) included areas in the parietal, the medial temporal, 
the prefrontal and occipital lobes. We found dominant activity in the lateral part of the parietal lobe: 
bilaterally the supramarginal gyrus (lrSMG, BA40) and the right angular gyrus (rAG, BA39) of the 
inferior parietal lobe (IPL). Activity was also found in the medial part of the parietal lobe: the left 
precuneus (lPCu, BA7), the dorsal part and the ventral part of the posterior cingulate cortex/retrosplenial 
cortex (dPCC, BA31; vPCC/RSc, BA23. In the temporal lobe we found bilaterally-increased activity in 
the parahippocampal gyri (lrPHG, BA28,35,36) and the right inferior temporal gyrus (rITG, BA21). 
Significant activity was also found in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG, BA45), and bilaterally in the 
lateral occipital gyri (lrLOCG, BA19). When comparing the fALFF estimates in these brain regions to 
the non-instructed rest condition (considered as baseline) we found that some of the memory-math 
differences were due to a stronger increase in BOLD activity during the memory compared to math 
condition (areas included lrPHG and dPCC), while other changes were due to increased BOLD activity 
during the memory and decreased BOLD activity during the math conditions. Areas de-activated during 
math compared to rest included rAG, lrSMG, lrLOCG, lPCu and vPCC/RSc. (Fig. 2b). Conversely, we 
also identified a set of brain areas significantly more active during the math compared to the memory 
condition: in the frontal lobe, significantly higher activity was found in the ventral and dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex and bilaterally in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Areas in the temporal lobe included 
bilaterally the superior temporal gyrus and the left middle temporal gyrus. In the parietal cortex, 
significantly higher activity was found in the right intraparietal sulcus and the pre/post central gyrus as 
well as the dorsal posterior cingulate cortex. In the occipital cortex the occipital gyrus was activated 
bilaterally. In contrast to the above observation of areas de-activated during math (compared to the rest 
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condition), none of the areas with significantly higher activity in the math condition were actually de-
activated during the memory condition (SI Appendix, Figs. S2a and S2b).  
To determine condition-specific networks, we further analysed, in terms of their functional 
connectivity, the brain regions that demonstrated significant BOLD activity changes between 
the memory and math conditions, as identified by the fALFF analysis. These connectivity 
values were organized in matrices, and the regions were re-ordered according to their 
correlation profiles. The connectivity analysis revealed two distinct networks within the regions 
that displayed stronger activity during the memory condition (Figs. 2c and 2d). Network I. 
included the vPCC/RSc, lrPHG, lrOCG, rITG and lPCu, while network II. comprised the rIFG, 
rAG, lrSMG, and dPCC. Compared to the non-instructed rest condition, both networks 
displayed strong increases in connectivity amidst their respective regions, while remaining 
uncorrelated to each other and to the areas identified in the math condition. 
 
Fig. 2. Memory-specific changes in fMRI activity and fMRI functional connectivity memory sub-
networks. A. fMRI fALFF analysis. T-test of fALFF for memory > math condition revealed stronger 
activity in lrSMG, rAG, lrLOCG, lPCu, dPCC, vPCC/RSc, lrPHG, rITG, rIFG. T-score threshold: 
T>2.20; FDR-corrected for multiple comparisons (5%). B. Areas of stronger activity in the memory, 
compared to math condition. Some of the memory-math differences were due to a stronger increase 
in BOLD activity during the memory than the math condition relative to rest, while other changes were 
due to increased BOLD activity during the memory and decreased BOLD activity during the math 
conditions relative to rest. C. Connectivity analysis. Network I. included the vPCC/RSc, lrPHG, 
lrOCG, rITG and lPCu, which we called “scene-reconstruction subsystem”. Network II. comprised the 
rIFG, rAG, lrSMG, and dPCC, called “self-experience subsystem”. D. Sub-networks of the 
connectivity analysis. Regions were also projected onto a surface template for better visualization. 
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3.2.? Instructed thoughts modulated the temporal dynamics of specific EEG microstates.  
A k-means cluster analysis was first applied to each individual subject and then across subjects within 
each condition. While the optimal number of clusters varied between subjects, the meta-criterion 
determined 6 clusters as the optimal number in the clustering across subjects for each condition. The 
topographies of these six maps were strikingly similar between the three conditions and resembled those 
previously described in the literature (Michel and Koenig, 2018). We ordered the microstate maps 
according to their highest spatial correlation across conditions (i.e. math, memory, rest) and labelled 
them from A-F states (Custo et al., 2017; Michel and Koenig, 2018) (Fig. 3a). Statistical comparison of 
the underlying brain sources that generated these microstates indicated similar networks between the 
corresponding maps in the three conditions (SI Appendix, Table S1). We then fitted the maps back to 
the original EEG of each participant and labelled each time point with the microstate that had highest 
spatial correlation (Fig. 3b). This procedure allowed us to determine the mean duration of each 
microstate in the three conditions, and how often the microstates occurred independent of their duration. 
ANOVA analyses for each microstate revealed that two states (i.e. microstates C and D) 
significantly differed in their duration and occurrence depending on the condition (Fig. 3c) and 
one state (i.e. microstate B) significantly differed in its occurrence (Fig. 3d). Microstate B was 
specific to the memory condition as it significantly increased in occurrence compared to the 
math as well as to the rest conditions (both p<0.0001). Microstate C significantly decreased in 
duration and occurrence in the math condition as compared to both, the memory and the rest 
conditions (both p<0.001). Finally, microstate D was specific to the math condition as it 
significantly increased in occurrence and duration compared to the memory (p<0.001) and the 
rest (p<0.0001) conditions. 
? ????
 
Fig. 3. Temporal dynamics of EEG microstates.  
A. The six microstates identified by k-means cluster analysis across subjects in the three conditions 
(rest, memory and math). B. A representative period of 10-sec EEG with eyes closed after picture 
presentation is shown (traces of 64 electrodes and Global Field Power (GFP) trace). Back-fitting the 6 
microstate maps derived from the cluster analysis shows the chunking of the EEG into segments of 
various durations covered by one of the microstate maps (indicated by different colors). C. Mean and 
standard error of the duration of each of the microstates in each condition. Post-hoc tests were performed 
when the ANOVA revealed significant condition differences at p<0.0001. This was the case for 
microstate map C and map D: Microstate C was significantly shorter and microstate D significantly 
longer in the math condition compared to memory and rest. D. Occurrence of the six microstates in the 
three conditions (number of microstates per second). Significant ANOVAs were found for microstates 
B, C, and D. As for the duration, microstate C occurred less and microstate D more often in the math 
condition compared to rest and memory. Concerning microstate B, an increased occurrence was found 
for memory compared to math and rest.  
 
3.3.? Sources of EEG microstates.  
To estimate networks underlying each microstate we inverted the original data of each subject into 
source space using a distributed linear inverse solution (Grave De Peralta Menendez et al., 2004), as 
described in the Methods. We then averaged the estimated activity across all time points that were 
labelled with the same microstate maps for each subject and each condition. The brain regions 
underlying the six microstate maps confirmed and extended previous efforts (Custo et al., 2017) in 
source localization of microstates (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Figures 3-5). Specifically, microstate A 
showed left-lateralized activity in the superior temporal gyrus (STG), the medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC) and the OCG. Microstate B showed main activity in OCG and in the medial part of the parietal 
cortex in the PCu/RSc. The sources of microstate C were located bilaterally in the lateral part of the 
parietal cortex including both the SMG and AG. The sources of microstate D showed main activity 
bilaterally in the IFG, dACC, and superior parietal lobule (SPL)/intraparietal sulcus (IPS). Strongest 
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activity for microstate E was found in the right MPFC. Finally, microstate F showed bilateral activity in 
the MPFC.  
 
Fig. 4. Source localization of EEG microstates. The EEG of each participant and condition were 
subjected to a distributed linear inverse solution and standardized across time. The source maps of all 
time points that were labelled with the same microstate map were then averaged within participants. The 
mean sources across subjects in the memory condition are illustrated here (for individual source maps 
per condition see SI Appendix, SFigs. 3-5). Areas with activity above 95 percentiles are shown. Notice 
the strong activity of the superior parietal lobe for microstate C (strong presence in memory and rest) 
and the frontoparietal activity for microstate D (strong presence in math).  
 
3.4.? Transition between memory-related subnetworks.  
To determine whether the brain alternates between the two dominating microstates in the memory 
condition (microstates B and C), we calculated the transition probabilities (normalized by the 
occurrence) between microstate B and C and compared them to all other possible transitions. We found 
that specifically and only in the memory condition, the transition from microstate C to microstate B was 
significantly more frequent than the transition from any other state and that microstate B transitioned 
significantly more often to microstate C than to any other state (Fig. 5). Likewise, microstate C was 
significantly more often followed by microstate B than microstates A, D or E, but not F.  
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Fig. 5. Markov chain transition probabilities. We calculated the transition probabilities from each 
microstate to any other using Markov chains. The observed probabilities were divided by the expected 
probabilites to account for the variability in occurrence of the states. In the memory condition, we found 
that microstate B was significantly more often preceded (A) and followed (B) by microstate C than any 
of the other microstates. This transition behavior was not found during rest or when participants 
performed mental arithmetic operations.  
 
4.? Discussion 
By using fMRI and EEG in a paradigm where participants were instructed to focus their 
thoughts on specific tasks, we here provide direct evidence of capturing the temporal 
occurrence of specific large-scale brain networks that are involved in self-related and self-
unrelated thoughts. In line with previous task-related studies (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2014; Axelrod et al., 2017), the fMRI data revealed that thinking about self-
experienced past events boosted a brain network known to be related to autobiographic episodic 
memory, while performing mental arithmetic enhanced a network known to be involved in 
attention and cognitive control. Intriguingly, the EEG analysis showed that the different 
conditions produced modulations in the occurrence and duration of brief, sub-second episodes 
of stable configuration of the brain electric field (the EEG microstates). Source localization of 
these episodes revealed networks that spatially coincided to those observed with fMRI. 
Crucially, in this study, we sought to build upon previous fMRI work that applied experimental 
designs with faster alternating conditions (each lasting for less than 30s) (Axelrod et al., 2017), 
to explore a design where all trials of each condition are grouped in an individual run lasting 
for several minutes. This allowed not only the study of changes in BOLD activity for each brain 
region (through fALFF analysis), but also the study of the interactions between those regions 
across time (through functional connectivity analysis) throughout the same condition – thereby 
shedding new light on the question of whether different functional regions that become active 
? ????
at the same time effectively share similar BOLD activity.  
The fALLF analysis confirmed and extended previous studies by revealing condition-specific BOLD 
changes in several cortical and subcortical brain regions. The regions with significantly higher brain 
activity during the memory, compared to the math condition, included the core brain areas of the 
episodic memory retrieval network (Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng and Grady, 2009; Svoboda et al., 2006) 
in the parietal, the medial temporal, the prefrontal and occipital lobes. Conversely, we also identified a 
set of brain areas more active during the math, compared to the memory condition, that have been 
previously associated to mental arithmetic tasks and frontoparietal control network (FPCN) in general 
(Fehr et al., 2007). 
The fMRI connectivity results revealed that the regions of increased fALFF were essentially 
organized in two subsystems with distinct functional and anatomical characteristics – highly 
correlated within themselves, but poorly correlated between each other. Network I. was 
strikingly similar to a previously described subsystem which becomes involved during 
constructions of mental scenes (hereafter termed “scene-reconstruction subsystem”), while 
network II. closely matched a previously defined subsystem which becomes active when 
participants engage in self-relevant cognitive processes and reflect on their current mental states 
(hereafter termed “self-experience subsystem”) (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014, 2010; Axelrod et 
al., 2017).  
Beyond the slower timescale of fMRI measures, the EEG microstate analysis revealed new 
insights into the temporal dynamics of these networks in the sub-second range. We found that 
specific EEG microstates, representing brief periods of coherent network activity, were 
selectively increased in duration and occurrence by the instructed thoughts. The brain regions 
generating these microstates overlapped with the specific fMRI networks. The network 
underlying microstate C, which occurred more often and lasted longer in the memory compared 
to the math condition, largely overlapped with the lateral parietal areas of the “self-experience” 
memory retrieval subnetwork that we identified in the fMRI analyses. On the other hand, the 
brain areas underlying microstate B, which selectively increased in occurrence during the 
memory condition, overlapped with the medial parietal and occipital areas of the “scene-
reconstruction” subnetwork that we detected in the fMRI analyses. Finally, brain areas 
underlying microstate D, which selectively increased in duration and occurrence in the math 
condition, included areas generally attributed to the frontoparietal control network (FPCN) 
(Ptak et al., 2017).  
Moreover, during memory retrieval, we found increased transitions between the microstates 
that corresponded to the “self-experience” and “scene-reconstruction” subnetworks in the fMRI 
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data. These results provide direct evidence that the RSNs captured by fMRI are tightly linked 
to, and possibly originated by, a prolongation and repeated occurrence of states of synchronized 
activity of specific large-scale neuronal networks, in the sub-second timescale. Most 
importantly, the EEG microstate analysis provides compelling evidence that these subnetworks 
are not activated at the same time, as concluded by Axelrod and colleagues (Axelrod et al., 
2017), but that they are sequentially and repeatedly activated over time in the sub-second range, 
supporting the different models of parcellation of cognition into different mind states (Baars, 
1997; Deco et al., 2011; Dehaene et al., 1998; Efron, 1970; Huys et al., 2014; James, 1890; 
Meehan and Bressler, 2012; Michel and Koenig, 2018; Rabinovich et al., 2001).  The fMRI 
connectivity results are in good agreement with this finding, showing a clear functional 
dissociation between the two memory subnetworks, albeit at the slower timescale of BOLD 
fluctuations, less directly related to the underlying neuronal activity. 
 
To capture the occurrence of any conscious experience, and to directly investigate the cognitive 
processes operating during mind-wandering, it is crucial to better control the spontaneous 
thoughts of participants (Koch, 2018; Kucyi et al., 2016). In line with other recent studies 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Axelrod et al., 2017; Delamillieure et al., 2010), we here initiated 
periods of spontaneous mentation with brief presentations of external stimuli and instructed 
participants to close their eyes and internally direct their thoughts to either self-related 
photographs or self-unrelated arithmetic operations. The main regions that showed increased 
BOLD activity in the memory condition comprise the IPL and MTL structures. Numerous 
studies have previously identified these regions as the core of the episodic memory retrieval 
network (Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng and Grady, 2009; Svoboda et al., 2006). Traditionally, 
since the discovery of densely amnesic patients, the MTL structures have been regarded as 
essential for long-term memory formation, allowing us to remember past experiences and to 
retrieve acquired knowledge (Moscovitch et al., 2016; Steinvorth et al., 2005). In contrast to 
the MTL structures, extensive evidence from patient lesion and brain stimulation studies 
suggests that the IPL plays a key role in integrating vivid details of personally experienced 
events into conscious representations during memory retrieval (Berryhill et al., 2007; Simons 
et al., 2010). The subjective experience of perceiving a scene, recognizing a face, hearing a 
sound or reflecting on the experience itself presents a complex interplay between memory, 
attention and consciousness (Corbetta and Shulman, 2011; Tononi et al., 2016). Tulving 
(Tulving, 1985) defined the underlying ability to re-experience the subjective sense of self in 
the past and to mentally project oneself into the future, i.e. the autonoetic consciousness, as the 
crucial aspect of episodic memory retrieval. Evidence across lesion studies, stimulation and 
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recording studies consistently point to the posterior regions, including temporal, parietal and 
occipital areas (“posterior hot zone”) as playing a direct role in specifying the contents of 
consciousness (Koch, 2018). Our current findings are also in line with a recent study (Bréchet 
et al., 2018) where we confirmed the contribution of the IPL, especially the AG, to the 
subjective, first-person perspective re-experience of self-relevant, vivid past episodes. 
 
Brain activity constantly fluctuates in and out of different mental states that are stable for 
fractions of seconds. Only one epoch or state of conscious content can be considered at a time 
(Seth and Baars, 2005). It is assumed that the EEG microstates capture these states that last for 
around 100 milliseconds only (Baars, 2002; Changeux and Michel, 2004). Using high-density 
whole-brain EEG, we indeed observed modulations of duration, occurrence, and transitions 
between particular microstates by the instructed thoughts, microstate B and C being increased 
in the memory condition and microstate D being increased in the math condition. The 
topographies of these three microstates strongly resemble three of the four canonical 
microstates previously described in the literature (for reviews see (Khanna et al., 2015; Michel 
and Koenig, 2018)). Studies on large cohorts showed that microstate C is generally the most 
dominant state during eyes-closed rest (Koenig et al., 2002; Tomescu et al., 2014). Recently, 
Seitzman et al. (Seitzman et al., 2016) showed that microstate C decreases in duration and 
occurrence during a mental arithmetic task, similar to our findings. Decrease of microstate C 
duration has also been described when subjects are engaged in object or verbal visualization 
tasks compared to rest (Milz et al., 2016). Based on these and other studies, it is assumed that 
microstate C reflects activity in the DMN (Custo et al., 2017; Milz et al., 2016; Panda et al., 
2016; Seitzman et al., 2016); for a discussion, see (Michel and Koenig, 2018). Indeed, our 
analysis of the sources underlying this microstate confirms such interpretation. The sources of 
microstate C were located bilaterally in the lateral part of the parietal lobe and MTG, areas that 
we attributed in the fMRI results to the “self-experience subsystem”. The observation that 
microstate C is not significantly boosted by the memory condition compared to rest is not 
surprising. It confirms the assumption that self-relevant memory retrieval also predominates 
during spontaneous mind wandering.  
 
Moreover, our investigation revealed that microstate B increased in occurrence during the 
memory as compared to both rest and math conditions. This state has been previously attributed 
to the visual network (Britz et al., 2010; Custo et al., 2017, 2014). For example, Milz and 
colleagues (Milz et al., 2016) showed that microstate B increased when participants were asked 
to visualize previously presented images. Source localization in our study also indicated strong 
? ????
activation of the visual cortex together with medial parietal areas. Intriguingly, lesions to the 
medial parietal cortex cause memory recognition and visuospatial impairments, but no 
impairments related to self-consciousness (Davidson et al., 2010). We thus interpret the 
increased occurrence of microstate B as related to the “scene-reconstruction subsystem” found 
in the fMRI connectivity analysis. An intriguing assumption is therefore that the microstate 
analysis allows us to disentangle the sub-parts of thoughts related to the conscious experience 
of an episodic autobiographic memory, i.e. visualization of the scene and visualization of the 
self in the scene. Indeed, the transition probability analysis revealed a more frequent switching 
between microstate B and C than between any other state. 
 
Additionally, our results show that while both microstates B and C are less frequently appearing 
when participants are engaged in math calculations, microstate D strongly increases in duration 
and occurrence during this condition. Microstate D has previously been attributed to the 
attention/cognitive control network including frontoparietal areas (Britz et al., 2010; Custo et 
al., 2017) and our source localization of microstate D confirmed the attribution of this state to 
the frontoparietal control network (FPCN) (Ptak et al., 2017). Furthermore, the observation of 
increase of microstate D and decrease of microstate C fits very well to the observation that the 
FPCN and the DMN are inversely activated when participants are engaged in external-directed 
and self-directed cognition (Dixon et al., 2018).  Therefore, we show that the large-scale 
network anti-correlation found in the fMRI data is associated with sub-second modulation of 
the presence of microstates sub-serving these functions.  
 
EEG microstate studies have repeatedly revealed changes of the temporal dynamics of 
microstates in mental disease, particularly schizophrenia (for reviews see (Khanna et al., 2015; 
Michel and Koenig, 2018)). The most robust finding, confirmed in a recent meta-analysis 
(Rieger, 2016), is an increase in duration and occurrence of microstate C and a decrease of 
microstate D in patients with schizophrenia (Koenig et al., 1999; Lehmann et al., 2005) or at 
risk to develop schizophrenia (Andreou et al., 2014; Tomescu et al., 2014), a disequilibrium 
that is normalized when patients are treated with antipsychotic medication (Kikuchi et al., 2007)  
and with rTMS (Sverak et al., 2018). These findings correspond well to the interpretation that 
microstate C reflects introspective, self-focused thoughts, while microstate D reflects attention 
and cognitive control. An increase of microstate C and decrease of microstate D in 
schizophrenia might index the progressive detachment of mental states from environmental 
input. While a healthy person constantly and effortlessly balances periods of rest with periods 
of focused attention when interacting with their surroundings, patients with schizophrenia or 
? ????
other mental disorders may persist on thinking about a particular unpleasant event that involves 
themselves and lose control over the natural flow of the wandering mind. Understanding the 
functional significance of microstates with studies as the one presented here might thus not only 
be relevant for monitoring the vulnerability of patients at risk for mental disease and the effects 
of treatment, but also for better understanding the thoughts that these patients are caught in. 
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Supplementary Method 
EEG source localization normalization: After the inverse solution matrix has been applied to 
the ongoing EEG at each time point, a standardization of the estimated current density across 
time was applied to each solution point. As a matter of fact, substantial variability of power is 
observed across solution points when localizing the sources on ongoing (non-averaged) EEG 
in individual subjects. These variations are supposed to come from geometrical and 
mathematical approximations that are done during the inverse matrix calculation. It is thus 
necessary to find a way to correct for this power variability, in order to correctly estimate the 
fluctuations of brain activity over time in individual subjects and to compare them between 
? ????
subjects (Supplementary Figure, Fig. S1). 
The main idea here is to use the background activity of the norm of the inverse solution over 
time to estimate a baseline and a scaling factor for each solution point. In order to have a robust 
estimation, a large enough time sample should be used, preferably the whole recording as it was 
done in this study. Still, the correction factors can be satisfactorily computed on as little as a 
thousand time points, as long as no solution point remains in the same stable state more than 
half of the sampled time. 
Here is a step-by-step description of this specialized standardization: 
Given a 3D dipole ????? ???? ???? at a given solution point ??, we define ??? as the squared 
value of its norm (Equ. 1). It therefore follows a Chi-square distribution of degree 3 for the 
noisy part of the data. The Chi-square variable ??? can be transformed into a normally 
distributed variable ??? (Equ. 2) (12). Having now a normal distribution, it can be standardized 
into ??? by using the regular z-transform (Equ. 3). However, the values of ? and ? used for the 
z-transform have to be calculated only on the noisy part of the data - the background activity 
from the Chi-square i.e. the lowest values of the distribution. Hence ? is estimated from the 
left-most Mode of the ??? distribution (Equ. 4). For the same reason, ? is estimated from the 
Median of Absolute Deviation (MAD), centred on the previously estimated ?, and computed 
only with the values below ? (Equ. 5). Implementation-wise, these estimators are computed 
multiple times on random sub-samplings of the data, and the two respective medians of all these 
estimators are finally taken. 
Finally, because we started with positive data (the norm of a dipole), we also wish to end up 
with positive data, as to avoid any confusion due to having signed results. We define ???? as 
??? shifted by 3 standard deviations to the right, then divided by 3 so that the background mode 
is finally aligned to 1 (Equ. 6). 
 
??? ? ???? ? ???? ? ????       (Equ. 1) 
??? ? ???? ?? ?
? ??         (Equ. 2) 
??? ? ???? ? ????? ?????        (Equ. 3) 
???? ? ?????????????       (Equ. 4) 
???? ? ????????????       (Equ. 5) 
???? ? ?????????? ? ?????? ??      (Equ. 6) 
 
The result of this standardization procedure is comparable power of the current density across 
? ????
all solution points, and a normal distribution of the solution points (Supplementary Figure, Fig. 
S1). 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S1. Source localization standardization. A. is the time series (horizontal axis) of 3 solution points 
(vertical axis), showing the difference in power range between them. C. is the histograms of these 3 
solution points, showing that the background activity is the left-most mode of the distribution. E. is the 
histograms for all solution points (vertical axis), with the red color coding for the maximum probability. 
B. is the same time series as in A but after standardization, showing that the 3 solution points now have 
the same range. D. is the histograms after standardization, showing that all the background activity has 
been centered to 1. F. is all histograms after standardization, showing that all solution points now have 
a background range from 0 to 1, while retaining their respective highest activities. 
 
? ????
 
Fig. S2. Math-specific changes in fMRI activity and fMRI functional connectivity networks. 
A. fMRI fALFF analysis. T-test of fALFF for math > memory condition revealed stronger activity in 
a set of brain areas. In the frontal lobe, significantly higher activity was found in the ventral and dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (vACC, BA24; dACC, BA32), and bilaterally in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (lrDLPFC, BA46). Areas in the temporal lobe included bilaterally the superior temporal gyrus 
(lrSTG, BA22), the left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG, BA21), and the right opercular cortex/insula 
(rOper/Ins, BA45). In the parietal cortex, significantly higher activity was found in the right intraparietal 
sulcus (rIPS, BA7) and the pre/post central gyrus (Pre/PostCG, BA3,1) and dorsal posterior cingulate 
cortex (dPCC, BA30). The occipital findings concerned the occipital gyrus bilaterally (OCG, BA19). T-
score maths > memory threshold: T>2.20; FDR-corrected for multiple comparisons (5%). B. Areas of 
stronger activity in the math, compared to memory condition. In contrast to the above observation 
of areas de-activated during math (compared to the rest condition), none of the areas with significantly 
higher activity in math compared to memory were actually de-activated during the memory condition. 
C. Connectivity analysis. The connectivity analysis revealed two distinct networks within the regions 
that had displayed stronger activity during the math condition: network III included the OCG, lrSTG, 
rOper/Ins and Pre/PostCG, while network IV comprised the dACC, dPCC, lrDLPFC and vACC. Beyond 
their strong intrinsic connections, the two networks were also moderately connected to each other, unlike 
what was observed for the memory-related networks. The lMTG and rIPS regions displayed no relevant 
correlations with any of the two networks, or with each other. D. Sub-networks of the connectivity 
analysis. The two identified networks were also projected onto a surface template for better 
visualization. 
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Fig. S3. Source localization of the six microstates during the rest condition. Sources are averaged 
across all time points that were labelled with the corresponding map and averaged across subjects. Areas 
with activity above 95 percentiles are shown. 
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Fig. S4. Source localization of the six microstates during the memory condition. Sources are 
averaged across all time points that were labelled with the corresponding map and averaged across 
subjects. Areas with activity above 95 percentiles are shown. 
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Fig. S5. Source localization of the six microstates during the math condition. Sources are averaged 
across all time points that were labelled with the corresponding map and averaged across subjects. Areas 
with activity above 95 percentiles are shown. 
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Table S1. Result of the T-test across subjects of the sources derived for each microstate in each of the 
three conditions. Significance values and maximal T-values are given. Note that in general the sources 
of the microstates with the same label are not significantly different, while the sources of different 
microstates are. An exception is microstate D and E in the comparison of the math vs. the rest condition. 
In this case all significantly different solution points for microstate D were located in the superior frontal 
gyrus where stronger activity was found in the rest condition. 
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3? General Discussion 
 
3.1? Summary of the main findings 
Here, I will first summarize the main findings of the four studies included in this thesis and 
address some of the open issues. I will integrate results from the studies into a larger context of 
the recent cognitive neuroscience research and include a short discussion about theories of self-
consciousness. I will conclude this chapter by suggesting how future work could incorporate 
the findings from my thesis to the recent clinical work on memory prosthesis and enhancement.   
 
3.1.1? Bodily-self effect on episodic autobiographical memory (study 1)  
In the first study (study 1) we investigated how an integration of visual and proprioceptive, 
multisensory bodily cues influence long-term episodic autobiographical memory. We have 
showed that the episodic memory for real life-like events may be specifically manipulated by 
the self-related, bodily cues. This study drew us to make three main conclusions: First, our VR 
setting enabled us to measure objective memory recognition for real life-like scenes that are 
immersive and integrating the moving physical body of the participants into these scenes. The 
VR setting approached naturalistic, real life-like and subjective experiences, yet in a controlled 
laboratory-based environment. Second, we showed that memory recognition is time-dependent 
and further relies on the number of changed items between encoding and retrieval. Third, our 
data revealed that viewing one’s own physical body as part of the VR scene during encoding 
enhanced memory retrieval. Importantly, this body-specific effect was not observed when no-
body was presented or when a control object replaced the body. Thus, we argue that embodied 
views lead to body-related performance changes, as described in studies investigating features 
of bodily self-consciousness. To conclude, in this study we argue that the experience of the 
physical bodily-self is intrinsically linked to the autobiographical-self.  
 
3.1.2? The self-experience in bodily consciousness and memory (study 2) 
In the second study (study 2) we examined how the self-related, multisensory cues from one’s 
own body relate to the subjective re-experiencing of past events, which are usually retrieved 
from a viewpoint and location similar to encoding. We have shown that episodic 
autobiographical memory is not only functionally, but also anatomically overlapping with 
bodily self-consciousness. The present study allowed us to make two major conclusions: First, 
we show an anatomical overlap bilaterally in the angular gyrus between bodily self-
? ????
consciousness and episodic autobiographical memory. Multisensory cues about the body, such 
as proprioception or viewpoint, are usually present during the encoding of personal events. 
Therefore, we argue that these bodily signals are relevant not only to the bodily self-
consciousness, but also to episodic autobiographical memory. Second, we found no anatomical 
overlap between bodily self-consciousness and semantic autobiographical memory. Consistent 
with the prior literature that shows that the angular gyrus represents a heterogeneous area 
comprising functionally and anatomically distinct sub-regions (Daselaar et al., 2013; 
Hutchinson et al., 2014), we found that semantic autobiographical memory does not 
anatomically overlap with bodily self-consciousness in lateral parietal cortex. Therefore, we 
argue that the parietal regions are associated differently with episodic and semantic memories, 
especially because semantic autobiographical memory is independent of re-experiencing 
conscious, vivid and multi-modal life episodes. To conclude, this study suggests that the 
conscious re-experiencing of past events and the conscious experience of being located and 
experiencing the world from first-person perspective depend on the lateral parietal cortex 
region. Especially, the angular gyrus seems to be involved in processing both the bodily self-
consciousness and episodic autobiographical memories. Therefore, we suggest that the angular 
gyrus may be the key structure for neural processing related to self-consciousness.  
 
3.1.3? Retroactive effect of the bodily-self on episodic memory (study 3) 
In the third study (study 3) we explored how the bodily self-related cues, particularly the 
presence or absence of one’s own physical body from first-person perspective influence the 
retroactive and selective memory for conceptually related information. We have shown that 
seemingly insignificant everyday details of neutral real life-like events can be retroactively 
enhanced, if future conceptually related details acquire significance by the presence of one’s 
own physical body. We have made two major conclusions in this study: First, we replicate our 
first study, in which we showed that the presence of one’s own physical body enhances the 
memory for real-life like events. Instead of using inside rooms, which we have used as our VR 
paradigm in the study 1, here we have created a novel VR paradigm consisting of outside scenes 
into which we immersed our participants during the memory stages of encoding and retrieval 
in order to test the memory performance. Second, we demonstrate that one’s own physical body 
selectively and retroactively strengthens memory recognition for items from real life-life 
events. This result confirms and extends previous studies (Dunsmoor et al., 2015; Patil et al., 
2017) by showing that the presence of one’s own physical body retroactively enhances memory 
for real life-like events and that b.) the retroactive memory enhancing can be generalized to 
? ????
conceptually related items encoded in real life-like scenes. To conclude, we show that 
multisensory bodily self-related cues can significantly modify the re-prioritization, i.e. memory 
is retained if any information may become relevant in the future, which is a process involving 
the post-encoding memory consolidation (Tambini et al., 2010, 2017; Tambini and Davachi, 
2013; Tompary et al., 2015).  
 
3.1.4? Task-initiated spontaneous thoughts with EEG and fMRI (study 4) 
In the fourth study (study 4) we examined the temporal structure of self-generated cognition, 
which is a key attribute to the formation of a meaningful stream of consciousness. Recent fMRI 
studies suggested that functionally distinct subsystems of the default mode network are 
activated at the same time during task-initiated self-generated processing, seemingly in 
contradiction with overwhelming evidence that information processing evolves through a 
stream of discrete conscious units. We used ultra-high field functional magnetic resonance 
imaging and high-density electroencephalography to analyze the continuous thoughts of 
participants, who were instructed to retrieve self-relevant past events. EEG microstate analysis 
allowed us to examine these short-lasting (i.e. milliseconds scale) participant-focused thoughts. 
The fMRI data confirmed that distinct subnetworks of the DMN are concurrently activated 
during episodic memory retrieval; however, these subnetworks were markedly separate based 
on their functional connectivity. Crucially, the EEG microstate analysis showed that these 
functional networks are temporally parsed. Our findings support an increasing evidence that 
particular fMRI networks can be observed with EEG microstate method as re-occurring, 
integrated short-lasting periods of synchronized neuronal activity, which last fractions of 
seconds. To conclude, we argue that our results offer direct evidence that the resting state 
networks captured by fMRI are closely linked to repeated occurrence and prolongation of 
mental states of synchronized neuronal activity as demonstrated by EEG microstates.  
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3.2? Conclusion and Outlook for future work 
 
3.2.1? Can amnesic patients have a conscious sense of self? 
The inner self exists uniquely as a conscious mental state of each person, who is the only one 
who can access this state. An observer may distinguish various conscious states of others, but 
the “self-experience of how it feels” is restricted to the inner self of the involved person. As 
James (1890) described, “when I wake up, I do not have to question “who am I”, because I still 
have my own thoughts that seem to be continuous and represent my personal past.” One may 
assume that others have similar inner experiences, but nobody else can directly experience the 
inner self of others. Consciousness is detectable in behavior of others, but none of the 
neuroimaging techniques can fully read the mind of private thoughts (Lee and Kuhl, 2016; 
Wang et al., 2017). Some philosophers and neuroscientists have argued that without memory, 
we lack the sense of self and our personal identity. Our sense of self includes the story of our 
past and imagining the future (Tulving, 1985). Ascribing consciousness to those who cannot 
talk about their experiences, such as infants (Kouider et al., 2013) or severely brain injured 
patients (Owen et al., 2008), is more difficult. What about the amnesic patient H.M. - did he 
have a sense of self? Corkin (2013) clearly stated that “There is no doubt that Henry did have 
a sense of self, even though it was a fragmented one.” Patient H.M. was missing the pieces to 
retrieve any self-relevant experiences or imagine his future, due to his inability to mentally 
travel in personal time. He lost his ability to remember. Despite his amnesia, he had a sense of 
self, he remained friendly and intelligent. Patient H.M.’s sense of identity was based on his 
general knowledge about the world, yet he still had his own beliefs and values. This is in 
agreement with the studies presented in this thesis. Particularly, in studies 1, 2 and 3 I have 
argued that the subjective re-experiencing of past events is usually described as from a 
viewpoint and location similar to encoding. When patient H.M. was asked about his age, he 
often missed it by decades and his knowledge about his physical look was full of gaps. Yet, 
when he looked into the mirror, he seemed to accept the person he saw looking back at him. In 
the introduction of this thesis, I have presented a study during which patient H.M. was able to 
recognize a set of complex pictures, based on his sense of familiarity without explicitly recalling 
having seen them. The declarative memory of patient H.M. was deficient, yet he was left with 
a vague sense of familiarity that helped him to cope with his amnesia. I would argue that the 
preserved sense of familiarity corresponds well to the intact parietal regions of patient H.M.  
 
? ????
3.2.2? Discrete states of self and their manipulation  
Patient H.M. lived 55 years without any possibility to mentally travel consciously back in time 
or project himself in the future, he was fully trapped in the present moment of his short-term 
memory span, lasting 30 seconds. When we watch a movie, an entire lifetime can be presented 
continuously in two hours without anyone feeling that something is missing. Patient H.M. could 
not construct a continuous autobiography of his own life, because he was not able to create and 
store any new long-lasting memories. Our long-term memories are critical for survival; 
however, memories often keep us locked into the identities we have created for ourselves. We 
replay moments and events that happened before and imagine what might happen in the future, 
becoming wrapped in emotions and anxieties of these possible events. In study 4, I have 
presented the analysis of EEG microstates, which suggest that the human brain does not process 
information continuously over time, but rather processes the information in distinct temporal 
epochs (Lehmann et al., 1998). The momentary experience of conscious awareness seems to be 
homogeneous and indivisible, yet the contents of consciousness are separable entities. In the 
study, we have argued that EEG microstates may indeed integrate the discrete, temporal units 
of conscious self-experience into a sequence of consciously experienced inner thoughts. 
 
Understanding the neuronal architecture that forms conscious experiences is one of the essential 
questions of neuroscience. Why are we conscious? Recent experimental studies have focused 
on establishing a link between subjective conscious experiences and measurable neuronal 
activity (e.g., Faivre et al., 2017; Park et al., 2016). “The easy problem” is to explain how our 
brains enable us to perform different tasks (e.g., recognizing sounds, describing our feelings, 
focusing our attention, making plans or performing movements), such as I examined in studies 
1, 2 and 3. “The hard problem” is to explain why we have subjective experiences at all. How 
can the human brain give rise to an inner, personal life? The brain generates experiences day 
after day. A number of researchers have tried to establish a theory of consciousness, such as the 
Global neuronal workspace (Dehaene et al., 1998) and Information Integration Theory (Tononi 
et al., 2016) that could predict under which conditions any particular system may have an 
experience.  
 
The Global neuronal workspace argues that consciousness emerges when workspace neurons 
from a number of a brain regions become co-activated from discrete spatio-temporal patterns 
of global activity. The network of neurons that transmits information is hypothesized to be 
situated in the frontal and parietal lobes. Once the information is transmitted on the network 
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and globally available, the information becomes available and a subject may become 
consciously aware of it. The Integrated information theory (Tononi et al., 2016) suggests that 
each experience has particular essential properties: intrinsic, existing only for the subject, 
structured and specific, distinct from any other conscious experience, unified and definite. In 
agreement with both the Global neuronal workspace and Integrated information theory, I have 
argued in study 4 that EEG microstates are the electrophysiological correlates of a global brain 
integration. The time window during which spatially distinct brain processes are accepted as a 
momentary EEG microstate lasts between 75 and 150ms (Koenig et al., 2002). Interestingly, a 
number of theories propose that consciousness may be parceled into discrete states lasting 
around 100 ms (Baars, 1997; Deco et al., 2011; Efron, 1970; Rabinovich et al., 2001). Thus, it 
seems intriguing to consider that the electrophysiological EEG microstates may reflect the 
building blocks of consciousness (Baars, 2002b; Changeux and Michel, 2004).  
 
A number of previous studies have tried to relate EEG microstates to the ongoing mental 
activity. For example, Seitzman and colleagues (2016) altered the temporal features of the 4 
canonical microstates by instructing their participants to either mentally subtract numbers or to 
spontaneously mind-wander. They found significant decrease in occurrence and duration of 
microstate C and increase in microstate D during mental calculation, supporting the hypothesis 
that this state is related to externally-oriented, attentional system. The study of Milz and 
colleagues (2016) showed an increase in microstate A while visualizing and microstate B while 
verbalizing. Thus, these studies show that the temporal dynamics of EEG microstates may be 
sensitive to instruction and changes in the content of spontaneous mentation. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that if EEG microstates are perceptive of the level of consciousness, then they 
should be modulated by changes of the state of mind. The study of Panda and colleagues (2016) 
recorded simultaneous EEG-fMRI while experienced participants meditated. This study 
showed that at rest, the meditators exhibited increased duration and occurrence of default mode 
network related microstate C, which further increased during meditation.  
 
A more precise definition of EEG microstates and further understanding of their functional role 
as well as clinical relevance is still needed. A recent meta-analysis on EEG microstates (Rieger, 
2016) showed that the default mode network-related microstate C increased in occurrence in 
patients with schizophrenia, who suffer from an exaggerated sense of self. Contrary to 
schizophrenia, reduced occurrence of EEG microstate C has been observed in dementia patients 
(Nishida et al., 2013). Similarly, findings from fMRI studies show that the default mode 
network connectivity increases in schizophrenic patients (Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012), 
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decreases in vegetative patients and coma and disappears in brain death (Vanhaudenhuyse et 
al., 2010). Therefore it seems that default mode network is involved in self-consciousness 
(Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2011). Does it mean that the self disappears once we die (Pereira 
et al., 2015)?  
 
3.3.3? Memory enhancement and memory prosthesis 
Autobiographical memories are the vivid and rich recollections of our lives, which essentially 
shape who we are (Tulving, 2002b). Loss of autobiographic memory, among the first symptoms 
reported by patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease (AD), is one of the most devastating 
conditions, which affects considerably the quality of everyday living. While non-invasive 
techniques are gradually allowing the theoretical examination of how memories are encoded 
and retrieved, the transition from basic science to clinical application is still highly challenging. 
AD is the leading cause of dementia, affecting approx. 50 million people world-wide. AD is 
also the leading cause of disability amongst older people and the 6th leading cause of death. 
Despite this enormous disease burden, therapeutic options are very limited. The neural circuitry 
of the brain’s memory network still keeps many mysteries. While there are pharmacological 
interventions that transiently improve cognitive function, there are no treatments that alter 
disease progression. Neuroimaging data are correlational and as such cannot provide direct, 
causal links between brain activity and memory performance. Similarly, neuropsychological 
studies often include unique symptoms of individual patients and thus require caution when 
making generalized conclusions. Thus, other non-invasive techniques may be better suited to 
overcome these limitations. As such, the development of a disease-modifying intervention 
would be of great clinical significance.  
 
Targeted non-invasive electromagnetic brain stimulation has been applied to directly enhance 
episodic memory in healthy participants. Wang and colleagues (2014) used multiple sessions 
of high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the posterior 
parietal cortex and demonstrated increased functional connectivity among cortical-
hippocampal network regions, including the precuneus, parahippocampal cortex, superior 
parietal cortex and left lateral parietal cortex. Furthermore, changes in fMRI connectivity were 
correlated with increase in associative memory (i.e. face-word cued recall) performance. The 
same group (Nilakantan et al., 2017) later tested the effects of multiple sessions rTMS and 
showed that the left lateral posterior parietal cortex targeted stimulation enhanced precise 
memory details (i.e. object-location memory task). Recent rTMS study (Wang et al., 2018) 
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revealed boosting of semantic memory representation and showed the impact of stimulation on 
the neural substrates of episodic memory. Thus, these facilitatory TMS studies suggest that this 
non-invasive technique may have an effect on deeply located hippocampal structures without 
any surgery.  
 
For the past two decades, neuroscientists have been treating neurological disorders with deep 
brain stimulation (Holtzheimer and Mayberg, 2011), an invasive technique in which electrodes, 
implanted into specific brain regions, send electrical impulses through targeted neural circuitry. 
More recently, there has been a gradual progress from using non-invasive TMS in an effort to 
target the right pathways and help the brain to restore past memories, however with inconsistent 
findings (Suthana and Fried, 2014).   Recently, researchers have aimed to develop a memory 
prosthesis brain implant to help patients suffering with memory loss. Ezzyat et al. (2017) used 
targeted electrical stimulation in epileptic patients with intracranial electrodes to modulate the 
neural encoding states and subsequent memory outcomes. They suggested that DBS treatment 
would improve its effectiveness if the electrical stimulation were applied as a response to 
particular brain states, i.e. closed-loop approach in which electrodes monitor brain activity and 
use stimulation centred on neural feedback. The authors emphasized that memory is a 
distributed network and as such the brain state of the healthy participant or patient, targeting 
the right place at the right time, is crucially important in showing the effect of memory 
improvement. First, they trained multivariate classifiers to identify the unique patterns of brain 
activity of subject-specific model that could predict whether encoded states would be later 
forgotten or remembered. For this, they developed a machine-learning algorithm to build a 
memory model suitable to each participant. It could read a patient’s neural response and even 
more specifically, change patterns of low- and high-frequency activity throughout the memory 
network during the initial presentation of words and as such predict how likely the participants 
would remember the words later during retrieval. Second, targeted stimulation during learning 
was applied to electrodes in the memory network nodes. The electrical stimulation enlarged the 
encoding state and recall if sent when the classifier reported low encoding efficiency. However, 
when applying the electrical stimulation when the classifier indicated high encoding efficiency, 
the memory recall was decreased. Thus, this study suggests that using brain-state decoding 
could increase the possibility to enhance memory. A year later, a similar study from the same 
group (Ezzyat et al., 2018) used the closed-loop system to stimulate the lateral temporal cortex 
during a memory task. By developing patient-specific, personalized, machine-learning models, 
the authors programmed their stimulator to deliver pulses only when memory was predicted to 
fail. Lateral temporal cortex stimulation enlarged the likelihood of recall by 15 per cent. Thus, 
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the authors concluded that by linking the brain stimulation to ongoing brain rhythms, they were 
able to reliably enhance memory. These results represent an early step towards novel 
technologies that could improve memory function in Alzheimer’s disease patients.  
 
Hampson et al. (2018) went a step further by demonstrating the first human implementation of 
a system for restoring memory function by means of the patient’s own hippocampal 
spatiotemporal neural memory codes. They used data from the memory task to understand the 
configurations of brain activity associated with individuals’ memory performances. Later, they 
made the device electrically stimulate similar brain activity in the participants while they 
performed further memory tasks. Memory performance improved by 35 per cent when using 
the correct stimulation pattern, while random stimulation impaired performance. In conclusion, 
this memory prosthesis was intended to bypass a damaged hippocampal part and deliver the 
correctly translated memory to the next brain area by giving small electric shocks to 
the hippocampus. The group envisions to restore the ability to create long-term memories by 
implanting silicon chips to mimic the signal processing that neurons perform when they are 
functioning properly in the brain, allowing to recall past experiences. 
 
A number of open questions arise from these recent studies and their results. Would using non-
invasive, rather than invasive, brain stimulation techniques find the same results? With regard 
to the studies presented in this thesis, how can this stimulation method ensure that people 
selectively remember what’s significant in real life-like rather than laboratory-based settings? 
How can we ensure that the right memories are enhanced? Would a replication in more patients 
and with diseases such as dementia show the same results? Is this the first step towards “a 
personal memory pacemaker”? Thus, more work is needed toward the long-term vision of 
restoring memory function. 
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3.3.4?    Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, self-consciousness has been considered by philosophers, psychiatrists, 
psychologists and recently also cognitive neuroscientists as one of the most astonishing 
characteristics of the human brain. Self and self-consciousness are difficult to define as they 
include a number of different concepts, such as physical self or autobiographical self (Damasio, 
1999; Riva, 2018). As described in the introduction, the fundamental aspects of the self and its 
link with the body, the so-called bodily self-consciousness, have been recently investigated 
(Blanke, 2012; Serino et al., 2015). Conscious experiences are not always specifically bound to 
here and now. The subjective experience of mentally travelling back in time or projecting 
oneself in the future has been associated with the autonoetic consciousness, which is the key 
feature of episodic autobiographical memory (Tulving, 1985). In this thesis, I have examined 
how the sense of bodily-self relates to the autobiographical sense of self. Furthermore, I have 
studied how to experimentally capture the brief periods of personal, inner conscious 
experiences. In order to investigate the underlying aspects of self-consciousness and its relation 
to memory and body, a number of cognitive neuroscience approaches, including virtual reality 
(VR), electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance (fMRI), have been 
employed in this thesis. Study 1 investigated how the presence or absence of multisensory 
bodily cues influence episodic autobiographical memory. In this study, we have used a novel 
immersive VR system in order to create highly controllable lab-based setting, which would 
imitate the naturalistic environment of everyday life events. Study 2 examined the neural 
mechanisms underlying the bodily and autobiographical self. In this study, we have combined 
the results from a recent publication of Ionta et al. (2011), which showed that the inferior 
parietal lobule was associated with some of the key aspects of the bodily self-consciousness, 
with a meta-analytically based investigation of episodic and semantic autobiographical 
memories. Study 3 explored the advantages of our immersive VR system to selectively and 
retroactively enhance episodic autobiographical memory. By manipulating the presence or 
absence of one’s own body, we reported changes in post-encoding memory consolidation. 
Study 4 applied the recent fMRI and EEG methods to capture the inner, personal conscious 
mentation. In this study, we have shown that it is possible to manipulate and enhance specific, 
inner thoughts. Finally, the long-term vision of the memory research should try to bridge the 
existing gap between basic and translational neuroscience by improving the early diagnosis, 
long-term treatment for the early stages of memory loss and modern technology which could 
produce meaningful gains in memory performance.  
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German             State Exam in German 
Latin, Classical Greek, Biblical Hebrew  
 
Teaching Assistant: 
 
2017-present       MOOC: Fundamentals of Biomedical Imaging: Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
2017-present       MOOC: Fundamentals of Biomedical Imaging: Ultrasounds, X-ray, positron 
                            emission tomography (PET) and applications  
2014-2016           MSc course, EPFL: Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience 
2014-2016           BSc course, EPFL: Neuroscience for Engineers 
 
Scientific Supervision:   
 
Title of the project                                   Type of Supervision                                 Length    
 
OHBM International Online Mentoring                   BSc and MSc Mentoring                              1.1.2018-present 
                        
“Retroactive Strengthening of Memory”                  BSc Project in Life Science                           8.8.-2.9.2016         
 
“Influence of exteroceptive and                                BSc Project in Life Science                           1.2-6.2. 2016                                   
interoceptive signals on the episodic memory”                                                                
                                                                       
“Self-Memories and Virtual Reality”                       MSc Project in Bioengineering                      16.2.-19.6.2015                               
 
“Influence of Body on Memory”                               High School visitor                                      12.9.-23.9.2015    
 
Institutional Responsibilities and Work Experience:   
 
2016                     Brain Stimulation and Imaging Meeting, Geneva, help with organization 
2016-2017            Scientific Guide at the Exposition “Pas de Panique", Geneva 
2015-2016            Managing The Recruiting System of Participants at Campus Biotech, Geneva 
2013                     fMRI operator training, Brain & Behavior Laboratory (BBL) 
2008-2009            Fairtrade committee, St. John’s College, Durham 
July 2008             Cambridge Scholars Network, Downing College, Cambridge- coordinator 
2007-2008            School of Theology, Tyndale House, Cambridge- internship, coordinator 
August 2007         Apologetics Course, Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge 
 
? ????
AWARDS: 
 
Selected Article highlighting               Campus Biotech             June, 2018        Geneva, Switzerland 
multi-modal (EEG-fMRI) imaging 
  
Best Oral Presentation                         Springer                           9.1. 2017          Champéry, Switzerland 
 
Membership: 
 
2018-                     member of The International Society for Brain Electromagnetic Topography  
2014-                     member of the Organization of Human Brain Mapping (OHBM) 
2013-                     member of the Swiss Society for Neuroscience (SSN) 
2013-                     member of the Swiss Psychological Society (SPS) 
2013-                     member of The British Psychological Society (MBPsS) 
2012-2013             Association des étudiants de Neuroscience de Genève (AENG) 
2012                       member of The British Psychological Society (BPS) 
2008-2009             Theology Network, Durham (UCCF) 
 
Journal Articles: 
 
Bréchet, L., Mange, R., Herbelin, B., Gauthier, B., Serino, A., Blanke, O. (2018). Viewing one’s 
body during encoding boosts episodic memory. Under review after 1st revision in PlosOne. 
Preprint published in:  bioRxiv, doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/318956. 
 
Bréchet, L., Grivaz, P., Gauthier, B., Blanke, O. (2018). Common recruitment of angular gyrus 
in episodic autobiographical memory and bodily self-consciousness. In press in Frontiers in 
Behavioral Neurosciences. Preprint published in: bioRxiv, doi: 
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/early/2018/06/14/345991.  
 
 
Bréchet, L., Brunet, D., Birot, G., Gruetter, R., Michel, CM, Jorge, J. (2018). Capturing the 
spatiotemporal dynamics of task-initiated thoughts with combined EEG and fMRI. Under 
review in Neuroimage. Preprint published in: bioRxiv, doi: 
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/early/2018/06/14/346346. 
 
 
Bréchet, L., Hausmann, S., Mange, R., Blanke, O., Serino, A. The Bodily Self Selectively and 
Retroactively Strengthens Episodic Autobiographical Memories During Post-Encoding 
Consolidation. (in preparation) 
 
Jorge, J., Bouloc, C., Bréchet, L., Michel, CM., Gruetter, R. (2018). Investigating the variability 
of cardiac pulse artifacts across heartbeats in simultaneous EEG-fMRI recordings: a 7T study. 
Under review in Neuroimage. 
 
Invited Talks and Oral Presentations:   
  
Title                                                      Type of Contribution                    Date                           Place  
 
Sixth Biennial Conference on Brain               Poster                                     24.-25.9.2018              Montreal, Canada 
Connectivity 
 
Limitless! Augmenting Brain Function           Poster                                     19.-21.8.2018              Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Human Brain Mapping Annual Meeting         Poster                                     17.-21.6. 2018             Singapore  
 
BBL/CIBM Research Day                              Poster                                     6.6.2018                      Geneva, Switzerland 
? ????
 
Swiss Society for Neuroscience                       Poster                                     9.2. 2018                     Zurich, Switzerland 
 
BMI-NCCR Synapsy Meeting                         Poster                                      24.-26.1. 2018             Geneva, Switzerland  
“Neurobiology of Mental Health” 
 
Alpine Brain Imaging Meeting                        Oral Presentation                   7.-11.1.2018               Champéry, Switzerland     
 
Brain and Mind Symposium                            Poster                                      16.-17.11.2017            Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Campus Biotech Human Neuroscience           Oral Presentation                  6.11.2017                   Geneva, Switzerland  
 
EEG-fMRI OHBM Symposium                      Poster                                      3.-4.11.2017               Bern, Switzerland 
 
Technical Institute CEITEC                            Invited talk  24.10.2017                  Brno, Czech Republic 
 
Brain Stimulation and Imaging Meeting          Poster                                       23-24.6.2017               Vancouver, Canada 
 
International Conference on Memory             Poster                                        17-22.7.2016              Budapest, Hungary 
 
Human Brain Mapping Annual Meeting         Poster                                        26.-30.6. 2016            Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Brain Stimulation and Imaging Meeting          help with organization              24-25.6.2016               Geneva, Switzerland 
 
LNCO Annual Retreat                                    Oral Presentation                    15-18.6.2016              Stresa, Italy  
 
The Brain Forum                                             Exhibitor & Poster                   26.-27.5. 2016             Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Campus Biotech Human Neuroscience           Oral Presentation                    2.5.2016                     Geneva, Switzerland  
 
Center for Neuroprosthetics Annual Retreat   Poster                                        25-26.1. 2016             Chamonix, France 
 
Swiss Society for Neuroscience                       Poster                                        23.1. 2016                  Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Alpine Brain Imaging Meeting                        Poster                                        11-16.1.2016              Champéry, Switzerland 
 
BMI-NCCR SYNAPSY: “Mechanisms           Poster                                       21-22.12.2015             Lausanne, Switzerland 
of Memory Consolidation, Reconsolidation 
and Extinction” 
 
Lemanic Neuroscience Annual Meeting         Poster                                        28.-29.8.2015              Diablerets, Switzerland 
 
Swiss Memory Workshop                                Poster                                        24-26.8.2015              Spiez, Switzerland 
 
An Interdisciplinary Summer School:             Oral Presentation                     21-27.6.2015              Aegina, Greece 
“The Social Self: How Social interactions        
shape body and self-representations” 
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